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Abstract 
 After facing a life-threatening situation (e.g., cardiac arrest), or a situation 
perceived as such, some people will report peculiar life-changing events known as 
“near-death experiences” (NDEs). These experiences, that typically include 
transcendental and mystical features (e.g., out-of-body experiences, meeting with 
deceased relatives), have aroused curiosity among lay people and scientists. To date, 
the mechanisms that underlie the emergence of the phenomenon and its rich memory 
remain ill-described. Consequently, by exploring NDE accounts, the aims of this thesis 
were three-fold: i) to contribute to a better description of the NDE phenomenology; ii) 
to examine how its memory is stored in autobiographical memory; and iii) to explore 
its potential neurochemical models.     
 Study 1: By means of an exploratory qualitative thematic analysis, we 
extracted the common features reported in written NDE accounts. We identified ten 
“time-bounded” (i.e., isolated features experienced during the NDE) and one 
“transversal” theme (i.e., a feature that shapes the whole experience and does not 
correspond to a defined point in time). Time-bounded themes were the following: 
“light”, “return”, “meeting”, “hyperlucidity”, “description of scenes”, “darkness”, “out-
of-body experience”, “awareness of death”, “life events” and “entrance in the NDE”. 
The “altered time perception” was identified as the only transversal theme. 
 Study 2: NDEs are typically associated with positive affect; however, some 
distressing NDEs have also been described. Empirical investigations about these 
phenomena are still lacking. Our goal was therefore to examine their prevalence, 
content and possible precipitating factors. Results showed that they represent 14% of 
our sample and that they are as phenomenologically detailed as “classical” NDEs. 
Besides, they seem to follow suicidal attempts more often. These findings support the 
possible implication of “top-down” processes in the emergence of NDEs: when sensory 
inputs are degraded (i.e., altered states of consciousness), the content of the 
conscious experience produced by our brain could be influenced by one’s state of 
mind and/or prior knowledge in order to mentally “fill in the gap”. 
 Study 3: Given the reported impact of NDE memories on experiencers’ lives, 
we assessed to what extent they could meet the definition of “self-defining 
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memories” (SDMs; i.e., vivid memories that strongly contribute to our sense of self). 
NDE experiencers described their two main SDMs and completed the Centrality of 
Event Scale (i.e., to assess how central an event is to one’s identity). The NDE memory 
was reported by a majority of participants. Moreovoer, it was considered more 
“central” compared to other SDMs. Findings confirm the strong impact of NDEs and 
reveal the importance for clinicians to facilitate their integration within the self.  
 Study 4: Given their emotionality and consequentiality, NDE memories are 
often compared with flashbulb memories (i.e., a vivid memory of the circumstances in 
which a surprising piece of news was heard). We therefore examined the 
phenomenological characteristics, centrality and amount of episodic and non-episodic 
information provided in verbal recalls of NDE, flashbulb and control autobiographical 
memories. Analyses revealed that NDE memories comprise more episodic details than 
control autobiographical and flashbulb memories, and more non-episodic details than 
flashbulb memories. Besides, flashbulb memories are considered less central, and are 
associated to a lower intensity of feelings while remembering and a lower personal 
importance. Overall, even though NDE and flashbulb memories seem to be similar at 
first glance, our findings highlight that NDE memories are unrivaled and particularly 
rich in details.  
 Study 5: Several neurochemical models have been suggested to reproduce 
NDE features in a laboratory setting, notably endorphins, DMT and ketamine. To 
further investigate potential neurochemical models for NDEs, we assessed the 
semantic similarity between NDE narratives and thousands of reports linked to the use 
of 165 psychoactive substances. Analyses indicated that the accounts of experiences 
under ketamine were the most similar to those associated with NDEs. Altogether, 
results indicate that ketamine could be used as a safe pharmacological model to study 
the NDE phenomenology in a laboratory setting. 
 To conclude, we believe that NDE memories can be regarded as SDMs with 
flashbulb-like components. Their important impact on experiencers’ lives highlights 
the importance of developing psychological interventions to foster their integration 
into their life story, especially since some of them are particularly distressing. Besides, 
if the neural correlates of NDEs have not been identified yet, research has made 
significant progress in that direction. 
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Résumé 
 Suite à une situation potentiellement mortelle (par exemple un arrêt 
cardiaque), ou perçue comme telle, certaines personnes vont décrire des 
événements particuliers que l’on nomme « expériences de mort imminente » 
(EMIs). Ces événements, qui comprennent des caractéristiques transcendantales et 
mystiques (par exemple, une expérience de sortie du corps ou la rencontre avec 
des proches décédés), suscitent la curiosité de la population générale et de la 
communauté scientifique. À ce jour, les mécanismes qui sous-tendent l’apparition 
du phénomène et la richesse de son souvenir restent néanmoins méconnus. Par 
conséquent, en explorant les récits d’EMIs, cette thèse avait trois principaux 
objectifs : i) contribuer à une meilleure description des EMIs ; ii) évaluer comment 
leur souvenir est stocké en mémoire autobiographique ; et iii) explorer de 
potentiels modèles neurochimiques. 
              Etude 1 : Au moyen d’une analyse qualitative thématique exploratoire, 
nous avons extrait les caractéristiques communes aux récits écrits d’EMIs. Nous 
avons identifié dix thèmes « délimités dans le temps » (i.e., des caractéristiques 
isolées et distinctes au sein des récits écrits) et un thème « transversal » (i.e., un 
élément qui façonne toute l'expérience et qui ne correspond pas à un moment 
précis du récit). Les thèmes délimités dans le temps étaient les suivants: lumière, 
retour, rencontre, hyper-lucidité, description de scènes, ténèbres, expérience de 
sortie du corps, conscience de la mort, événements de vie et entrée dans l’EMI. La 
perception altérée du temps, quant à elle, a été identifiée comme étant le seul 
thème transversal. 
              Étude 2 : les EMIs sont généralement associées à un affect 
positif. Toutefois, des EMIs négatives ont également été décrites de façon 
anecdotique. Les études empiriques portant sur ces phénomènes sont peu 
nombreuses. Notre objectif était dès lors d'examiner leur prévalence, leur contenu 
et leurs éventuels facteurs déclencheurs. Les résultats ont montré que les EMIs 
négatives représentent 14% de notre échantillon et que leur souvenir serait 
aussi détaillé que celui des EMIs dites « classiques ». En outre, il semblerait qu’elles 
soient plus souvent consécutives à des tentatives de suicide. Ces résultats 
corroborent l'implication probable de processus « top-down » dans l'émergence 
des EMIs : lorsque les informations sensorielles sont dégradées (comme lors d’états 
de conscience altérée), le contenu de l'expérience consciente produite par notre 
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cerveau pourrait être influencé par notre état d'esprit et/ou les connaissances 
préalables que nous possédons sur le monde afin de mentalement « combler le 
vide ». 
              Etude 3 : Etant donné l'impact des souvenirs d’EMIs sur la vie des 
expérienceurs, nous avons cherché à déterminer s’ils peuvent être considérés 
comme des « souvenirs définissant le soi » (SDSs ; i.e., des souvenirs vivaces qui 
contribuent à définir qui nous sommes). Nous avons demandé à des expérienceurs 
de décrire leurs deux principaux SDSs et de compléter l’Echelle de Centralité de 
l’Evenement, destinée à évaluer à quel point un événement est central dans la vie 
d’un individu. Une majorité des participants a rappelé le souvenir de l’EMI parmi les 
SDSs. De surcroît, ce souvenir est considéré comme plus « central » par rapport aux 
autres SDSs. Globalement, nos résultats confirment donc l’impact conséquent que 
peuvent avoir les EMIs et suggèrent qu’il est crucial que les cliniciens facilitent leur 
intégration au sein de l’identité des expérienceurs.   
 Etude 4 : Compte tenu de leur caractère émotionnel et de leur impact, les 
souvenirs d’EMIs ont souvent été comparés aux souvenirs « flashes » (i.e., des 
souvenirs vivaces d’événements publics marquants). Nous avons dès lors exploré 
les caractéristiques phénoménologiques, la centralité et la quantité d’informations 
épisodique et non-épisodique fournies au sein des récits verbaux d’EMIs, 
d’événements flashes et d’événements autobiographiques contrôles. Nos analyses 
ont révélé que les souvenirs d’EMIs comprennent davantage d’informations 
épisodiques que les autres types de souvenirs, et davantage de détails non-
épisodiques que les souvenirs flashes. En outre, les souvenirs flashes sont 
considérés comme moins centraux et comme ayant une importance personnelle 
moindre. Globalement, nos résultats confirment que les souvenirs d’EMIs se 
distinguent des autres souvenirs d’événements marquants en étant 
particulièrement riches en détails.  
              Etude 5 : plusieurs modèles neurochimiques ont été proposés afin de 
reproduire des caractéristiques d’EMIs en laboratoire, notamment les endorphines, 
la DMT et la kétamine. Afin d’étudier ces modèles plus en détail, nous avons évalué 
la similarité sémantique entre les récits d’EMIs et des milliers de récits liés à 
l’utilisation de 165 substances psychoactives. Nos analyses ont montré que les 
expériences vécues sous kétamine étaient les plus ressemblantes du point de vue 
sémantique. Globalement, ces résultats indiquent que la kétamine pourrait 
constituer un modèle pharmacologique sûr afin d’étudier la phénoménologie des 
EMIs. 
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 Pour conclure, nous pensons que les souvenirs d’EMIs peuvent être 
considérés comme des souvenirs définissant le soi avec des composantes de type 
« flashes ». Leur impact significatif sur la vie des expérienceurs souligne 
l’importance de développer des interventions psychologiques afin de favoriser leur 
intégration dans la vie de ces personnes, d’autant que certaines EMIs sont vécues 
très négativement. En outre, si les corrélats neuronaux des EMIs n’ont pas encore 
été formellement identifiés, les recherches ont néanmoins fait un pas important 
dans cette direction.  
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1 Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Based on the following publication: 
Cassol, H., Martial, M., Charland-Verville, V., & Laureys, S. (in press). Les 
expériences de mort imminente. In A. Dechêne & B. Dupont (Eds.), Crises 
(MethIs). Presses Universitaires de Liège. 
Introduction 
2 
 
1.1 Description of the phenomenon 
 
I saw my entire life scroll before my eyes. Subsequently, I entered a 
tunnel that seemed endless. I had the feeling that I would never 
see the end of it. Then, I perceived a very intense light. At that 
moment, I realized I was not in my body anymore. This may sound 
strange, but I had left my body envelope. I met some deceased 
family members and I travelled through the light. I was 
“transfigured”. I felt an intense feeling of well-being. On the other 
side of the light, I have seen absolutely beautiful things, so 
beautiful that I do not have enough words to describe them. All this 
was very different from the world we know. However, I probably 
was not ready for this, I thought of my life, my family and 
acquaintances, and that is the moment when I came back from the 
experience.  
Text excerpt of the memory of a cardiac arrest reported by a 62-
year-old man four years after the event.   
  
 The invention of the artificial respirator in the 1950s and the improvement 
of resuscitation techniques enabled survival of conditions that were previously fatal 
to human beings, leading to longer lifespans and an increasing number of accounts 
of what is commonly known as “near-death experiences” (NDEs) (Bush, 2002). The 
expression "near-death experience" refers to a set of perceptions generally 
occurring to an individual, called “experiencer”, during non-ordinary states of 
consciousness and following life-threatening situations such as cardiac arrest, 
intracerebral haemorrhage, traumatic brain injuries, near-drowning or asphyxia 
(Facco, Agrillo, & Greyson, 2015; Greyson, 2000b). The American psychiatrist Bruce 
Greyson, a pioneer in the scientific study of the phenomenon, defined these 
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experiences as “profound psychological events including transcendental and 
mystical elements, typically occurring to individuals close to death or in situations 
of intense physical or emotional danger” (2000b, pp. 315-316).  
The latest studies have estimated that 4 to 15% of the population would 
experience a NDE  (Greyson, 2003; Knoblauch et al., 2001; Lallier, Pacquelet, Théry-
Merland, Loriot, & Hurtaud, 2018; Perera & Belanti, 2005; Schmied et al., 1999). 
Regarding cardiac arrest survivors, the reported prevalence seems higher and 
would affect 10 to 23% of this specific population (Greyson, 2003; Schwaninger, 
Eisenberg, Kenneth, & Weiss, 2002; van Lommel, Van Wees, Meyers, & Elfferich, 
2001). As discussed later in this introduction, these experiences have been 
described for centuries; however, our scientific and technologically sophisticated 
time allowed us to gather enough accounts depicting this phenomenon, thereby 
permitting to identify recurrent patterns in the experience per se as well as in its 
aftermath.  
 Regarding its content, a NDE includes a set of distinguishable elements 
referred to as “features” (or at a lesser extent “characteristics”1) in the specialized 
literature. Among the frequently reported features, we can cite, in order of 
frequency of appearance: i) an intense feeling of peace and well-being, ii) the 
sensation of being separated from one's physical body and of existing outside of it 
(i.e., a phenomenon known as “out-of-body experience” [OBE]), iii) the vision of a 
brilliant light (described by experiencers as having a mystical origin and provoking 
an inexorable attraction), iv) an altered time perception, and v) the entry into an 
unearthly world (Charland-Verville et al., 2014).  
             Apart from these peculiar features, the phenomenon distinguishes itself by 
the nature of its memory, which is particularly vivid, rich in details, and would 
                                                          
1
 Both terms will be used interchangeably throughout this work.  
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include more phenomenological characteristics (e.g., sensory details) than 
memories of other real and imagined events (Thonnard et al., 
2013). Besides, many experiencers report an impression of “hyper-reality” 
and describe the experience as being “more real than real” (Thonnard et al., 
2013). Moreover, the amount of memory details subsequently reported by 
experiencers is positively associated to the richness2 of the experience. More 
precisely, the sensory details (i.e., sounds, smells and tastes), the personal 
importance and the frequency of reactivation of the NDE in memory seem to vary 
according to the number of features comprised in the experience (Martial, 
Charland-Verville, Cassol, Didone, et al., 2017).   
              Given the particular circumstances of appearance of a NDE and its 
phenomenological and emotional richness, some authors have stipulated that it 
could be a key element for identity building (Moore & Greyson, 2017; Thonnard et 
al., 2013). Indeed, the consolidation of one’s identity is based on a certain amount 
of main emotional events considered as breaking points in one’s life (Berntsen & 
Rubin, 2006). These breaking points, or seizures, can be defined as causal agents 
that could explain the choices and changes in values that follow landmark events 
(Berntsen & Rubin, 2006). 
  
 
 
                                                          
2
 In the present work, the richness of a near-death experience refers to the number of 
reported features (e.g., feeling of well-being and peace, vision of a bright light, OBE,...). 
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1.1.1 Near-death experiences throughout centuries 
 While the scientific studies of NDEs flourished in the 1970s, representations 
of the phenomenon already existed in much older paintings and writings. Thus, in 
the 5th century, Proclus, neo-Platonic philosopher, described an episode 
experienced by Cleonymus of Athens that clearly resembles current depictions of 
NDEs: following a loss of consciousness of a few days, Cleonymus described having 
left her physical body and having raised above it, therefore becoming able to 
observe very varied landscapes full of colors from an upper perspective (Proclus, 
1970). 
 In the 13th century, the Italian writer Dante Alighieri approached the theme 
of life after death in his long narrative poem entitled “The Divine Comedy” (Figure 
1).  
 
Figure 1 – Representation of “The Paradise” from Dante Alighieri (engraving created by 
Gustave Doré in 1868)
3
. 
                                                          
3
 Image taken from https://arthistoryproject.com. 
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 Later, in the 16th century, Hieronymus van Aken, better known as 
Hieronymus Bosch, painted the seminal four-panel-artwork “Visions of the 
Hereafter”, which includes “Ascent into the Empyrean”, representing a tunnel and 
a white light, key features of the NDE (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2 – Representation of “Ascent into the Empyrean” from Hieronymus Bosch (painted 
around 1505)
4
. 
                                                          
4
 Image taken from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ascent_of_the_Blessed. 
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 Around the same time, in his “Essays”, Michel de Montaigne 
(1582) described an experience of infinite sweetness after a gastrointestinal 
bleeding. In the following excerpt, he associates the process of dying with a 
pleasant feeling of peace and an absence of pain: 
J’avoy mon estomach pressé de sans caillé… Cependant mon assiette 
estoit à la vérité très-douce et paisible : je n’avoy affliction ny pour 
autruy ny pour moy : c’estoit une langueur et une extrême foiblesse, 
sans aucune douleur Quand on m’eut couché, je senty une infinie 
douceur à ce repos… On me présenta force remèdes, dequoy je n’en 
receuz aucun, tenant pour certain que j’estoy blessé à mort par la 
teste. C’eust esté sans mentir une mort bien heureuse : car la 
foiblesse de mon discours me gardoit d’en rien juger, et celle du 
corps d’en rien sentir. Je me laissoy couler si doucement, et d’une 
façon si molle et si aisée, que je ne sens guere autre action moins 
poisante que celle-là estoit. Quand je vins à revivre et à reprendre 
mes forces, qui fut deux ou trois heures après, je me suis senty tout 
d’un train rengager aux douleurs… 
 
 Notwithstanding these various pictorial and written descriptions, it was not 
until the 19th century that the expression “near-death” was formulated for the first 
time by the Swiss climber and professor of geology Albert von St. Gallen Heim. The 
expression, that was still informal at the time, was set out by the Swiss 
mountaineer himself to account for the experience he and his thirty climber 
teammates went through following an accident in the Alps. It was only in 1891 that 
Albert von St. Gallen Heim wrote about the peculiar phenomenology and recurring 
characteristics of these experiences, in the “Annals of the Swiss Alpine Club”. They 
included an absence of pain, a feeling of infinite calm and peace, an altered time 
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perception, auditory perceptions such as music and other sounds, and the vision of 
idyllic landscapes (Heim, 1891).  
 This inaugural publication initiated many debates among psychologists and 
philosophers at the end of 19th century and eventually led Victor Egger, French 
philosopher and epistemologist, to formulate for the first time in French the 
expression that we are using today “expérience de mort imminente”:  
We would make a strange dream at the moment of death. While 
the discourses of the dying are words with the methodical slowness 
of human thought, in the case of injured people, a sequence of 
images expresses many more events in much less time. Hence, in a 
few seconds only, we see many milestones of the past life 
(personal translation; Egger, 1896).  
 
 A few decades later, mainly through the best-seller “Life after Life” written 
by the American physician and Doctor of Philosophy Raymond Moody (1975), the 
English expression “near-death experience” was first coined and the NDE 
phenomenon reached an unprecedented popularity. This publication is noticeable 
in the sense that it opened the field of contemporary NDE research. In his book, 
Moody (1975) listed a number of attitudinal changes that may possibly occur 
following a NDE, such as a decreased fear of death. For numerous experiencers, the 
NDE is considered a breaking point and a powerful catalyst for change. Moreover, 
this change is generally perceived as beneficial (Noyes, 1980; Ring, 1984). In 
addition to the lesser fear of death, various modifications have also been identified, 
including a perception of increased invulnerability, the feeling of being special and 
important, a more developed spirituality, a loss of interest in material goods, or an 
increased compassion towards others (Noyes, 1980; Ring, 1984). 
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1.2 Common features reccurring in near-death 
experiences  
 Several pioneers in the study of NDEs have analyzed their content and 
identified the features that characterize the experience. Moody (1975) listed a set 
of features extracted from a pool of 150 NDE narratives. This list consisted of the 
following elements: ineffability, the fact that experiencers have heard that they 
have been pronounced dead, a feeling of peace and tranquility, the sensation of 
being out of the physical body, hearing noises such as ringing or buzzing sounds, 
moving through a tunnel, meeting with deceased relatives and/or a being of light, 
seeing a panoramic playback of one’s major life events, approaching a barrier or 
border representing the limit between earthly life and the next life, and returning 
to the physical body. 
 Some years later, Greyson and Stevenson (1980) extracted features from 
78 retrospectively collected accounts. The authors found that the characteristics 
reported were, in order of frequency, a distorted sense of time (79%), OBEs (75%), 
seeming to enter an unearthly realm (72%), reaching a border or point of no return 
(57%), having the impression of dying (52%), meeting people that are not physically 
present (49%), experiencing unusual phenomena such as somatic sensations (e.g., 
warmth, analgesia) or auditory perceptions (e.g., noise, music: 48%), extrasensory 
experiences (39%), the impression of passing through a tunnel or a similar structure 
(31%), and experiencing a life review (27%). In parallel, these authors also looked at 
the emotional valence associated with the experience and highlighted that a 
majority described it as neutral or mildly negative (45%). Fourty percent of the 
sample reported a mildly positive experience and 15% a positive one. None of the 
NDEs were considered as very negative.         
 Around the same time, Ring (1980) highlighted a set of five core (or main) 
NDE features consisting of a feeling of peace (60%), an OBE (reported to a lesser 
Introduction 
10 
 
extent than in previous writings; 37%), entering a tunnel or a dark area (23%), 
envisioning a light (16%) and entering the light (10%). In addition to these core 
features, Ring (1980) described other elements such as the decision to return from 
the experience (57%), the encounter with a presence (41%), the life review (24%), 
or meeting with deceased relatives (16%). It is not clear, however, how he 
determined that a feature is (or not) a core component of the phenomenon.     
As of today, the key features that are commonly associated with the 
phenomenon are those listed in the Greyson NDE scale (Greyson, 1983), which is 
currently the gold standard tool to identify NDEs. Greyson (1983) retained 16 key 
components: altered time perception, speeded thoughts, feeling of peace, joy, life 
review, suddenly understanding everything, sense of harmony with the universe, 
vision of a light, vivid senses, extra-sensory perceptions, pre-cognitions, OBE, 
unearthly world, encounter with deceased relatives or mystical beings, and coming 
to a point of no return. Using this scale, some authors have assessed the frequency 
of these 16 features (Charland-Verville et al., 2014; Greyson, 2003; Parnia, Waller, 
Yeates, & Fenwick, 2001; Schwartz & Maquet, 2002; Zhi-Ying & Jian-Xun, 1992). 
Table 1 sets out the percentages reported in the literature. Overall, the feeling of 
peace, the brilliant light and the OBE seem to pop out from most studies as the 
most common manifestations of the phenomenon. Regarding the less common 
characteristics, they seem to vary according to the study, however, the life review, 
extrasensory perceptions and precognitive visions appear to be less frequently 
mentioned (Charland-Verville et al., 2014;  Greyson, 2003; Parnia et al., 2001; 
Schwaninger et al., 2002; Zhi-Ying & Jian-Xun, 1992).       
 If the recurrent features of NDEs have been studied by several authors, 
their order of appearance in verbal or written narratives remains under-explored. 
When describing the “core NDE”, Ring (1980) suggested that it consisted of a 5-step 
sequence that tended to appear in the following order: 1) peace and well-being, 2) 
separation from the physical body, 3) entry in a dark area, 4) vision of a dazzling 
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light, and finally 5) entry through the light into another realm. This 5-step 
sequence, however, was built upon his personal observations and was not based 
on any statistical analysis. Consequently, a recent study by our group explored the 
order of appearance and temporality of NDE features in written narratives (Martial, 
Cassol, Antonopoulos, Charlier, et al., 2017). We observed that the OBE is often 
recalled in first position in written accounts and that it is often reported before the 
feeling of peace and well-being. Besides, “returning into the body” unsurprisingly 
frequently comes in at last position. The NDE therefore seems to be generally 
triggered by a sensation of detachment from the physical body and to end with the 
impression of returning into it. Additionnaly, we found that the most described 
sequence of two consecutive features is the “feeling of peace” followed by 
“encountering with spirits/people”. Finally, the most frequently encountered 
temporality core features sequence was observed in only six narratives: 1) the OBE, 
followed by 2) experiencing a tunnel, followed by 3) seeing a bright light, and finally 
by 4) a feeling of peace. The impossibility of identifying an invariable sequence (i.e., 
present in all or a majority of accounts) highlights the uniqueness of NDE narratives 
(Martial, Cassol, et al., 2017). 
  
 
NO = Not Observed. 
Table 1. Frequency (%) of NDE features according to the Greyson NDE scale in the literature. 
 Zhi-ying & Jian-xun, 
1992 
n=81 
Parnia et al., 
2001 
n=4 
Schwaninger et al., 
2002 
n=11 
Greyson, 2003 
 
n=27 
Charland-Verville et al. 
2014 
n=140 
Time distortion faster=43; slower=20 50 (speeded up) 9 67 75 
Thought acceleration 51 NO 9 44 44 
Life review 51 NO 9 30 26 
Sudden understanding 28 25 18 30 54 
Peace 52 75 100 85 91 
Joy 10 75 18 67 70 
Cosmic unity 16 50 45 52 69 
Brilliant light 15 75 63 70 76 
Sensory vividness 28 50 54 15 60 
Extrasensory perception 14 50 NO 11 34 
Precognitive visions 17 NO 9 7 19 
Out-of-body experience 43 50 90 70 79 
Otherworldly experience 26 50 54 63 72 
Mystical presence 12 25 63 26 51 
Deceased spirits/religious 
figures 
28 50 72 52 39 
Border/point of no return 15 100 45 41 61 
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1.3 Identification of near-death experiences 
The first instrument, the Weighted Core Experience Index (WCEI; Table 2), was 
developed by Ring (1980) based on Moody’s (1975) description of a “core experience” 
(i.e., defined as a consistent experiential pattern that generally unfolds when an 
individual is seemingly close to death; Ring, 1980). This 10-item scale however left 
authors with numerous questions relating to the prevalence of the experience as well 
as the potential influence of the context on its content. In order to provide answers to 
these remaining questions, Ring and his team administered the WCEI to a sample of 
102 persons that had recounted a total of 104 incidents of their close brushes with 
death. Structured interviews were conducted in this sample that was drawn from a 
larger group of individuals, of which many members were unwilling to participate. As 
stated by Ring (1980) himself, however, the sampling was strongly affected by the 
conditions that led people near death, which is undeniably a cause of bias. More 
precisely, Ring (1980) reported that accident victims were particularly willing to 
participate, half of the illness victims gave their consent, and suicide attempters 
showed the lowest participation rate. Besides, data collection also suffered from a 
recruitment bias. While illness victims were referred to examiners by medical sources, 
most suicidal attempters were included following advertisements. Despite all these 
biases, Ring ultimately determined that nearly half of his sample 48% had lived a core 
experience based on the index calculated using the ten arbitrarily weighted items of 
the questionnaire itself.  
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Table 2. The Weighted Core Experience Index (WCEI; Ring, 1980). 
Item Weight 
Subjective sense of being dead 1 
Feeling of peace, painlessness, pleasantness, etc. 2 
Sense of bodily separation 2 
Sense of entering a dark region 2 
Encountering a presence/ hearing a voice 3 
Taking stock of one’s life 3 
Seeing, or being enveloped in, light 2 
Seeing beautiful colors 1 
Entering into the light 4 
Encountering visible “spirits” 3 
  
For each one of the ten items of the scale, potential experiencers have to 
answer a yes/no question to indicate if they have experienced the feature. The 
addition of the ticked items following their respective weight provides an index 
representing the depth of a NDE. An individual is considered as having lived a “core 
experience” (i.e., having experienced “enough” components related to this kind of 
experience) if he/she obtains more than 6 out of 23. In addition, the scale permits 
to conclude if the experience is “moderate” (score between 6 and 9) or “deep” 
(score between 10 and 23).  
Although Ring’s (1980) work is considered as pioneer, his tool however 
presents substantial limitations. First, the ten items were arbitrarily chosen (i.e., 
based on his impression of the most often reported features). Second, the cut-off 
points indicating moderate and deep experiences were not based on statistical 
analysis and were not tested for internal coherence or reliability. Third, it seems 
that this scale can lead to false positives when used to identify NDE experiencers 
(Greyson, 1983).  
 Given these methodological limitations, Greyson (1983) developed a new 
scale derived from an initial pool of 80 features described prominently in the NDE 
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literature. Based on this exhaustive list, he built a preliminary questionnaire 
including the 40 most frequent items and launched a pilot study involving 100 
participants who had come close to death. On the basis of the collected responses, 
he eliminated seven items either because of their redundancy or their lack of 
clarity, and administered the 33-item preliminary questionnaire to a first pool of 
patients of which 67 responded by referring to 74 distinct experiences (a response 
rate of 81%). The final scale was composed of 16 items covering four factors based 
on inter-item correlations and retrospectively designated as “cognitive”, 
“affective”, “paranormal” and “transcendental”. Items for which item-component 
and item-scale correlations were deemed acceptable were selected. Regarding 
answer modalities, respondents have to choose among three options permitting to 
score each item as being definitely present (corresponding to a score of 2 on the 
item), atypical or questionable (corresponding to a score of 1 on the item), or 
absent (corresponding to a score of 0). Based on the answers to the 16 items, a 
total score ranging from 0 to 32 is calculated, representing the overall intensity of 
the NDE. Greyson established a cut-off score of 7 or more to consider an 
experience as a “real” NDE. This cut-off score corresponds to one standard 
deviation (SD) below the mean of his study sample (i.e., mean=15.01, SD=7.84). To 
date, the 16-item Greyson NDE scale is the gold standard for a standardized 
identification of a NDE. It is currently the tool that has the best psychometric 
qualities. Additionnally, Lange, Greyson and Houran (2015) used techniques in 
computational linguistics to support concurrent validity of the Greyson NDE scale 
(Greyson, 1983) and confirmed that it identifies a “core experience” that is 
invariant across age, time since NDE and gender. A detailed description of the scale 
can be found in Table 3.  
More recently, a 6-item NDE scale, largely drawn from the Greyson NDE 
scale has also been developed by Prosnick and Evans (The Near-Death Experience 
Scale-6; 2003); however, it was practically not used. 
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Table 3. The Greyson near-death experience scale (Greyson, 1983). 
 Item Possible responses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cognitive 
Did time seem to speed up 
or slow down? 
 
0 = No 
1 = Time seemed to go faster 
or slower than usual 
2 = Everything seemed to be 
happening at once; or time 
stopped or lost all meaning 
Were your thoughts 
speeded up? 
 
0 = No 
1 = Faster than usual 
2 = Incredibly fast 
Did scenes from your past 
come back to you? 
 
0 = No 
1 = I remembered many past 
events 
2 = My past flashed before 
me, out of my control 
Did you suddenly seem to 
understand everything? 
 
0 = No 
1 = Everything about myself 
or others 
2 = Everything about the 
universe 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Affective 
Did you have a feeling of 
peace or pleasantness? 
 
0 = No 
1 = Relief or calmness 
2 = Incredible peace or 
pleasantness 
Did you have a feeling of 
joy? 
 
0 = No 
1 = Happiness 
2 = Incredible joy 
Did you feel a sense of 
harmony or unity with the 
universe? 
0 = No 
1 = I felt no longer in conflict 
with nature  
2 = I felt united or one with 
the world 
Did you see, or feel 
surrounded by, a brilliant 
light? 
0 = No 
1 = An unusually bright light 
2 = A light clearly of mystical 
or other-worldly origin 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Paranormal 
 Were your senses more 
vivid than usual? 
0 = No 
1 = More vivid than usual 
2 = Incredibly more vivid 
Did you seem to be aware 
of things going on 
elsewhere, as if by 
extrasensory perception 
(ESP)? 
 
0 = No 
1 = Yes, but the facts have 
not been checked out 
2 = Yes, and the facts have 
been checked out 
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Did scenes from the future 
come to you? 
0 = No 
1 = Scenes from my personal 
future 
2 = Scenes from the world’s 
future 
 Did you feel separated 
from your body? 
0 = No 
1 = I lost awareness of my 
body 
2 = I clearly left my body and 
existed outside it 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Transcendental 
Did you seem to enter some 
other, unearthly world? 
0 = No 
1 = Some unfamiliar and 
strange place 
2 = A clearly mystical or 
unearthly realm 
Did you seem to encounter 
a mystical being or 
presence, or hear an 
unidentifiable voice? 
0 = No 
1 = I heard a voice I could not 
identify 
2 = I encountered a definite 
being, or a voice clearly of 
mystical or unearthly origin 
Did you see deceased or 
religious spirits? 
0 = No 
1 = I sensed their presence 
2 = I actually saw them 
Did you come to a border or 
point of no return? 
0 = No 
1 = I came to a definite 
conscious decision to 
“return” to life 
2 = I came to a barrier that I 
was not permitted to cross; 
or was “sent back” against 
my will. 
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1.4 Near-death like experiences   
 Nearly four decades ago, Gabbard, Tremlow and Jones (1981) were already 
asking: “Do ‘near death experiences’ occur only near death?”. Authors clearly 
responded in the negative (Gabbard et al., 1981; Gabbard & Twemlow, 1991). Since 
then, numerous experiences closely resembling NDEs have been described in the 
scientific literature following various contexts such as syncope (Lempert, Bauer, & 
Schmidt, 1994), intense grief (Kelly, 2001), and even spontaneously, after an 
undetermined cause (Facco & Agrillo, 2012). These experiences have been termed 
“NDEs-like” and are classically described in absence of genuine and/or perceived 
threat to one’s life (Charland-Verville et al., 2014).    
 It was originally argued, among the very few publications investigating 
NDEs-like, that regardless the genuine threat to life, the expectancy of an 
impending death could be both necessary and sufficient to live a NDE (Gabbard & 
Twemlow, 1991; Owens, Cook, & Stevenson, 1990). For illustrating purposes, 
Gabbard and Tremlow (1991) described the case of a marine recruit who accidently 
dropped a hand grenade during an instruction session at boot camp and watched 
the safety pin get out as it hit the ground. This incident, that has proved to be 
harmless given that the grenade was a dummy, triggered within the young marine 
an experience regrouping key features of a NDE, such as an OBE, the vision of a 
light, moving through a tunnel, and an intense feeling of love. As a conclusion, 
authors suggested that one’s “state of mind” is far more important than one’s 
“state of the body” in order to experience the phenomenon. Owens, Cook and 
Stevenson (1990) retrospectively assessed the experiences lived by a sample of 58 
patients of whom, based on the analysis of their medical reports, 28 were 
considered to have been close to death (i.e., they would have died without medical 
intervention), while the other 30 patients thought they were dying but were 
actually not in danger. Experiences were similar in both groups of patients; 
however, patients who were really near death described enhanced perceptions of 
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light as well as more cognitive powers (i.e., experiencing enhanced mental and 
sensory functioning). In another study, Kelly (2001) specifically considered the 
“encounter with a deceased relative” in a sample of NDE reports consecutive or not 
to a life-threatening situation (n=237). All participants had lived their NDE as a 
result of a medical condition, nonetheless, based on the evaluation of medical 
records, 107 cases were deemed to be “not near death” by two examiners. It is 
important, however, to note that the author specifies that a few cases were 
secondary to grief or anxiety, in other words supposedly with no real threat. The 
exact number of cases might be anecdotal and was not provided.     
 Considering the studies detailed thus far, one might actually come to the 
conclusion that the perceived proximity to death –regardless the real danger— is 
the key element to trigger the phenomenon. In contradiction with this assumption, 
however, Facco and Agrillo (2012) published the case report of an electrotechnician 
who experienced an unusual phenomenon with most of the features typical of a 
NDE except that it happened spontaneously, in absence of any life-threatening 
conditions, or at least in appearances. This experience, which reached the total 
score of 16 on the Greyson NDE scale (i.e., thus interpreted as a rich experience), 
included features such as the vision of a light, intense feelings of peace and joy, the 
impression of knowing everything about the universe, and the encounter with an 
entity. Furthermore, an empirical study from Charland-Verville and colleagues 
(2014) recently examined a relatively large sample (n=50) of NDEs-like. This sample 
also included experiences that followed a non-life-threatening event with no 
perceived threats such as, for example, sleep (n=13) or meditation (n=5). 
Interestingly, authors found that NDE-like experiencers report experiences that are 
equivalent in content (i.e., the frequency of the characteristics reported by means 
of the Greyson NDE scale do not differ) and in intensity (i.e., Greyson NDE scale 
total scores do not differ). Overall, NDEs happening in the aforementioned contexts 
of occurrence cannot be explained by the perception of an incoming death.    
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 To conclude, little is known about these experiences. Data regarding their 
potential causes, their prevalence and their impact on NDE-like experiencers’ lives 
have not been published yet. Although they are still misunderstood, NDEs-like 
could however be interesting in many aspects, in particular they could make NDEs 
more empirically accessible by allowing us to recreate experiences that are strongly 
similar in a controlled environment and without causing a safety hazard to 
participants. Indeed, previous studies have for example already shown meditation-
induced NDE features (Beauregard, Courtemanche, & Paquette, 2009; Van Gordon 
et al., 2018). 
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1.5 Resulting memory 
 As mentioned previously, NDEs have fascinated humans since centuries 
because of their mystical aspect and the surprisingly highly detailed memory that 
people keep from the event. How is it that experiences supposedly occurring during 
brain dysfunction lead to such vivid recollections? Despite this intriguing aspect, 
research on the peculiarity of NDE memories is relatively recent. Most studies have 
assessed them by means of the Memory Characteristics Questionnaire (MCQ). This 
questionnaire was developed by Johnson, Foley, Suengas and Raye (1988) in order 
to more precisely assess the phenomenological characteristics of memories of real 
and imagined events. When completing this questionnaire, participants are asked 
to rate the amount of sensory details (i.e., visual, auditory, olfactory and/or 
gustatory) contained in a memory, the clarity of the representation of the place 
and time in which the event took place, the clarity of the spatial arrangement of 
the objects and persons involved in the event, the valence and intensity of the 
emotional reactions triggered by the event, the memory of the thoughts that the 
individual had during the event,… Each memory characteristic is assessed on a 7-
point Likert scale (e.g., “While remembering the event, I feel as though I am 
mentally reliving it”: 1 = “not at all”, 7 = “completely”). In other words, the MCQ 
enables a more precise examination of the presence of sensory and contextual 
details (spatio-temporal) during the recall of an event. 
  In a groundbreaking study using a short 15-item version of the MCQ, 
Thonnard and collaborators (2013) have highlighted the uniqueness of NDE 
memories within autobiographical memory (i.e., memories about an individual’s 
life; Williams, Conway, & Cohen, 2008). NDE memories were found to contain more 
details (e.g., sensory, emotional and self-referential) than memories of other real 
and imagined events, and memories of a period of coma or impaired consciousness 
following an acquired severe brain dysfunction without NDE (Thonnard et al., 
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2013). It was therefore suggested that they could not be considered as imagined 
event memories, but also that they were unique and unrivaled.  
 Directly inspired by the theoretical premises by Thonnard and collaborators 
(2013), Palmieri and colleagues (2014) showed that NDE memories were similar to 
real memories and significantly different from imagined memories in terms of 
richness, self-referential and emotional information. Besides, they identified 
specific EEG-patterns in real memories (including NDE memories) as compared to 
imagined event memories, more precisely higher alpha and gamma bands which 
are memory-related (Bastiaansen & Hagoort, 2003; Jensen, Kaiser, & Lachaux, 
2007). Regarding NDE memories in particular, authors found that they were linked 
with theta band, known to be a marker of episodic memory, as well as delta band, 
known to index processes/mental states such as recollections of the past, 
hallucinations or trance. As a conclusion, authors expressed that NDE memories are 
not equivalent to imagined ones from a phenomenological point of view. With 
regard to the neural level, they found that they are stored the same way than 
memories of other experiences lived in peculiar states of consciousness.      
 More recently, Moore and Greyson (2017) asked 122 experiencers to rate 
three memories by means of the 38-item version of the MCQ: i) their NDE memory, 
ii) the memory of a real event, and iii) the memory of an imagined event (i.e., 
events they had planned/wished for, dreamed or fantasized about, for example). 
Overall, MCQ scores for the NDE memories were found to be higher than those of 
real events memories which, in turn, were higher than those of imagined events.   
 Finally, we looked into the association between the “richness” of the NDE 
memory (i.e., which refers to the number of distinct features described, as assessed 
by the Greyson NDE scale) and the intensity of its phenomenology (as measured by 
MCQ scores) (Martial, Charland-Verville, Cassol, et al., 2017). We found that 
Greyson NDE scale and MCQ total scores were positively correlated. In other 
words, the higher the number of features people experience, the more detailed will 
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be the memory. Moreover, authors highlighted that the richness of the NDE 
memory was particularly associated with the amount of sensory information, the 
frequency of reactivation and the personal importance.   
 To conclude, we still do not know how memory consolidation may happen 
under circumstances in which experiencers are believed to be unconscious and at a 
moment when memory formation is not expected to operate efficiently. Besides, 
NDE memories are often reported several decades after the incident but remain 
very detailed, which led some authors (Martial, Charland-Verville, Cassol, et al., 
2017; Thonnard et al., 2013) to compare them with specific autobiographical 
memories, notably “self-defining memories” (SDMs; i.e., emotional and vivid 
memories that reflect important themes and conflicts in one’s life; Singer & 
Salovey, 1993) and “flashbulb memories” (i.e., detailed memories of the 
circumstances during which a surprising piece of news was heard; Brown & Kulik, 
1977).  
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1.6 Characteristics of near-death experiencers  
 What are the potential factors that could possibly explain that a minority of 
people will report NDEs while a majority will not? Besides, are there specific 
individual characteristics that could underlie the emergence of particular NDE 
features?  
 
1.6.1 Age 
 Most of the scientific literature has been focusing on an adult population; 
however, NDEs have been reported by people of all ages. For example, even 
though scientific data is quite scarce, a few authors have described these 
experiences in children (Atwater, 1996; Bonenfant, 2001; Bush, 1983; Morse, 
Castillo, Venecia, Milstein, & Tyler, 1986).  
 Among authors who identified a significant age difference between 
experiencers and non-experiencers, van Lommel and collaborators (2001) found, in 
a prospective study, that 52% of their experiencers group were under 60 years of 
age vs. 34% in the non-experiencers group. In a second prospective study 
conducted on cardiac arrest survivors, Greyson (2003) also showed that 
experiencers were younger in average than the comparative group of non-
experiencers (56 years old vs. 64 years old, respectively). As raised by Greyson 
(2003) himself, this age difference might be explained by the fact that younger 
patients could be more likely to remember them. Indeed, older patients are at 
higher risks to have reduced blood flow to the brain when experiencing their 
cardiac arrest and to forget events occurring around that time (Greyson, 2003). 
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1.6.2 Gender 
 The NDE scientific literature has shown that these experiences have been 
reported by men as well as women. Specifically, prospective (Greyson, 2003; van 
Lommel et al., 2001), retrospective (Greyson, 1990; Groth-Marnat & Summers, 
1998), and meta-analysis studies involving more than 500 experiencers (Audain, 
1999), revealed no significant differences in the proportion of males and females 
reporting a NDE, suggesting that both groups are equally predisposed to 
experience, or at least recall, this phenomena. 
 Other studies have also looked closely at the existing association between 
the gender and the content of NDEs. Notably, Sabom (1982) found that 
“encounters/meeting with others” were more frequent in females, and van 
Lommel and collaborators (2001) pointed out that females experienced “deep” 
NDEs more frequently than men, as measured by the WCEI (Ring, 1980). 
 
1.6.3 Psychopathological characteristics 
Neither Gabbard and Twemlow (1984) nor Greyson (1991) have found 
differences between experiencers and non-experiencers in terms of mental health. 
On the other hand, even though the underlying processes are little-known, authors 
have shown that individuals presenting psychiatric disorders tend to describe less 
elaborate NDEs (e.g., Gabbard & Twemlow, 1984; Greyson, 1991).  
One groundbreaking study regarding psychopathological characteristics of 
experiencers was conducted by Greyson (2000) based on Ring's hypothesis (1992) a 
few years earlier. Ring (1992) formulated a developmental theory according to which 
dissociative responses (i.e., a lack of normal integration of thoughts, feelings or 
experiences into the stream of consciousness and memory; Bernstein & Putnam, 
1986) developed during childhood in reaction to a trauma would make some 
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individuals more prone to live dissociative experiences and/or NDEs later on. Based 
on this assumption and on the observation that NDEs share some features with the 
phenomenon of dissociation, Greyson (2000a) compared the amount of dissociative 
symptoms in people who had lived a NDE following a life-threatening situation and in 
people who had also lived a life-threatening situation without presenting such an 
experience. Using the “Dissociative Experiences Scale” (Bernstein & Putnam, 1986), 
he found that experiencers reported significantly more dissociative symptoms than 
the other group. Moreover, the depth of the NDE, as measured by the Greyson NDE 
scale (Greyson, 1983), was positively associated to the quantity of dissociative 
symptoms. Importantly, however, the amount of dissociative symptoms is lower in 
experiencers as compared to patients with pathological dissociative disorders. 
Overall, it was observed that the dissociative symptoms described by experiencers 
correspond to non-pathological dissociative reactions to stress.  
  
1.6.4 Nonpathological characteristics  
 Nonpathological aspects of human personality have also been analyzed and 
associated with the NDE phenomenon. Among them, fantasy proneness, defined as a 
habitual engagement in imaginative activities (Merckelbach, Horselenberg, & Muris, 
2001), has received particular attention (e.g.,  Martial, Cassol, Charland-Verville, 
Merckelbach, & Laureys, 2018; Ring, 1992). Three decades ago, Ring and Rosing 
(1990) explored the propensity to imaginary engagement in experiencers by means of 
the Childhood Experience Inventory (CEI; Holeman, 1994), but failed to show a higher 
imaginative involvement in comparison to control subjects who had not lived a close 
brush with death or a NDE. Similarly, Ring (1992) found no tendency to engage in 
imaginative activities in experiencers, leading Greyson (2000) to conclude that data in 
favor of fantasy proneness within this population were not compelling. Recently, a 
study by our group involving 108 experiencers (i.e., 51 who had their NDEs in the 
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context of a life-threatening situation and 57 who had lived a NDE-like), showed that 
participants who reported NDEs-like obtained higher scores of fantasy proneness as 
compared to those describing classical NDEs, those who did not meet the NDE criteria 
(i.e., cut-off score of 7 or more at the Greyson NDE scale) and control volunteers. On 
the contrary, classical experiencers showed a comparable engagement in fantasy than 
controls. Overall, even though data does not enable us to establish a clear link 
between fantasy proneness and NDEs, these findings suggest that the important 
engagement in fantasy in NDE-like experiencers might make them more prone to 
recall a NDE-like experience when facing suitable conditions such as meditation or 
syncope. It is important to note that inconsistent observations between studies might 
be due to the different scales and questionnaires that authors employed to assess 
fantasy proneness. 
In an attempt to identify the psychological correlates of NDEs, Greyson (2003) 
identified a higher proportion of purportedly psychic experiences (i.e., extrasensory 
perceptions, paranormal experiences such as déjà vu, or altered states of 
consciousness such as dreams), in experiencers compared to non-experiencers.  
 Finally, false memory susceptibility was also investigated in a study by 
Martial, Charland-Verville, Dehon, and Laureys (2017). Authors used the Deese–
Roediger–McDermott paradigm (Roediger & Mcdermott, 1995) to assess 
susceptibility to create false memories in two groups of participants: i) people who 
had experienced a NDE following a close brush with death and ii) a group of 
matched volunteers who underwent a similar life-threatening situation (i.e., 
comparable etiologies and a period of coma) without recalling a NDE. It turned out 
that both groups did not differ regarding the susceptibility to recall false memories, 
but that the recalls in the NDE group were more often accompanied by illusory 
recollections (i.e., the subjective feeling of remembering that may accompany false 
recollections).    
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1.6.5 Culture 
 Most research were conducted in Western cultures (e.g., Charland-Verville 
et al., 2014; Parnia et al., 2014; Sleutjes, Moreira-Almeida, & Greyson, 2014), 
however, NDEs have been described by individuals of other origins, notably in 
China (Zhi-Ying & Jian-Xun, 1992) or India (e.g., Pasricha & Stevenson, 1986). As 
pointed out by Groth-Marnat (1994), literature in this specific field is difficult to 
interpret since it usually involves small and varied samples, as well as poor 
objective means of data collection. In one of the rare studies that have compared 
narratives from different countries (Belanti, Perera, & Jagadheesan, 2008), authors 
revealed a number of dissimilarities between Western and non-Western NDEs. For 
example, Mapuche (i.e., indigenous inhabitants of south-central Chile and 
southwestern Argentina) and Hawaiian accounts did not comprise features such as 
the vision of a bright light or a life review, which are deemed common among 
North American and European experiencers. In addition, overriding characteristics 
of these reports included descriptions of landscapes made up of volcanoes. 
Similarities were also detected in Asian accounts originating from Thailand and 
India, which did not contain depictions of a bright light, tunnels, specific landmarks 
and encounters with deceased relatives. Table 4 groups NDE features from 
different cultures and continents. 
 
1.6.6 Religion 
 NDEs have been reported among individuals belonging to different 
religions, including Christians of all kinds (Fenwick & Fenwick, 1995; Ring, 1980; 
Sabom, 1982), Buddhists (Carr, 1993) and Muslims (Suleman, 2004). Furthermore, 
they also have been described in nonadherents, such as atheists or agnostics 
(Fenwick & Fenwick, 1995; Ring, 1980; Sabom, 1982). Researchers have found no 
link between religious (non)affiliation and the content (Sabom, 1982), depth (Ring, 
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1980; van Lommel et al., 2001) or incidence of the NDE phenomenon (Ring, 1980; 
Sabom, 1982; van Lommel et al., 2001).   
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Table 4. NDE features collected in different cultures (adapted from Belanti, Perera, & 
Jagadheesan, 2008). 
Geographical 
provenance 
Authors Sample 
size 
Extracted features 
Americas    
Hawaii Kellehear 
(2001) 
1 Deceased people/spirits, visions of 
landscapes/realms, incorrect 
time/person, flying 
Mapuche Gómez-Jeria 
(1993) 
1 Deceased people/spirits, visions of 
landscapes/realms, incorrect 
time/person, door/gate 
Native American Schorer (1985) 2 Visions of landscapes/realms, out-of-
body experiences, animals, color, fire 
Africa  
Morse & Perry 
(1992) 
 
15 
 
Deceased people/spirits, incorrect 
time/person, out-of-body experience, 
highway, stars, negative emotions 
Asia    
China Zhi-Ying & Jian-
Xun (1992) 
81 Religious figures, evil, deceased 
people/spirits, visions of 
landscapes/realms, tunnel, 
estrangement from the physical body, 
light, life review, out-of-body 
experience, sounds, smells, unusual 
body sensations 
India Pasricha & 
Stevenson 
(1986) 
Pasricha (1993) 
16 
 
 
13 
Religious figures, evil, deceased 
people/spirits, incorrect time/person, 
residual marks on one’s body 
Deceased people/spirits, incorrect 
time/person, residual marks on one’s 
body 
Israel Abramovitch 
(1988) 
1 Out-of-body experience, deceased 
people/spirits, incorrect time/person, 
light 
Thailand Murphy (2001) 10 Religious figures, evil, deceased 
people/spirits, incorrect time/person, 
out-of-body experience, tunnel, hell, 
animals 
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Europe    
Germany Knoblauch, 
Schmied, & 
Schnettler 
(2001) 
82 Heaven, deceased people, door/gate, 
positive/negative emotions, visions of 
landscapes/realms, life review 
Netherlands van Lommel et 
al. (2001) 
62 Deceased people/spirits, positive 
emotions, out-of-body experience, 
tunnel, light, colors, visions of 
landscapes/realms, life review 
 
1.6.7 Other 
 Other demographical variables have been evoked in the NDE literature but 
studies addressing these are scant. For example, two studies have analyzed the 
socioeconomic status of experiencers and have compared them to those of non-
experiencers. It was notably the case of Ring (1980) who has roughly pre-defined 
four social-classes categories and found individuals of each subclass in experiencers 
as well as non-experiencers. Around the same time, Sabom (1982) looked at the 
size of home community and at the occupation of 78 survivors of near-death crisis, 
and found no differences between people who had lived NDEs and those who had 
not.  
 Finally, although very rarely reported in large-scale studies, the level of 
education of NDE experiencers has been explored sporadically. The few existing 
studies found no differences between experiencers and non-experiencers (Groth-
Marnat & Summers, 1998; Sabom, 1982), and no relationship between the level of 
education and the depth or content of the NDE (Sabom, 1982; van Lommel et al., 
2001). Besides, no study has yet examined the possible association between the 
level of education and the aftereffect triggered by NDEs.       
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1.6.8 The specific case of out-of-body experiences 
Scientific research has also been focusing on the cognition and personality 
traits of people who have only experienced OBEs. Irwin (1981, 1985), for example, 
found that OBE experiencers show greater capacity of absorption (i.e., a disposition in 
which individuals become absorbed in mental imagery, specifically fantasy; Lynn & 
Rhue, 1988) than control subjects. More recently, Gow and collaborators (2004) 
showed that OBE experiencers display a higher propensity to engage in imaginary and 
fantasy activities by means of the Inventory of Childhood Memories and Imaginings 
(Wilson & Barber, 1983b), a short form of the Memory, Imagining, and Creativity 
Schedule (Wilson & Barber, 1983a).  
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1.7 Distressing near-death experiences 
 Early studies on NDEs reported only very few, if not any, negative 
experiences (e.g., Moody, 1975; Ring, 1984), leaving them under-explored for many 
years. Indeed, a substantial majority of NDEs is depicted as pleasant and positive 
(e.g., Charland-Verville et al., 2014; van Lommel et al., 2001). As highlighted by 
Charland-Verville and colleagues (2014), for example, the feeling of peace and 
pleasantness is by far the most frequently reported characteristic as it occurred in 
90% of their sample of life-threatening NDEs (i.e., in 89% of anoxic, 93% of 
traumatic and 91% of other life-threatening NDEs) and 91% of NDEs-like. But what 
about the other remaining experiences? What exactly do we know about them? As 
stated by Bush (2002), the hard facts relating to distressing NDEs appear to be as 
few as the researchers who deal with them.  
 Even though most studies have identified a proportion of frightening NDEs 
generally varying between 1 and 10% (e.g., Charland-Verville et al., 2014; Gallup & 
Proctor, 1982), some authors have found larger proportions of these negative 
events. For instance, Lindley, Bryan and Conley (1981) collected a total of 55 
accounts through calls for NDEs in advertisements and identified 11 (20%) “partially 
negative or hellish” narratives. Nearly two decades ago, Knoblauch et al. (2001) 
found even greater percentages of distressing NDEs within the German population. 
The authors compared NDEs experienced in post-socialist East Germany and West 
Germany, and found out that West Germans experienced more positive NDEs (i.e., 
60% described positive emotions and 29% negative ones) compared to East 
Germans (i.e., 40% of positive emotions and 60% of negative ones). The great 
disparity in the reported percentages may be explicable, on the one hand, by the 
use of closed questionnaires which could potentially disguise the presence of 
negative NDEs (i.e., some distressing experiences also comprise positive emotions 
and the Greyson NDE scale only enables the detection of feelings of well-
being/peace or joy, therefore, distressing NDEs might be incorrectly identified as 
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positive) and, on the other hand, because the frightening and mystical aspects of 
some experiences could prompt people to withdraw. 
 In a pioneer study, Greyson and Bush (1992) conducted an investigation on 
50 narratives of distressing NDEs. Their qualitative analysis ultimately led to the 
identification of three subclasses of frightening experiences: (i) the “inverse” 
experience or “prototypical NDE interpreted as terrifying”; (ii) the experience of 
“non-existence” or “eternal void”; and (iii) the “hellish” or “demonic” experience. 
The first subtype shares a lot of features with the classical pleasant NDE (i.e., light, 
OBE, encounter with deceased relatives, life review…), except that individuals 
experience very negative feelings such as fear and despair instead of blissful 
moments. The second-type experience refers to the impression of ceasing to exist 
or to be condemned to roam through an eternal void forever. This second-type 
may also include the sensation that life as we know it never existed and is a fraud. 
Besides, it sometimes comprises features of the classical NDE but at a lesser extent 
compared to the inverse experience. Finally, experiences with hellish imagery were 
the less numerous in their sample. These NDEs contain graphic demonic 
symbolism, like falling into a dark pit or meeting horrific tormented beings. Overall, 
Greyson and Bush (1992) provide a very vague indication of the frequency of each 
subcategory in their sample of negative NDEs (i.e., in decreasing order: inverse, 
void and hellish). Unfortunately, the exact number of accounts belonging to each 
subcategory is not supplied. In addition to this classification, Rommer (2000) 
suggested a fourth type during which experiencers are heavily disturbed by a life 
review, but this category is considered by Bush (2002) as a subtype of hellish NDEs.   
 Recently, Charland-Verville, Lugo, Jourdan, Donneau and Laureys (2015) 
found that people suffering from a “locked-in syndrome” (i.e., patients who are 
conscious but deefferented, and therefore are not able to produce speech and 
move their limbs/face; Laureys et al., 2005) following an infra-tentorial lesion (i.e., 
located below the tentorium cerebella) experienced less blissfull NDEs compared to 
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patients who also went through a period of coma following a supratentorial brain 
lesion.    
 Information relating to the impact of frightening NDEs are even more 
scarce and do not come out from reliable studies. Bush’s (2002) personal 
observations over several years suggest that there are at least three different types 
of reaction to the making of meaning in distressing NDEs:  
I. The Turnaround (“I needed that”): The negative event is perceived as a 
warning and may lead to a self-analysis and a turnaround in the 
experiencer’s life;  
II. Reductionism (“It was only…”): The event is treated as if it did not matter;   
III. The Long Haul (“What did I do?”): The frightening event may result in a 
difficulty to integrate the experience and in the development of a sense of 
stigma. 
 
As a concluding remark, it is important to stress that frightening NDEs may 
trigger a post-traumatic stress response (Bush, 2002), symptoms such as recurrent 
flashbacks (Greyson & Bush, 1992), and long-term reactions like an increased fear of 
death (Greyson & Bush, 1992). Moreover, they may lead to difficulties in integrating 
the experience (Flynn, 1986; Greyson, 1997; Noyes, 1980; Ring, 1984; Sabom, 1982). 
Distressing NDEs are understudied and potentially traumatic, which advocates for 
further rigorous studies.  
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1.8 Theoretical approaches to near-death experiences  
 In a very synthetic manner, theoretical approaches to NDEs can be divided 
into three main categories (e.g., Roe, 2001; Thonnard et al., 2008): i) spiritual (also 
known as “transcendental” or “dualistic”), ii) psychological, and iii) organic (also 
referred to as “neurobiological”) theories. This classification is merely used with a 
view to simplification and clarity. In practice, some of these theories overlap 
(French, 2009). 
 
1.8.1 Spiritual theories: A dualistic perspective 
 Overall, dualism manifests itself in the idea that our spirit/soul exists 
independently of our physical body, and in the idea of a life after death (Bloom, 
2007; Demertzi et al., 2009). This “dualistic” attitude toward mind-brain 
relationship appears to be widespread among scholars (Demertzi et al., 2009). 
Unsurprisingly, many experiencers are similarly convinced that their “soul” 
separates from their physical body and clearly exists outside of it during their NDE, 
thereby providing a glimpse into their life after death. This approach towards NDEs 
is mostly driven by the OBE core feature in particular, during which people observe 
their physical bodies from an upper perspective and are allegedly able to describe 
accurately what was going on around them while they were considered 
“unconscious”.  
 Advocates of the spiritual theories postulate that NDEs represent a 
different state of consciousness (i.e., transcendence), in which the self, cognition, 
and emotions would function independently from the brain (e.g., Parnia, 
Spearpoint, & Fenwick, 2007; Van Lommel, 2004). For these authors and others, 
the NDE phenomenon poses a serious challenge to current scientific 
understandings of the brain, mind and consciousness (Parnia et al., 2001; Ring, 
1980; Sabom, 1982). Concomitantly, Ring and Cooper (1999) reported cases of 
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blind patients who, after a cardiac arrest, have had an intense OBE of which they 
could relate elements that would have been verified. Although fascinating, these 
claims are not supported by any scientific evidence yet. It is currently impossible to 
determine if these memories actually correspond to an intermediate stage 
between life and death, or if these would result from a specific neuronal activity. 
Moreover, no study has yet been able to demonstrate the total absence of cerebral 
activity during the simultaneous occurrence of a cardiac arrest and a NDE. 
 In an attempt to elucidate this conundrum, Parnia and collaborators (2014) 
conducted the AWARE (i.e., AWAreness during REsuscitation) study. Their 
objectives were twofold: i) investigate the incidence of awareness and the broad 
range of mental experiences during cardiopulmonary resuscitations, and ii) 
establish a new methodology to assess the accuracy of reports of awareness as well 
as visual and auditory perceptions during cardiac arrest. Authors found that two 
(out of 140) cardiac arrest survivors experienced a NDE including visual awareness 
of events occurring during their cardiopulmonary resuscitation. Of these two 
patients, one recalled elements of the environment he/she was in during 
cardiopulmonary resuscitation that were corroborated by medical records later on. 
However, the study protocol does not allow excluding that these memories are 
retrospective imaginative (re)constructions based on the patient’s expectations 
about the world and/or on his/her interactions with the medical staff. Besides, 
most of the cardiac arrests took place in rooms without shelves, making it 
impossible to hide targets and verify the claims objectively and in a controlled way. 
A more refined methodology is therefore needed to provide an objective incidence 
and to examine information gathered following OBEs associated with critical 
contexts of impending death.  
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1.8.2 Psychological theories 
 Some theories rely on the “expectation hypothesis” and take the view that 
the NDE stems from projections of one’s beliefs regarding an afterlife while being 
in a life-threatening context and in an altered state of consciousness (e.g., 
Blackmore & Troscianko, 1989). The plausibility of this hypothesis was discussed by 
French (2005) who emphasized that religion and spirituality are global human 
systems of faith and worship that have always existed down the ages. Hence, no 
culture would be totally free of any form of religious belief and people would keep 
a form of religiosity deep in their psyche, even in cultures that have abolished any 
type of creed such as the USSR in the past century. The author however notes that 
it is quite unclear how individuals who find themselves in life-threatening situations 
become aware that they are experiencing a close brush with death and develop 
such complex projections to suit their expectations.  
 Other psychological theories that focus on more specific aspects have also 
been suggested. For example, it was hypothesized that NDEs could be the results of 
a depersonalization or a dissociative phenomenon (i.e., the NDE would be a 
defense mechanism to evade a distressing reality: when feeling in danger, 
experiencers would disconnect from their environment to engage in internally 
generated fantasies; e.g., Noyes & Slymen, 1978). Some authors have also 
mentioned the potential role of personality factors such as fantasy-proneness, 
which would make some individuals more prone to exclude frightening elements of 
their external environment and redirect their attention towards imaginative and 
sensory experiences (Ring, 1992). False memories were also evoked. Proponents of 
this hypothesis suggest that at least part of the experience is built by the 
experience in order to make sense of degraded information during periods of 
unconsciousness (French, 2001; Mobbs & Watt, 2011).  
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 Finally, Blackmore (1993) made the point that NDEs could be at least partly 
imagined and would combine information relating to the context of occurrence, 
elements of one’s cultural background, one’s prior knowledge, lucky guesses, and 
degraded information relating to the direct environment that filter through the 
senses.  
 
1.8.3 Organic theories 
 Organic or neurobiological hypotheses posit that NDEs are produced by the 
brain. The role of drugs, medication and/or neurotransmitters was notably raised, 
and various models have been proposed ranging from endogenous opioids to 
serotonin (Carr & Prendergast, 1981; Morse et al., 1989; Peinkhofer, Dreier, & 
Kondziella, 2019). Bailey (1973), for example, highlighted the resemblance between 
trips elicited by drug intakes and the experience of “dying” when describing 
indigenous societies in North America, notably, who used to ingest peyote 
(Lophophora williamsii, a cactus containing the psychedelic molecule mescaline) 
during ceremonies to enable a quick overview of what they believed to by their 
afterlife. It was hypothesized that this association between drugs and the 
experience of “dying” could be based their capacity to trigger NDE-like features. 
Later, Jansen (1990, 1991) discussed the implication of glutamate N-methyl-D-
aspartate (NMDA) receptor antagonists in the emergence of NDEs among 
neurocritical patients, and also suggested a link with hallucinogenic substances 
such as ketamine. This assumption is based on the high resemblance between the 
phenomenology of NDEs and the one triggered by the NMDA antagonist ketamine 
which may induce features such as OBEs, the sensation of entering a tunnel or the 
vision of a light (Collier, 1972). In critical conditions like hypoxia or temporal lobe 
epilepsy, which are known to trigger NDEs or NDEs-like, we observe a glutamate 
flood that overactivates NMDA receptors. This overactivation results in a 
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neurotoxicity that substances such as ketamine would hinder. Besides, there are 
substances that are naturally secreted by the brain and that bind on the same 
receptors as ketamine does. Therefore, Jansen (1997b) suggested that 
circumstances that induce a glutamate flood could also produce a flood of 
neuroprotective compounds binding to NMDA receptors, thereby leading to a 
specific state of consciousness that displays a phenomenology close to that of 
recreational ketamine trips. Apart from NMDA antagonists, endorphins were also 
regarded as being involved in the emergence of some NDE features such as the 
feeling of peace and well-being (Carr & Prendergast, 1981; Saavedra-Aguilar & 
Gomez-Jeria, 1989). On the contrary, it was hypothesized that endorphin-blocking 
agents such as naloxone could generate negatively toned emotions during 
frightening NDEs (Judson & Wiltshaw, 1983). More recently, our group collaborated 
in a within-subjects placebo-controlled study aiming at assessing the similarity 
between the phenomenology induced by the potent serotonergic N,N-
Dimethyltryptamine (DMT) and NDEs (Timmermann et al., 2018). The injection of 
DMT in 13 healthy volunteers triggered the emergence of features such as entering 
an unearthly environment, peace and pleasantness, heightened senses, or a feeling 
of harmony/unity with the universe. Interestingly, all participants scored above the 
cut-off score of 7 at the Greyson NDE scale (Greyson, 1983). 
 Changes in blood gas levels were also studied as a possible cause of NDEs. 
Acceleration induced loss of consciousness episodes show important similarities 
with these experiences (Whinnery, 1997). This phenomenon, consisting of a lack of 
blood flow to the brain (i.e., hypoxia), is sometimes experienced by fighter pilots 
during maneuvers of important acceleration and may notably provoke tunnel 
visions, bright lights, OBEs, pleasant sensations and/or visions of beloved ones. Still 
with regard to hypoxia, Lempert and coworkers (1994) induced syncopes in 42 
volunteer participants by means of hyperventilation and Valsalva maneuver (i.e., a 
forced exhalation against a closed airway that is usually performed by closing the 
mouth and pinching the nose shut while blowing up; Taylor, 1996). Authors found 
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out that people reported visual (40%) and auditory (60%) hallucinations, OBEs 
(16%), feelings of peace and pleasantness (35%), vision of a light (17%), entering 
another world (47%), encountering preternatural beings (20%), and experiencing a 
tunnel (8%). Likewise, hypercarbia (i.e., abnormally elevated levels of carbon 
dioxide in the blood) would induce recollections of past memories/life reviews, 
visions of a light, OBEs, or mystical experiences (Klemenc-Ketis, Kersnik, & Grmec, 
2010; Meduna, 1950).  
 Other organic causes were suggested as well. Nelson et al. (2006), notably, 
hypothesized that some NDE features (e.g., vision of a light, awareness of being 
dead) could be a consequence of rapid eye movement (REM; i.e., rapid and random 
saccadic eye movements, loss of muscle tone, vivid dreams, and cortical activation; 
Scammell, 2015) intrusions during wakefulness. Indeed, authors found that 
experiencers described significantly more often REM intrusions than control 
subjects matched for age and gender. These findings were corroborated by a 
recent study which showed a higher prevalence of NDEs in people with REM sleep 
intrusions (Kondziella, Dreier, & Olsen, 2019). Along with REM sleep intrusions, 
neuronal disinhibition in the visual cortex was also hypothetically envisaged (e.g., 
Blackmore, 1993; Saavedra-Aguilar & Gomez-Jeria, 1989). Blackmore (1996) 
suggested that a random excitation in the organization of cells of the visual field 
might lead to the perception of a bright light and a tunnel vision.  
 Interestingly, electroencephalography (EEG) studies in humans and rodents 
seem to indicate a highly coherent electrical activity in the brain just before death. 
This was first found out in a small human case series by Chawla, Akst, Junker, 
Jacobs and Seneff (2009), who identified transient electrical spikes in half of their 
sample of critically ill patients immediately before cardiac arrest. Authors therefore 
speculated that critical hypoxia entails a cascade of pathological neuronal activity 
resulting in a transient highfrequency EEG current that fades as neurons lose their 
resting potential. Interestingly, these findings were later reproduced on a larger 
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sample of 35 patients (Chawla et al., 2017). Two studies carried out on rats also 
described transient increases in electrical brain activity before death (Borjigin et al., 
2013; Li et al., 2015). Borjigin and colleagues (2013) detected increased power and 
global synchronization of gamma oscillations in rats undergoing experimental 
cardiac arrest. Moreover, directional information transfer across the brain, which is 
believed to play a role in conscious perception, was characterized by eightfold 
increase in gamma band in top-down information flow (i.e., believed to be an 
indicator of consciousness perception) and fivefold increase in bottom-up 
information processing (i.e., which is thought to be a key element in the treatment 
of sensory information) at near death. Furthermore, gamma bands were coupled 
with theta and alpha bands, another key compound of conscious treatment of 
information in the postarrest brain. Recently, Li et al. (2015) demonstrated that 
induced asphyxia in rats triggered a strong and prolonged surge of functional 
cortical connectivity as well as an immediate cortical release of various 
neurotransmitters. 
Some researches have considered a dysfunction of the temporal lobe to explain 
the occurrence of specific NDE features (Blanke, 2005; Blanke, Ortigue, Landis, & 
Seeck, 2002; Britton & Bootzin, 2004; Hoepner et al., 2013). Indeed, direct cortical 
stimulation (e.g., Blanke et al., 2002) as well as altered functioning (e.g., caused by 
brain damage or seizures; Hoepner et al., 2013) of this brain area may trigger OBEs 
(Britton & Bootzin, 2004) or mystical experiences (e.g., Daly, 1975; Penfield, 1958). 
For example, it was shown that a deficient multisensory integration due to 
stimulation of the right temporo-parietal junction in particular leads to OBEs (e.g., De 
Ridder, Van Laere, Dupont, Menovsky, & Van de Heyning, 2007). This was also found 
in neurological patients suffering from epilepsy or migraine who have described a 
similar phenomenology following focal electrical stimulation (e.g., Blanke et al., 2002). 
These results led authors to hypothesize that hypoxia experienced during life-
threatening conditions may hypersensitize neurons as well as lower their seizure 
thresholds, especially in the temporal lobe that is known to be sensitive to anoxia 
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(Benveniste, Drejer, Schousboe, & Diemer, 1984; Britton & Bootzin, 2004; Frenk, 
McCarty, & Liebeskind, 1978). In accordance with these findings, Britton and Bootzin 
(2004) detected higher temporal lobe epileptiform activity among NDE experiencers 
compared to non-experiencers. Interestingly, studies in patients suffering from 
ecstatic epilepsy (i.e., a type of epileptic seizure resulting in NDEs-like) have also 
demonstrated the involvement of the anterior insular cortex (Picard & Kurth, 2014; 
Picard, Scavarda, & Bartolomei, 2013). 
 In a nutshell, knowing that each aforementioned factor only accounts for a 
part of the NDE phenomenon, we believe that a combination of several 
neurophysiological mechanisms may lead to the emergence of a NDE and account 
for the whole phenomenon. Overall, the causal relationship existing between these 
numerous factors remains to be determined.   
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1.9  Impact of near-death experiences 
 It takes very little imagination to conceive that experiences combining such 
a specific context of appearance (i.e., presumed proximity with death) and 
phenomenology (i.e., characteristics considered as “paranormal” and/or 
“transcendental”) may have an impact on experiencers’ lives. The potential 
aftermath of NDEs indeed stoked researchers’ curiosity since the beginning of their 
modern-day investigation. One of the first studies focusing on their impact was 
conducted by Noyes (1980) on a sample of 205 individuals who had come close to 
death, regardless of what they had subjectively lived; while some of them had 
experienced a NDE, others had not. Of this relatively large pool, approximately two-
thirds described a subsequent change in their attitude towards life and death. The 
reported pattern of change mainly consisted of a reduced fear of death, a 
heightened sense of invulnerability, a feeling of being special, important and/or 
having a special favor from god, and an increased belief in life after death. Later, 
Ring (1984) developed the Life Change Inventory (LCI), to assess life changing 
effects after a NDE. When completing this questionnaire, participants are asked to 
respond in a 5-point likert scale indicating whether and to what degree they have 
changed regarding different traits and values (i.e., strongly increased (+2), 
somewhat increased (+1), no change (0), somewhat decreased (–1), and strongly 
decreased (–2)). Ring (1984) administered his newly created instrument to three 
groups of individuals: experiencers, people who had come close to death without 
experiencing a NDE and individuals who had never come close to death. After 
completion of several interviews, Ring (1984) highlighted that, compared to other 
groups, experiencers showed a reduced fear of death, were less materialistic, were 
more sympathetic, and displayed a greater self-confidence, sense of purpose and 
spirituality (i.e., they tended to turn toward spiritual practices such as prayer or 
meditation, and at the same time turn away from prior specific religious affiliations 
and institutions).  
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 Many subsequent studies have used standardized scales to differentiate 
experiencers from non-experiencers and assess differences in life changes after 
life-threatening events by means of a revised version of the Life Change Inventory 
(i.e., Life Change Inventory - Revised [LCI-R]; Greyson & Ring, 2004). It was found 
that experiencers systematically reported a greater extent of change compared to 
non-experiencers (e.g., Ring, 1984; Sutherland, 1992). Groth-Marnath and 
Summers (1998) also highlighted a correlation of .43 (p<.001) between changes 
emphasized using the Life Change Questionnaire and the total scores at the 
Greyson NDE scale. This finding could reflect the fact that more intense NDEs (i.e., 
comprising more typical features) may lead to greater changes, but also that some 
characteristics specific to each individual, such as their personality traits, could 
both lead to deeper experiences and foster a greater transformation.  
 More recently, two other studies were conducted in cardiac arrest 
survivors. The first of these was carried out by van Lommel and collaborators 
(2001) who compared, by means of the LCI-R, 35 cardiac arrest survivors who 
experienced a NDE with 39 who had not. Authors explored the potential changes 
two and eight years after the cardiac arrest. The two groups differed on 13 of the 
34 items of the scale relating to social and religious behaviors, attitude toward 
death as well as introspection. Details regarding the nature and the magnitude of 
the changes in the 38 patients for whom data were available at two and eight years 
can be found in Table 5. The second study was conducted by Schwaninger and 
coworkers (2002) and used a comparable design. Similarly, they found greater 
changes among experiencers, and highlighted that the major modifications related 
to the religious and spiritual spheres (i.e., greater sense of God’s presence, 
sacredness of life, and purpose in life). Overall, studies on cardiac arrest survivors 
point towards greater transformative changes in experiencers compared to people 
who suffered a heart attack without NDE.   
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 Finally, Barberia, Oliva, Bourdin and Slater (2018) recently performed an 
original study protocol consisting of immersive virtual reality (IVR) to approach the 
impact of mortality and NDEs. Healthy volunteers were embodied in alternate 
virtual avatars on an idyllic island with two companions. They experienced several 
sessions on the island, starting as a child and progressively ageing. Gradually, 
participants witnessed the death of the two cronies as well as their own death 
which comprised the classical features of a NDE (i.e., OBE, life review, the tunnel 
leading to white light). As compared to a control group, participants subsequently 
described attitudinal changes similar to those classically reported by real 
experiencers, notably being more concerned with others and less interested in 
material issues. 
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Table 5. Sum of individual scores at the Life Change Inventory - Revised per item (n=38; 
adapted from van Lommel et al., 2001).  
 
 
Items 
2 years after cardiac 
arrest 
8 years after cardiac 
arrest 
 
NDE group 
(n=23) 
No-NDE 
group 
(n=15) 
NDE group 
(n=23) 
No-NDE 
group 
(n=15) 
Social attitude     
Ability to express love for others 42 16 78 58 
Acceptance of others 42 16 78 41 
Compassion for others 52 25 68 50 
Understanding of others 36 8 73 75 
Involvement in family life 47 33 78 58 
Religious attitude     
Understanding what life is about 52 33 57 66 
Sense of inner meaning to my life 52 25 57 25 
Concern with spiritual matters 15 -8 42 -41 
Attitude toward death     
Fear of death -47 -16 -63 -41 
Conviction there is life after death 36 16 42 16 
Others     
Search for personal meaning 52 33 89 66 
Interest in self-understanding 58 8 63 58 
My appreciation of ordinary things 78 41 84 50 
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1.9.1 Near-death experience as a synonym for “crisis”  
1.9.1.1  Models of the integration of the near-death 
experience into one’s personal history             
 NDEs are often regarded as cornerstones in experiencers’ lives, which has 
led some authors to reflect upon the integration of the event within 
their identity. The models developed so far suggest that their aftereffects do not 
emerge suddenly nor simultaneously, and that the identity transformation that 
may subsequently occur is not immediately noticeable (Noyes, 1980). Besides, as 
described by the writer Phyllis Marie Atwater (1988), who experienced a NDE 
herself, some aspects of the phenomenon may persist over time which could delay 
its integration. Some people, for example, continue to experience an altered time 
perception after the NDE. 
 Sutherland (1992) suggested a progressive change scheme that she 
called the “integration trajectory”. Concretely, the integration of the event into the 
experiencer’s identity would begin immediately following the NDE, and then 
continue until the event becomes an integral part of his/her life. According to the 
author, there are four types of trajectories (Table 6). She suggests that these 
trajectories are influenced by numerous factors, including the look that the 
experiencer has on his/her NDE, the perceived control he/she has over the “return 
to everyday life”, the reaction of their beloved ones to their experience,… The path 
leading to the integration of the event therefore implies a set of processes in which 
social acceptance occupies a central place. 
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Table 6. NDE integration trajectories proposed by Sutherland (1992). 
Type Description 
Blocked Specific to experiencers considering the NDE as meaningless 
Arrested Reflects the trajectory of ambivalent experiencers who find it 
difficult to share the NDE with those around them 
Steady Illustrates a progressive and continuous integration of the 
experience 
Accelerated Refers to a quick integration of experience 
 
  Based on interviews, Hoffman (1995) identified five successive 
steps in the process of integration  of the NDE: i) early shock and surprise, ii) need 
for validation, iii) interpersonal implications, iv) active exploration, and finally v) 
integration of the experience into one’s personal story. According to Hoffman 
(1995), communication of the experience at each of these stages would be the 
keystone of a successful and beneficial integration process. 
 More recently, Morris and Knafl (2003) also attempted to design a 
conceptual framework for NDEs, reflecting its meaning for the experiencer. Based 
on the interviews of 12 experiencers, authors described a first stage that includes a 
quest for meaning that may result from a feeling of frustration, confusion or 
depression (i.e., the experiencer questions his mental health). The following step is 
a growing awareness that authors qualify as “awakening”, which is a starting point 
for new ways of understanding the world around them. This quest for meaning 
hangs on two major hinges: i) the spiritual domain (i.e., experiencers report a 
feeling of closeness to a higher entity, increased belief in life after death, less fear 
of death and developed intuition) and ii) the life course domain (i.e., experiencers 
perceive their survival as a second chance and reconsider their priorities by placing 
more emphasis on interpersonal relationships). 
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1.9.1.2 Influencing factors 
Noyes, Fenwick and Holden (2009) suggest that several factors are likely to 
influence the impact of NDEs: i) “pre-NDE factors” that are generally inherent to 
the individual, such as religious beliefs, culture or personality traits (Ring & 
Lawrence, 1993), ii) factors linked to the “circumstances and characteristics of the 
NDE” itself, including its intensity and phenomenological characteristics, and iii) 
“subsequent factors”, such as the reaction of the experiencer’s relatives to the 
event. 
 
1.9.1.2.1 Pre-near-death experience factors 
 
 As stated above, people who have had a NDE generally report similar 
changes in values (Noyes, 1980) such as reduced fear of death or a decrease in 
materialistic interests, however, dissimilarities have also been highlighted. This 
does not question the fact that there are common consequences on experiencers’ 
lives, but rather suggests the presence and impact of inter-individual variability 
among experiencers. Nevertheless, distinguishing between attitudes and behaviors 
that predated the experience and those resulting from it remains a complex 
undertaking, especially when it comes to personality traits (i.e., see studies on 
dissociation and absorption developed earlier in this chapter; e.g., Greyson, 2000a). 
Moreover, the possible role of some factors remains moot. For example, in the 
analysis of Western NDEs conducted by Holden, Long and MacLurg (2009), children 
seem to represent a vulnerable population group given that they do not always 
have the necessary metacognitive abilities to assimilate what they have 
experienced. Consequently, they may require special help to understand and 
integrate the NDE and its consequences. 
 Other authors have speculated the impact of people’s religious beliefs and 
culture in the aftereffects of NDEs. Zaleski (1987), for example, brought to light that 
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experiencers of the Middle Ages described transformative effects compatible with 
the medieval Christian faith. They reported profound spiritual changes, claimed to 
be more compassionate and understanding, were no longer afraid of death, and 
described the acquisition of paranormal abilities. Knoblauch and colleagues 
(2001) have compared changes in German and American experiencers, and have 
shown that the decrease in the fear of death was less frequent among the 
former. Similarly, the development of spirituality seemed less pronounced in this 
group. 
              Overall, analyses suggest that pre-NDE factors, such as age, culture or 
beliefs could influence the content of the experience and how it is assimilated.  
  
1.9.1.2.2 Circumstances and characteristics of the 
experience 
 
 Most authors have concentrated on the possible role of specific NDE 
features. By retrospectively exploring the phenomenology of 78 accounts, Greyson 
and Stevenson (1980) pointed out that behavioral changes that follow a NDE are 
more important in experiencers who were aware that they were dying during their 
NDE as well as among those who reported a life review. Later, Kellehear 
(1991) suggested that temporary immersion into an unearthly world, and the vision 
of idyllic landscapes in particular, would incite experiencers to modify their social 
values as well as their way of life. The entrance into a transcendental and utopian 
society could induce in experiencers a less sibylline discourse about death. Around 
the same time, Morse and Perry (1992) speculated that the mystical and 
transcendental aspect of NDEs, such as the encounter with a cosmic or divine force, 
could be the reason for the spiritual transformation in many experiencers.  
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              Finally, we could also hypothesize that the emotional valence of a NDE may 
have an impact on people’s integration of the experience. It is reasonable to think 
that more frightening NDEs could generate an important stress, and could 
therefore trigger a crisis more difficult to overcome for the experiencer. Key 
episodes in one’s life have an impact on how one will perceive and interpret future 
events. When highly negative experiences, such as hellish NDEs, are not integrated 
appropriately into one’s identity (i.e., he/she has not been able to draw a lesson 
and/or step back from the event), it may have an adverse effect on expectations 
related to future experiences and, as a result, it may be detrimental to one's 
mental health (Berntsen, Willert, & Rubin, 2003).  
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1.9.1.2.3 Subsequent factors        
 
 In order to study the reciprocal interaction between NDEs and 
interindividual relationships, Insinger (1991) collected the narratives of 11 
experiencers and found that relationships within the family are very likely to 
evolve. While a majority of families accepted the changes in their beloved ones' 
values and supported them in their approach, others needed an initial adjustment 
to understand the NDE and its implications. Some fewer experiencers, however, 
underwent less approving situations. For example, some of them found that their 
beloved ones were frustrated with various aspects of their new personality, were 
sometimes reluctant to discuss about the NDE, or criticized their new life concerns, 
in particular the loss of interest in material assets. As underlined by the author, it is 
understandable that a social system, such as family or relatives, endure difficult 
adjustments while its previous roles and standards undergo more or less significant 
changes. The most difficult adaptations being the ones in which the family shows 
an attitude of rejection regarding the experiencer’s new system of values.  
 Similarly, Christian (2005) and Sutherland (1992) described a significant 
number of divorces triggered by the mismatch between the experiencer’s new 
values and those of his/her partner.  
  
1.9.1.3 Near-death experiences as a form of statutory 
transition  
  
 In a innovatory analysis, Glaser and Strauss (1971) presented NDEs under 
an original angle: they considered the phenomenon as a type of “statutary 
transition”. The authors define the statutory transition as a set of transitional social 
processes marking the changeover from one status to another. This shift usually 
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involves a change in identity and behavior. The transition from one social, religious 
or wage class to another, such as the passage from childhood to adulthood for 
example, generates movements within one’s social structure. All these changes 
involve the following successive phases: (1) a separation from the former status, (2) 
a transitional reorientation period, (3) and an integration and recognition of the 
new status. According to these two authors (Glaser & Strauss, 1965, 1968), death, 
as well as the process of dying, can be seen as a statutory transition with its specific 
characteristics: 
I. Death is usually unexpected; 
II. When it occurs, it is usually defined as an unwanted and unintended event; 
III. Signs of an individual's death are not always clear, both for the caregiver as 
well as for the dying person;  
IV. The control that the dying person and his/her relatives have over this 
transition is uncertain and problematic; 
V. The dying person’s path may include phases of recovery and relapses that 
will mark his/her state of mind throughout the process. 
 
 Kellehear (1990) extends this thinking to the NDE phenomenon. As the 
author points out, these two events share common characteristics. Like death, 
NDEs encompass the following characteristics: 
I. Unpredictability; 
II. Its context of occurrence is often perceived as unintentional and undesired; 
III. Signs of death are not always clear to the individual (e.g., the case of a person 
suffering a cardiac arrest but who nevertheless presents a NDE, and therefore a 
content of conscience – perceptions and thoughts); 
IV. The difficulty of gauging the control exercised over a NDE: the impact of this 
(lack of) control relies on a variety of idiosyncratic factors such as one’s 
perception of physiological (i.e., possible relapse/reoccurrence of the NDE) or 
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relational (e.g., one’s ease to share the experience with the medical staff) 
variables. Furthermore, it has been suggested that experiencers themselves 
could exercise some control over their NDE (i.e., albeit questionable, many of 
them recounted their conscious decision to "come back" during the experience, 
especially since they felt that "it was not the right time to let go").  
 
              Through his analysis, Kellehear (1990) distinguishes NDEs from other 
statutory transitions that reflect well-established passages within our social 
structures. The author describes NDEs as phenomena that are beyond the control 
and regulation system of our society. Moreover they engender unprecedented 
changes in values and identity.  
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1.10 Overview of the present work 
 The aims of the present thesis are three-fold: i) to contribute to a better 
description of the NDE phenomenology (chapter 2: study 1 and study 2); ii) to 
examine how its memory is stored in autobiographical memory (chapter 3: study 3 
and study 4); and iii) to explore some of its potential neurochemical models 
(chapter 4: study 5). These objectives will be addressed primarily through the 
analysis of NDE written accounts.       
 NDE features have been studied extensively a few decades ago (Greyson & 
Stevenson, 1980; Greyson, 1983; Ring, 1980; Sabom, 1982). Ever since, however, 
these experiences came out of the taboo atmosphere, leading to a growing body of 
descriptions that differed from the initial prototypical NDE. Consequently, study 1 
is exploratory and aims to reach an updated description of the phenomenon by 
means of a rigorous qualitative thematic analysis, a method that promotes the 
classification of the data into themes. The aim of study 2 is to address the lack of 
empirical data relating to distressing NDEs (Bonenfant, 2001; Greyson & Bush, 
1992). To do so, we will look for the proportion of distressing experiences in a large 
sample of NDEs, analyze their content and further explore their context of 
occurrence. Although this study is essentially exploratory, we hypothesize that 
distressing NDEs are as phenomenologically detailed as “classical” ones and that 
they emerge more frequently following suicidal attempts (i.e., we assume that the 
psychopathological context surrounding a suicidal attempt may have an influence 
on the valence of the experience). In study 3 and study 4, we will test the 
assumptions of Martial, Charland-Verville, Cassol, et al. (2017) and Thonnard et al. 
(2013) according to which NDE memories could meet the definition of SDMs and 
flashbulb recollections, respectively. Given their high emotionality and 
consequentiality, we hypothesize that NDEs are self-defining and that they are at 
least as vivid and detailed as flashbulb memories. Study 5 rather focuses on 
potential neurochemical models to study NDEs. Indeed, “classical” NDEs are 
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impossible to predict, rendering simultaneous brain monitoring impractical. To 
bypass this issue, models involving several neurotransmitters and drugs were 
suggested to reproduce NDE features in a laboratory setting, notably DMT and 
ketamine (e.g., Jansen, 1997b; Timmermann et al., 2018). Therefore, we will 
explore the semantic similarity between NDE narratives and thousands of written 
accounts linked to the use of 165 psychoactive substances. Finally, we will conclude 
the present thesis by discussing our results and the perspective they might bring. 
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2 Exploring the content of pleasant and 
distressing near-death experiences 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Based on the following publications: 
Cassol, H.*, Pétré, B.* (contributed equally), Degrange, S., Martial, C., Charland-
Verville, V., Lallier, F., Bragard, I., Guillaume, M.*, & Laureys, S.* (contributed 
equally). (2018). Qualitative thematic analysis of the phenomenology of 
near-death experiences. PLOS ONE, 13(2), 1-14.  
Cassol, H., Martial, C., Annen, J., Martens, G., Charland-Verville, V., Majerus, S., & 
Laureys, S. (2019). A systematic analysis of distressing near-death experience 
accounts. Memory, 1-8. 
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2.1 Study 1. Thematic analysis of near-death 
experiences accounts 
2.1.1 Summary 
 NDEs refer to profound psychological events that can have an important 
impact on the NDE experiencers’ lives. Previous studies have shown that NDEs 
memories are phenomenologically rich. In the present study, we therefore aimed 
to extract the common themes (referred to as “features” in the NDE literature) 
reported by NDE experiencers by analyzing all the concepts stored in the narratives 
of their experiences. A qualitative thematic analysis has been carried out on 34 
cardiac arrest survivors’ NDE narratives. Our results shed the light on the structure 
of the narratives by identifying ten “time-bounded” themes which refer to isolated 
events encountered during the NDE and one “transversal” theme which 
characterizes the whole narrative and generally appears as a retrospective 
comment of self-reflection on the experience. The division of narratives into 
themes provides us with detailed information about the vocabulary used by NDE 
experiencers to describe their experience. This established thematic method 
enables a rigorous description of the phenomenon, ensuring the inclusion of all 
self-reported manifestations of themes in narratives. 
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2.1.2 Introduction 
 Despite the significant number of people who reported to have had a NDE, 
there is still no theory that may account for all the characteristics classically 
described. Moreover, although it is now widely admitted that this experience is a 
physiological and psychological reality, a commonly accepted definition of the 
phenomenon is still lacking. Indeed, NDEs were initially named so because of their 
connection with death or fear of death (Owens et al., 1990). More recently, 
however, similar experiences were reported in the absence of a physical or 
emotional threat (i.e., NDE-like experiences). Charland-Verville and collaborators 
(2014) have shown that scores of NDE intensity (using self-reported responses on 
the Greyson NDE scale; Greyson, 1983) do not differ between “real NDEs” 
experienced after a coma and “NDE-like” experiences occurring after non-life 
threatening events. Further systematic investigation is therefore required to better 
characterize these experiences and better describe their phenomenology. 
 Although a few studies have conducted text analysis on NDEs narratives 
(Hou, Huang, Prakash, & Chaudhury, 2013; Lange et al., 2015), reports of cardiac 
arrest survivors have never been, to our knowledge, analyzed using a rigorous 
qualitative thematic method. Thematic analysis is a method for identifying, 
analyzing and reporting patterns within data (Braun & Clarke, 2006) commonly 
used in qualitative research (Pope & Mays, 2006). This method promotes the 
classification of the data into thematic categories as well as the examination of all 
the cases in the study to make sure that all the manifestations of each theme have 
been accounted for and compared (Pope & Mays, 2006). Themes are patterns 
across data sets that are essential to a better description of a phenomenon. 
Therefore, thematic analysis can be used to develop taxonomies or classifications 
about a phenomenon (Pope & Mays, 2006). Furthermore, well-established 
guidelines for applying and assessing qualitative methods are nowadays available 
(Malterud, 2001; Tong, Sainsbury, & Craig, 2007), which have increased their use in 
Study 1. Thematic analysis of near-death experiences accounts 
 
62 
 
medical disciplines (Mays & Pope, 2000). The description of a NDE using closed 
scales can result in the overlooking of relevant features that might have been 
experienced by NDE experiencers but that are not listed in NDE questionnaires. 
Therefore, this study aims to explore the interest of a qualitative approach, 
specifically thematic analysis, to better portray NDEs that follow a cardiac arrest 
based on self-reported narratives. 
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2.1.3 Materials and methods 
2.1.3.1 Sample and recruitment 
 The study was approved by the ethics committee of the Faculty of 
Medicine of the University of Liège. NDE experiencers were recruited via the 
websites, the appearances in local media and the publications of the International 
Association for Near-Death Studies (IANDS France) and the Coma Science Group 
(GIGA Research Center, University and University Hospital of Liège, Belgium). 
Participants who contacted us indicated their consent by signing a written consent 
form. They then completed questionnaires requesting socio-demographic 
information (gender and age at interview), their age when they experienced the 
NDE, the time elapsed since the NDE and if the NDE has occurred during a life 
threatening event. In addition to these questions, participants were asked to write 
a detailed narrative of their experience. No limits regarding the number of pages 
were specified. The Greyson NDE scale (Greyson, 1983) was then used to identify 
the presence of a NDE. This 16-item multiple-choice validated scale (Greyson, 1983; 
Lange et al., 2004) allows the quantification of the intensity of the experience (i.e., 
total score ranging from 0 to 32) and enables a standardized identification of NDEs 
(i.e., cut-off score of 7). For each of the 16 items, the scores are arranged on an 
ordinal scale ranging from 0 to 2 (i.e., 0 = “not present”, 1 = “mildly or ambiguously 
present”, and 2 = “definitively present”; Greyson, 1983; Lange et al., 2004). These 
16 items fall into four subscales (i.e., affective, cognitive, paranormal and 
transcendental components). NDEs being frequently reported after cardiac arrests, 
we included participants whose experience was secondary to a cardiac arrest and 
who met the accepted criteria of a NDE (i.e., Greyson NDE scale's total score ≥ 7; 
Greyson, 1983). Table 7 shows the descriptive data of the study sample calculated 
using SAS version 9.3 for Windows statistical package. 
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Table 7. Greyson NDE scale total scores and descriptive data of the 34 NDE experiencers 
(34 cardiac arrests; 11 females). 
Greyson NDE scale total score 
Mean ± SD 13±5 
Range 7–22 
Reported time since NDE (in years)* 
Median 6 
Interquartile range (IQR) 4–10 
Age at NDE (in years) 
Mean ± SD 49±13 
Range 16–72 
Age at interview (in years) 
Mean ± SD 56±12 
Range 18–75 
*This variable being not normally distributed, we used the median and the IQR.   
 
2.1.3.2 Thematic analysis 
 According to the recommendations required for this method (Braun & 
Clarke, 2006; Miles & Huberman, 1994), an iterative step-by-step thematic analysis 
has been carried out on all anonymized 34 NDE narratives using NVivo software 
(version 9.2 for Windows). An inductive proceeding was chosen to analyze the 
data: themes were inductively defined from the raw data that were explored 
without any predetermined classification. 
 In the first step, two expert researchers in thematic analysis (SD and BP) 
read the narratives several times in order to familiarise themselves with the 
information. In the second step, emergent themes were developed following a 
series of coding stages: first, open coding was used and initial codes were 
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generated. Next, initial codes were grouped into categories according to their 
similarities. In the third step, these categories were organized into themes. It 
involves combining codes into overarching themes that accurately depict the data. 
According to Braun and Clarke (2006) “a theme captures something important 
about the data and represents some level of patterned response or meaning within 
the data set”. This work led to a first analysis grid (i.e., list of themes). In the fourth 
step, both experts independently extracted and classified all quotations (i.e., 
phrases or paragraphs) that corresponded to a theme of the analysis grid and 
preserved the quality of the writings as produced. To ensure the reliability of the 
coding and classification process, coding comparison query that enables to 
compare coding done by two experts in Nvivo, was performed by calculating a 
Cohen's kappa coefficient. The kappa coefficient can range from -1 to +1 (+1 
corresponding to a perfect concordance between the two experts). In the first 
instance, readers obtained a Cohen's kappa coefficient of 0.46 demonstrating a 
moderate agreement (Landis & Koch, 1977). That relatively poor result forced them 
to revise the analysis grid. According to the criteria of univocality and exclusivity 
(i.e., to ensure that themes are understandable in the same way by anyone and 
that quotations can be classified only in one single category), a new arrangement 
and a more precise definition of the themes have been proposed. Based on the 
revised grid (see Table 8), a new extraction and classification of quotations was 
achieved and led to a Cohen's kappa coefficient of 0.73 between both readers 
corresponding to a substantial agreement (Landis & Koch, 1977). The fifth step was 
made of a comprehensive analysis to examine the extent to which the themes 
contributed to an understanding of the data. For each theme, all the included 
quotations were synthesized to bring out the main ideas (i.e., a summary of the 
content provided by the participants). The sixth step involved writing the report 
and led to a detailed description of the results. To ensure robustness, descriptive 
results were accompanied by quotations that illustrate that description. In addition, 
the number of NDE experiencers who discussed the theme and its different 
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characteristics was reported in order to summarize the results in a more illustrative 
and comprehensive form. A native English speaker translated the quotations 
included in the present article from French to English in order to preserve the NDE 
experiencers' subjective points of view. 
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Table 8. Coding structure of NDE narratives. 
Time-bounded themes 
 
Light: experiences in which the light is the 
main object. 
 
Associated subthemes: 
- Attractiveness 
- Description of the light 
- Source of light 
- Body sensation 
- Emotional feeling 
 Return: transition between the "NDE" and 
"everyday life". 
 
Associated subthemes: 
- Opposition well-being/suffering 
- Attempt to relive the experience 
- No explanation  
- Order to come back 
 Meeting/encounter: experience of an 
individual who encounters other beings 
(human or imaginary). 
 
Associated subthemes: 
- Focus on the bright environment 
around him/her or bright being 
- Message- content of the interaction 
- Typology of being met 
- Type of interaction 
- Body sensation 
- Emotional feeling 
 Hyperlucidity: experience of omnipotence and 
extreme lucidity of the individual. 
 
Associated subthemes: 
- Outstanding intelligence, genius 
- Physical liberation 
- Links-unification-entirety-infinity 
- Omnipotence 
- Body sensation 
- Emotional feeling 
 Description of scenes: experience of an 
individual describing the scene in which he is 
immersed. 
 
Associated subthemes: 
- Description of the place 
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- Indescribable character of the place 
- Feeling of infinity 
- Body sensation 
- Emotional feeling 
 Darkness: experience of an individual 
describing a dark, black, and deadly 
environment. 
 
Associated subthemes: 
- Description of the dark or black place 
- Contrast, black/light sequence 
- Person’s movement/environment or 
lack of movement 
- Sensory perception 
- Body sensation 
- Emotional feeling 
 Out-of-body experience: experience of an 
individual who sees himself in an emergency 
situation from an observer’s perspective. 
 
Associated subthemes: 
- Awareness of being out of the body 
(state) 
- Experience of de-corporation (action 
of, way of getting out) 
- Visual description of the actual 
situation 
- High position, over flight 
- Attempt to communicate 
- Body sensation 
- Emotional feeling 
 Awareness of death: state of people being 
aware that they are dying. 
 
Associated subthemes: 
No subcategory proposed 
 Life events: experience of an individual who 
perceives different moments of his past or 
future life. 
 
Associated subthemes: 
- Actor/observer (notion of seeing or 
reliving the film of his/her life) 
- Content of the film (future 
projections vs. passed) 
- Imposed vs. free scrolling 
- Body sensation 
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- Emotional feeling 
 Entrance in the NDE: the moment when 
people enter the NDE. 
 
Associated subthemes: 
No subcategory proposed 
Transversal theme 
 
Altered time perception: depicts a change in 
NDErs’ perception of time.  
 
Associated subthemes: 
No subcategory proposed 
 
2.1.3.3 Validity and reliability of analysis 
 As recommended (Malterud, 2001; Miles & Huberman, 1994), several 
quality criteria were used to ensure the validity of the results and their 
interpretation: 1) triangulation: two complementary researchers (SD and BP) with 
different backgrounds (respectively MS in psychology and PhD in public health) 
performed the analysis; 2) researchers were experimented in qualitative research 
but novices in the NDE topic, which stimulates the exploration of new insights; 3) 
for each theme, the number of quotations were counted to get a more precise idea 
of their importance; 4) intercodage: a Cohen's kappa coefficient was calculated; 5) 
theoretical validation: done by comparing the results with existing scientific data 
(see Discussion); 6) an iterative process was then performed. If a new code was 
introduced, all of the narratives were read again to ensure that the data extraction 
was complete and to verify that the initial classification was accurate. 
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2.1.4 Results 
2.1.4.1 Extracted themes 
 The length of the narratives varied from four lines to three pages. The 
analysis conducted on the 34 narratives allowed us to distinguish 11 main themes, 
among which we identified ten time-bounded themes and one transversal theme. 
A time-bounded theme refers to an event that is relatively isolated within 
narratives and only occurs during a part of the experience, whereas a transversal 
theme characterizes the whole experience and is not described as an isolated 
moment. Moreover, the transversal theme generally appeared in narratives as the 
result of a retrospective consideration and as a comment of self-reflection on the 
experience. Arbitrarily selected illustrative verbatim are given in Table 9. Themes 
are detailed in the paragraphs below. 
 
Table 9. Arbitrarily selected examples of verbatim for each extracted theme. 
NDE theme Verbatim (gender; age at interview; reported time since 
NDE) 
Light “I moved forward. I was not walking. I felt attracted by the 
light and only my will was making me move forward.” (Male; 
43 years old; 15 years) 
 
“Suddenly everything got spotless white. A very bright white 
that I had never seen before. As if there were a multitude of 
rays coming from this light. But it was not dazzling. It was 
glorious! Beings appeared and then disappeared, as if they 
were passing through the light.” (Female; 76 years old; 6 
years) 
 
“The moment after, I was 'integrated' in an intense light that 
was so white that we cannot even imagine it, not enough 
words to describe that light. It is not dazzling, but it is 
extremely powerful, it is powerfully bright.” (Male; 61 years 
old; 20 years) 
Return  
 
“Quiet floating ride around the hospital and finally a meeting 
with a guy that sees me, hears me, ‘thinks’ me. He gives me 
the choice between two doors: this one, you go back home, 
but it will be difficult. OK, I go back, I cannot leave the 
children alone with their mother. Going back to my body is a 
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horrible pain; I had simply forgotten what life was like, pain 
and 90% ignorance.” (Male; 50 years old; 15 years) 
 
“Everything disappeared all at once and I once again saw the 
doctors and the firemen taking care of me. The paramedic 
told me that I just had a cardiac arrest of 30 seconds. 30 
seconds only, even though I have the impression that a very 
long time went by!” (Male; 52 years old; 4 years) 
Meeting/encounter “He talks to me. In fact, he does not talk to me: I am hearing 
his voice inside of me… I only remember one sentence, and I 
do not remember if he communicated anything else.” (Male; 
61 years old; 20 years) 
  
“I was also seeing forms, of a human appearance but 
beheaded. They inspired me fear.” (Male; 44 years old; 7 
years) 
  
“I saw my son who died at the age of 23.” (Female; 61 years 
old; 5 years) 
Hyperlucidity 
 
 
“I felt like I was a genius! I was thinking very fast, everything 
was working out well for me!” (Male; 64 years old; 9 years) 
  
“When my expansion was over, I was everywhere, I was 
everything at the same time, I was the sky, I was the ground, I 
was the trees and I felt the wind blowing in my leaves, I was 
the sea, and I was also my parents, my friends, people I had 
not met before but who, at that point, I knew because they 
were part of me. I was genuinely everything at the same time, 
everything was connected in one way or another.” (Female; 
34 years old; 19 years) 
  
“My mind is lighter and quicker. It is free to think and to 
evolve without any restriction. I am still surprised about these 
infinite possibilities available to me as a mind, impossible to 
imagine or to realize with a physical body.” (Male; 61 years 
old; 20 years) 
Description of scenes “I found out I was on a kind of pirogue that followed the flow 
of a very black river. I was moving toward a bridge where 
beheaded beings were standing. They extricated other 
persons from the pirogues that passed under the bridge. They 
tore away their nails and they tortured them. It was really 
horrible.” (Male; 44 years old; 7 years) 
  
“From a moment to the next I found myself on the top of a 
hill, overlooking a huge place composed of forests of fir trees 
and flowers. I felt an indescribable wind, filled with happiness. 
The sky was filled with magnificent colors that I had never 
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seen before. Clouds passed in the sky rapidly.” (Male; 44 
years old; 7 years) 
Darkness “First, I remember being in a dark place, with no walls or 
rooms. I was wondering what I was doing there.” (Female; 76 
years old; 6 years) 
  
“I heard a machine then nothing more, no more sound, 
nothing. I was in an absolute darkness.” (Female; 34 years old; 
19 years) 
Out-of-body experience “It all starts with a very clear feeling: the certainty of leaving 
my body.” (Male; 61 years old; 20 years)  
 
“It is when I was transported to go down from the second 
floor on the stretcher that I had the strange feeling of seeing, 
from very high above the stairwell, that stretcher carried by 
four of my comrades that I was hearing as if they were very 
far. From that height, I could see everything.” (Male; 70 years 
old; 51 years) 
 
Awareness of death “I knew I was dead but I felt good, happy.” (Male; 56 years 
old; 6 years) 
  
“I am thinking: « Well, I am dead ». In fact, it is quite pleasant; 
I abandoned my life, my sick and emotionally troubled body 
for this marvelous state of well-being and peace.” (Male; 61 
years old; 20 years) 
Life events “I do not know how it all began but I saw my life flashing 
before my eyes, essentially from the age of approximately 2 
years old to 18. I had no notion of time. It seems like I was 
living whole scenes of my life over again. It was a real 
pleasure to live these happy moments over again, like when I 
was steeling the cherries from the trees when I was a child. I 
was feeling good. I did not want that moment to end.” (Male; 
62 years old; 5 years) 
  
“I wandered for a while in what used to be my life, stopping, 
from time to time, on some events I had forgotten about or, 
by contrast, looking with delight at another scene that I had 
particularly enjoyed. Fragments deeply buried in my memory 
scrolled. Things that I had completely concealed from my 
conscious memory. I am surprised to find out about some 
scenes that seemed to be part of my life and that my memory 
has decided to overshadow. However, here they are! I am 
surprised to have done one thing or the other. All of this in a 
clear and sharp form.” (Male; 61 years old; 20 years) 
 
“I experienced visions of my future. Most of the events I saw 
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during my visions occurred in the 9 years following my cardiac 
arrest. Some of them have not yet occurred but I am deeply 
convinced that they will come true.” (Male; 50 years old; 15 
years) 
Entrance in the NDE “After a period of dark night, I found myself standing with no 
transition in a waiting room.” (Female; 51 years old; 11 years) 
 
“According to me, it seems that death comes relatively gently, 
at least in such a case. We open our eyes and we see tons of 
dancing lights. Even if I didn’t live the experience, the 
sensation of sliding in a bath of liquid nitrogen seems to be 
the best way to express what I felt. Then, simply, the pain 
stops.” (Male; 50 years old; 1 year) 
Altered time perception* “I am unable to tell how much time it lasted.” (Male; 65 years 
old; 6 years) 
 
“This impression of slow motion and of floating is still present 
within me, as if the notion of space and time had diluted.” 
(Male; 57 years old; 13 years) 
*Transversal theme 
 
2.1.4.1.1 Time-bounded themes 
 
 Light: Considering all narratives, 25 NDE experiencers mentioned seeing a 
light. This light was attached to a feeling of attractiveness for ten of them. Two NDE 
experiencers felt enveloped in this light. The description of the light comprised the 
following characteristics: intense (n=16), white (n=15), indescribable/unusual (n=5), 
soft and diffuse (n=3), not dazzling (n=3), and yellow (n=1). The physical sensations 
reported during this experience were an absence of body (n=3) and an absence of 
pain (n=1). NDE experiencers expressed a feeling of happiness, serenity and 
tranquility (n=15). The origin of the light was at the end of a tunnel or a corridor 
(n=9), diffused (it came from everywhere; n=7), or from an unknown origin (n=1). 
 Return: Nineteen individuals detailed the moment they got back from the 
NDE. Five NDE experiencers received a message that compelled them to get out of 
the experience. Four of them reported being expelled or ejected from the 
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experience. Getting back from the NDE was associated with an intense sleep (n=2) 
or with a state of confusion (n=2). One NDE experiencer mentioned he had woken 
up after a period of dark night and three others characterized the return as brutal, 
without transition. Two narratives included the idea of being brought back into the 
body. Two NDE experiencers did not remember how it happened. One 
NDEexperiencer attempted to live the experience again (which ended up in failure) 
and 12 NDE experiencers mentioned an opposition between the feeling of well-
being during the NDE and the problems they encountered when they got back to 
“everyday life”. 
 Meeting/encounter: A meeting with other beings (human or imaginary) 
was described in 15 narratives. The environment in which this meeting happened 
varied: a landscape (n=1), a waiting queue (n=1), an office (n=1), in a light (n=4), 
during a walk (n=1), and on a river (n=1). The message/the content of the 
interaction was mostly about getting back to life (n=7). The type of interaction with 
the being also varied: unilateral message (only one being communicates towards 
the other; n=4), telepathy (n=4), or dialogue (n=3). NDE experiencers mainly saw 
their interlocutor (n=11), however, others described the sensation of a presence 
(n=2). The meeting happened with human beings that were unknown to the 
individual, relatives, family members (deceased (n=8) or not (n=3)), and non-human 
beings. This experience was accompanied by a feeling of well-being (n=4), an 
absence of pain (n=3), fear (n=2), unbearable sadness (n = 2), pain (n=1), and 
confidence (n=1). 
 Hyperlucidity: Fourteen NDE experiencers reported a feeling of power and 
extreme lucidity. Hyperlucidity was associated with absolute clarity/understanding 
(n=3), the feeling of being a genius (n=2), clear and quick wit (n=2), or exceptional 
intelligence (n=1). This experience was in some cases accompanied by a physical 
release (n=4). Five people described this experience as being accompanied by a 
sense of power and omniscience: direct control over the thoughts of others (n=2), 
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omnipotence (n=2), or having an answer to everything (n=1). Three of them linked 
this supreme intelligence to the fact of being united with everything that 
surrounded them, to the global and universal character of this theme. This 
experience was associated with a feeling of well-being (n=6), a lack of physical pain 
(n=4), astonishment (n=4), and an inability to describe the feeling (n=1). 
 Description of scenes: Fourteen NDE experiencers provided a detailed 
description of the setting in which they were immersed. Six of them highlighted the 
indescribable aspect of the place (i.e., they showed difficulties in finding words). 
Four NDE experiencers evoked the idea of nature (e.g., vast meadow). This 
experience was accompanied by an intense feeling of well-being (n=10), a feeling of 
infinity (n=5), a lack of pain (n=4), astonishment (n=3), and fear (n=1). 
 Darkness: Thirteen participants mentioned the idea of “black” or “dark”. 
They described a gloomy/dark environment with no objects or way out. For several 
NDE experiencers (n=7), this darkness occurred in contrast to or following a bright 
environment. More specifically, NDE experiencers mentioned an absolute darkness 
(n=7), a gloomy environment (n=5), a gloomy tunnel (n=2), a period of dark night 
(n=1), and a waiting room with no walls (n=1). Two NDE experiencers described an 
idea of movement (i.e., passing through a dark night). This experience was 
associated with the absence or the presence of sound (respectively n=2 and n=1), 
and the absence of sight (n=2). This theme was linked to varied emotions: fear 
(n=1), calmness (n=1), and amazement (n=1). 
 Out-of-body experience: Twelve participants reported leaving their body. 
They “saw” themselves (i.e., observer's perspective). Four of them evoked the 
awareness of being out of their bodies. A detailed visual description of the 
emergency situation was reported by nine NDE experiencers. Six of them reported 
observing the scene from a higher position (positioned above). Three of them 
reported having felt a real detachment of their body and 1 expressed the feeling of 
reintegrating his/her body. Two NDE experiencers said they wanted to 
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communicate with the people they were observing, in vain. This experience was 
accompanied by an absence of pain (n=3), thirst (n=1), extreme cold (n=1), and 
body perception (n=1). The experience was also accompanied by a feeling of well-
being (n=7), amazement (n=3), exasperation (n=1), and rejection of the observed 
body (n=1). 
 Awareness of death: Nine NDE experiencers stated being aware that they 
were dying. 
 Life events: Eight NDE experiencers out of 34 described a past or future life 
event. During these visions, they perceived different moments of their past or 
future lives. Life was reviewed (n=5) or relived (n=2). The vision referred to the 
future life (n=1) or, in the majority of cases, to the past life (n=6). Three participants 
stated that life passages comprised an alternation between happy and unhappy 
moments. These passages were imposed (n=2) or selected (n=1). This life review 
was associated with curiosity or surprise (n=3), happiness (n=2), difficulties in 
reviewing (n=2), or with a feeling of indifference (n=1). 
 Entrance in the NDE: Six NDE experiencers detailed the moment they 
entered the NDE. For three of them, the entrance was progressive and soft. For 
two others, the entrance followed a period of dark night. Another NDE experiencer 
wrote he did not know how it all started. 
 
2.1.4.1.2 Transversal theme 
  
 Altered time perception: Sixteen NDE experiencers mentioned a change in 
the perception of time during their experience. Eight of them expressed a total loss 
of time marker. Six of them reported an impression of slow motion or the feeling 
that time had stopped. Finally, three NDE experiencers reported an unusual and 
Study 1. Thematic analysis of near-death experiences accounts 
 
77 
 
ineffable perception of time, and therefore described it in an uncommon way (e.g., 
“integrated time”). 
2.1.5 Discussion 
 Since the past three decades, considerable work has been undertaken to 
describe NDEs in sufficient details, however, most studies have been using closed 
NDE questionnaires in order to identify the presence of a NDE and assess this 
phenomenon (e.g., Charland-Verville et al., 2014; Palmieri et al., 2014). Yet, 
previous studies (Martial, Charland-Verville, Cassol, et al., 2017; Moore & Greyson, 
2017; Palmieri et al., 2014; Thonnard et al., 2013) have shown that NDE memories 
contained more characteristics than other memories of imagined and real events, 
which highlights the fact that we possess very rich and detailed narratives of these 
experiences. We therefore aimed to examine all the details stored in NDEs 
narratives using a qualitative thematic analysis. 
 One of the major contributions of our study is that it sheds a different light 
on the structure of the narratives by identifying one “transversal” theme and ten 
“time-bounded” themes. More specifically, “transversal” themes characterize the 
whole narrative and do not correspond to a specific moment of the experience. 
Moreover, the transversal theme (i.e., “altered time perception” in this particular 
case) is generally addressed retrospectively by NDE experiencers as they reflect 
upon their experience. On the contrary, “time-bounded” themes have more limited 
time duration and are generally described as clear isolated events (e.g., OBEs). 
 The originality of our approach also resides in the design of the study 
intended to provide new insights regarding the extracted themes. Firstly, the 
etiology group of our participants was not revealed to the readers until the end of 
the analysis, and secondly, they were not experts in the field of NDEs. For example, 
researchers had no knowledge of existing quantitative scales (e.g., Greyson NDE 
scale; Greyson, 1983) which, in the opposite case, could have had an incidence on 
Study 1. Thematic analysis of near-death experiences accounts 
 
78 
 
the extraction process of the themes. By proceeding on this basis, we notably 
aimed at highlighting themes which might have been left aside in previous studies. 
 In the end, we identified the “altered time perception” as a transversal 
theme. This loss of time marker has already been reported in the NDE literature as 
a defining NDE feature (e.g., Greyson, 1983; Van Lommel et al., 2001). 
Concomitantly, ten time-bounded themes have also emerged from our analysis, 
among which seven are similar, or even identical, to the features that are described 
in the Greyson NDE scale (Greyson, 1983) and the WCEI (Ring, 1980): the vision of a 
“light”, a “meeting”, “hyper-lucidity”, “darkness”, “OBEs”, “life events”, and 
“awareness of death”. It is worth noting that some of the themes that have 
emerged from our qualitative thematic analysis include several features of the 
Greyson NDE scale (e.g., “life events” include “life reviews” as well as 
“precognitions”). Besides, some of the components we have identified are less 
specific. For instance, we identified the theme “light” whereas the Greyson NDE 
scale focuses on a “brilliant”, “unusual” or “mystical” light.  
 In parallel, readers identified three additional themes that partly overlap 
with the features identified by Greyson (1983) and Ring (1980), namely, “entrance 
in the NDE”, “return” and “description of scenes”. These themes however seem to 
be described differently and to integrate complementary information and details. 
Indeed, for the theme “entrance in the NDE” some NDE experiencers remembered 
and spontaneously detailed the way their NDE began, abruptly or progressively. As 
regard to the other two themes, “return” and “description of scenes”, it must be 
noted that they somehow overlap with existing features assessed by the widely 
used Greyson NDE scale. If we consider, in the first instance, the theme “return”, 
we can establish the link with the concept of “border” raised by the scale. Indeed, 
the theme encompasses the decision to get back to life and the fact that some NDE 
experiencers felt like they were sent back against their will. Yet, the theme “return” 
is broader than Greyson's feature as it also comprises the way NDE experiencers 
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felt when returning to “usual awareness”, and the substantial gap that exists 
between the emotions experienced during the NDE and during everyday life. 
Indeed, part of the NDE experiencers emphasized the opposition between the 
feeling of well-being during the NDE and the problems encountered or the pain 
they felt when they got back from their NDE. It is our view that this latter finding 
could at least partially explain some of the beneficial consequences of NDEs such as 
a reduced fear of death (Greyson & Harris, 1987). The way NDE experiencers came 
back from their NDE (Moody, 1975) and how resentful and frustrated they could 
feel about it (Schwaninger et al., 2002) have already been brought to light by some 
authors, and we therefore believe that this issue deserves careful consideration in 
the future. Second, the theme “description of scenes” could lead one to think to 
the unearthly world reflected in the Greyson NDE scale. Nonetheless, this theme 
not only includes unfamiliar and mystical places but also comprises the description 
of the setting in which NDE expeiencers found themselves during their NDEs (e.g., 
an operating room or the scene of the incident). Interestingly, even though some of 
the places they saw were portrayed as ineffable and indescribable, participants 
endeavored to detail them. To our knowledge, no NDE questionnaire formally 
investigates those three themes and we believe that further work should be done 
to collect them more systematically. Furthermore, it could be interesting to explore 
the way they are described in narratives relating NDEs of other etiologies. 
 Overall, these results corroborate the content of existing tools such as the 
Greyson NDEscale (Greyson, 1983), but also highlight new aspects of NDEs that 
could be further investigated in future studies. This recurrence in the extracted 
themes/features supports the view of authors such as Facco, Agrillo, and Greyson 
(2015) who suggest that NDE testimonies from all around the world show sufficient 
commonality to consider NDEs as “universal human experiences”. In addition to 
outlining the structure of narratives, text analyses explore the context of reported 
themes and provide detailed descriptions of NDEs. In our sample, the “light”, 
usually qualified as “brilliant”, “unusual” or “mystical” in the NDE literature (e.g., 
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Greyson, 1983), is also described as “soft”, “diffuse” and “white” – interestingly, 
the majority the NDE experiencers who saw the light depicted a white light. 
Besides, NDE experiencers evoked a variety of strong feelings to describe most of 
the extracted themes and depicted a wide range of emotional states. Indeed, they 
not only mentioned feelings of peace or joy but also reported feelings of 
astonishment, amazement, surprise and fear to describe the identified themes. In 
addition, it is worth noting that negative feelings such as fear are also comprised in 
positive NDEs. This wide range of emotions partly explains the fact that the feature 
“feelings of peace, pleasantness or joy”, consistently reported in other studies on 
cardiac arrest survivors (e.g., Charland-Verville et al., 2014; Greyson, 2003; Parnia 
et al., 2001), has not been high-lightened as a key element following our analysis. 
Even though pleasant feelings were frequently reported, readers considered that 
their identification as a key theme would have masked the diversity of the 
emotions felt by NDE experiencers, especially negative ones. In addition, readers 
judged that positive feelings, such as pleasantness or joy, did not appear as a 
theme on their own but rather characterized some of the other themes that have 
been identified by the readers. As a matter of fact, “light”, “hyper-lucidity”, “OBEs” 
and “awareness of death” are generally associated with positive feelings (e.g., well-
being, happiness, serenity or amazement). On the contrary, “meeting”, “darkness”, 
“life events”, “description of scenes” and “return” are related to conflicting 
emotions. Finally, “entering the NDE” and “altered time perception” rarely have an 
emotional value. In most cases, NDE experiencers seem to use a wide range of 
qualifiers to describe their experience, which makes each narrative unique. In a 
nutshell, it has to be underlined that the keyness of a theme in qualitative analysis 
does not fundamentally lie on quantifiable measures but rather depends on the 
researcher's judgment based on the content of the accounts (Braun & Clarke, 
2006). 
 Existing questionnaires, such as the Greyson NDE scale, allowed 
researchers to gather data and identify NDE experiencers. Nonetheless, these tools 
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do not offer the possibility to distinguish between NDEs of different etiologies, or 
between classical NDEs and “NDE-like” experiences. In addition to the use of those 
scales, we believe that thematic analysis, combined with other types of qualitative 
analysis methods such as discourse analysis (Starks & Brown Trinidad, 2007), 
should help to explore this issue further. Yet, qualitative analysis methods require 
good quality narratives and appropriate data collection. In this sense, it would be 
interesting to have a more systematic approach for data collection in order to 
obtain more detailed narratives. Semi-structured interviews are recommended in 
such a framework, requiring well-constructed interview guides. Moreover, it could 
be of a great interest to look into the meanings attached to such experiences and 
to analyze how NDE experiencers reflect upon NDEs and their consequences on 
their lives. Besides, out of concern for methodological rigour, only narratives that 
scored 7 or more on the Greyson NDE scale were included in our study sample. 
Still, it would be interesting to carry out analyses on the narratives of all the NDE 
experiencers who have contacted us after a cardiac arrest, without taking any cut-
off score into account. 
 Finally, some issues remain to be addressed. First, the sample size in the 
present study is limited. Qualitative research is, however, very intensive and time 
consuming, which makes analysis of large samples impractical. Indeed, sample size 
in qualitative research is frequently much smaller than in quantitative study and 
generally does not exceed 50 participants (Pope, Van Royen, & Baker, 2002). 
Besides, given the preliminary use of the presented methodology, we decided in 
the first instance to restrict the analysis to the narratives of people who had lived 
comparable life-threatening situations, namely a cardiac arrest. As already 
mentioned above, it would however be of a great interest to invest in further 
analysis of reports depicting other types of experiences such as “NDEs-like” or close 
brushes with death that did not lead to a NDE. Second, because NDE experiencers 
voluntarily contacted us, our sample might suffer from a self-selection bias. Due to 
the mystical connotation of these experiences, and because they may be perceived 
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as negative and upsetting, some people might feel reluctant to share these events. 
Lastly, narratives were collected retrospectively and time elapsed since the NDE 
varies which could represent a source of potential bias. Indeed, one can 
hypothesize that NDE experiencers' narratives may have been tainted by 
descriptions of the phenomenon in the media and in lay literature. Consistent with 
this hypothesis, Charland-Verville and collaborators (2014) pointed out that some 
NDE features seemed to be more frequent in retrospective designs. We underline, 
however, that  Greyson (2007) had highlighted, prior to that, the consistency of 
NDE memories over a period of two decades. Given this potential bias and the 
ineffability of the experience, it would be interesting to collect NDE accounts and 
look into the terms used by NDE experiencers when recovering from their coma 
and depicting the experience for the first time. These observations and potential 
biases call for further studies to analyze prospective trials using thematic analysis 
method. 
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2.2 Study 2. Distressing near-death experience accounts 
2.2.1 Summary 
 NDEs are usually associated with positive affect, however, a small 
proportion is considered distressing. We aimed to look into the proportion of 
distressing NDEs in a sample of NDE narratives, categorize distressing narratives 
according to Greyson and Bush’s classification (inverse, void or hellish), and 
compare distressing and “classical” NDEs. Participants wrote down their 
experience, completed the MCQ and the Greyson scale. The proportion of suicidal 
attempts, content and intensity of distressing and classical NDEs were compared 
using frequentist and Bayesian statistics. Distressing NDEs represent 14% of our 
sample (n=123). We identified eight inverse, eight hellish and one void accounts. 
The proportion of suicide survivors is higher in distressing NDEs as compared to 
classical ones. Finally, memories of distressing NDEs appear as phenomenologically 
detailed as classical ones. Distressing NDEs deserve careful consideration to ensure 
their integration into experiencers’ identity.  
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2.2.2 Introduction 
 Although generally described as pleasant and leading to positive changes, a 
small proportion of NDEs has been depicted as negative and sometimes “hellish”. 
To date, only a few studies have addressed these distressing experiences and we 
do not precisely know their causes and potential consequences (Bush, 2002; 
Greyson & Bush, 1992). Moreover, their prevalence seems to vary widely. For 
example, most early studies on NDEs only depicted positive emotions (Greyson & 
Stevenson, 1980; Ring, 1980). Lindley and collaborators (1981) however published 
an interdisciplinary study in which they identified 55 NDE experiencers, of which 
eleven reported “negative” experiences (including one “hellish”). More recently, a 
study by our group (Charland-Verville et al., 2014) pointed out that 10% of the 
sample did not describe positive emotions. Overall, we should note that the 
heterogeneous set of tools used to identify negative NDEs might strongly influence 
the data. Moreover, some of these numbers may underestimate the actual 
percentage. Indeed, although NDEs seem to come out of the taboo atmosphere, 
some NDE experiencers might still feel reluctant to share them. This could be even 
more the case when these experiences are perceived as distressing or upsetting, as 
memory retrieval may be painful and as people might feel stigmatised (Greyson & 
Bush, 1992). Besides, as stated by Greyson and Bush (1992), current widely used 
NDE questionnaires, such as the Greyson NDE scale (Greyson, 1983) and the WCEI 
(Ring, 1980), only focus on positive emotions and might fail in identifying these 
distressing experiences. Only a small number of empirical studies have addressed 
distressing NDEs in-depth. In addition, most of them have focused on single cases, 
thereby affecting the generalisability of their observations (Bonenfant, 2001; Irwin 
& Bramwell, 1988). One noteworthy finding is the existence of experiences 
beginning the same way as classical NDEs, but that suddenly become negatively 
toned. To learn more about the content of distressing NDEs, Greyson and Bush 
(1992) looked closely into the content of 50 self-reported accounts and identified 
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three subcategories of frightening experiences. Firstly, those containing features 
similar to classical NDEs, with the exception that the NDE experiencer considers the 
whole experience as unpleasant. According to these authors, it is the most 
frequently reported type. These distressing NDEs had already been described by 
Ring (1994) who called them “inverse”, with reference to their resemblance with 
classical NDEs. Secondly, those in which the NDE experiencer is in an isolated and 
eternal void (i.e., “void” NDEs). Finally, the rarest type, “hellish”, is described as 
experiences of visiting hell-like regions and encountering demonic beings. Later, 
Rommer (2000) suggested a fourth type in which NDE experiencers are heavily 
disturbed by a life review. This category has however been classified by Bush 
(2002) as a subset of the “hellish” experiences. Although there has been an 
indication about the relative size of the different categories, the occurrence of 
these three subcategories in the reported sample has not been supplied. In 
addition, even though this pioneer article illustrates distressing experiences by 
providing numerous verbatim accounts, to date, no study has performed a rigorous 
analysis of the phenomenology of these subtypes of NDEs by multiple coders. 
 Regarding potential causes, the unpredictable aspect of NDEs makes it 
difficult to identify the psychological and physiological status before a distressing 
experience (Greyson & Bush, 1992). The literature has often suggested a 
relationship between the negative emotional context of suicides and the nature of 
the resulting NDE (Greyson & Stevenson, 1980; Ring & Franklin, 1982). However, 
even if this relationship remains largely under-explored, Ring and Franklin (1982) 
have reported that suicide-related NDEs are not different from NDEs in general. 
Overall, the few available scientific data and the potentially long-lasting emotional 
trauma triggered by frightening NDEs advocate for further rigorous studies (Bush, 
2002).  
 In this respect, we aim to (1) look for the proportion of “distressing” NDEs 
in a relatively large sample of self-reported NDE narratives; (2) classify the 
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distressing narratives by multiple assessors, in order to have a precise estimate of 
the occurrence of the three subtypes of “negative” NDEs; and (3) compare 
memories of distressing and “classical” (i.e., experiences comprising typical 
features and not perceived as negative) NDEs on the basis of their content, 
intensity, phenomenological details and proportions of suicidal attempts. 
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2.2.3 Materials and methods 
2.2.3.1 Participants and procedure 
2.2.3.1.1 Participants 
  
 Participants were initially recruited following calls for NDE testimonies via 
the websites, the appearances in local media and the publications of the Coma 
Science Group (GIGA Consciousness, University and University Hospital of Liège, 
Belgium) as well as the IANDS (France and Flanders). They were then mailed 
questionnaires including items relating to socio-demographic (gender, age at NDE, 
age at interview) and clinical (time since NDE, presence of a loss of consciousness 
exceeding one hour) characteristics. Participants, who were not aware of the 
specific purpose of the research, were subsequently invited to freely write down a 
detailed description of the experience on blank sheets of paper, with no restriction 
regarding text size. Lastly, they were asked to complete the Greyson NDE scale 
(Greyson, 1983) in order to identify “true” NDEs using a cut-off score of 7 (Greyson, 
1983; Lange et al., 2004), as described previously. We only included experiences 
equal or above the cut-off score of 7 that occurred following a severe brain injury 
accompanied by a period of coma (loss of consciousness exceeding one hour) and a 
hospitalisation in an intensive care unit. Additionally, participants filled out a short 
version (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2008) of the MCQ (Johnson et al., 1988). 
It includes 16 items (each rated on a 1–7 points Likert scale) assessing the following 
categories of memory characteristics: memory clarity, sensory details, self-
referential and emotional information, reactivation frequency, and confidence in 
the memory. The study was carried out in accordance with the recommendations 
of the ethics committee of the Faculty of Medicine of the University of Liège. The 
protocol was approved by the ethics committee of the Faculty of Medicine of the 
University of Liège. All participants completed a written informed consent in 
accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. 
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2.2.3.1.2 Classification of distressing experiences 
 
 The first step consisted in identifying distressing NDE narratives. To that 
end, we evaluated responses at item 14 of the short version of the MCQ (i.e., 
"When the event happened, my emotions were: −3 = “very negative”, 0 = 
“neutral”, +3 = “very positive”") and selected the narratives that were rated 
between −1 and −3. All written narratives were therefore divided into two main 
emotions-related groups (i.e., distressing NDEs and “classical” NDEs). The dataset, 
including distressing narratives that had to be classified into three subtypes (i.e., 
inverse, void and hellish), was created and composed of five Dutch and 12 French 
narratives. Their average length was of 975 words per account (ranging from 206 to 
4795). A detailed description of the subtypes (Greyson & Bush, 1992) was provided 
to coders (i.e., two Dutch speakers and two French speakers). Each account was 
then independently read by the two coders who perfectly mastered the language in 
which it was written. NDE features corresponding to each of the three subtypes 
were highlighted in different colours. The pre determined features corresponding 
to each type of distressing NDE can be found in Table 10. The number of observed 
agreements was 5/5 for Dutch narratives and 11/12 (92%) for French narratives. 
 Inter-rater reliability was assessed using a Cohen’s kappa coefficient. The 
closer the value to 1, the better the concordance is between coders (Landis & Koch, 
1977). We obtained a Cohen’s kappa coefficient of 1 (“perfect” agreement) for 
Dutch narratives and of 0.855 (95% confidence intervals 0.583-1; “very good” 
agreement) for French narratives. Discrepancy was discussed in order to reach a 
final unanimous categorisation. 
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Table 10. General description and features belonging to distressing near-death 
experiences subtypes.  
Type General description and features 
Inverse Narratives contain classical NDE features but the event is considered as 
unpleasant (Greyson & Bush, 1992) Coders considered features described 
in the two most used NDE scales (i.e., Greyson NDE scale and Weighted 
Core Experience Index –WCEI– scale (Greyson, 1983; Ring, 1980): 1) 
intense feeling of joy, 2) peacefulness, 3) altered time perception, 4) 
accelerated thoughts, 5) vision of scenes belonging to one’s past/life 
review, 6) sensation of understanding everything (about oneself, others or 
the universe), 7) feeling of harmony with the universe, 8) vision of a very 
bright light, 9) communication with a light, 10) vision of/moving through a 
tunnel, 11) more vivid senses than usual, 12) being aware of things 
happening elsewhere, 13) visions of the future, 14) out-of-body 
experience, 15) entering a non-terrestrial world, 16) encounter with a 
mystical being/voice, 17) vision of dead or religious spirits, 18) coming to a 
border/point of no return, 19) awareness of being dead, 20) observation of 
colors, 21) observation of a celestial landscape, and 22) darkness.  
Void Narratives might contain features belonging to the classical type but in a 
smaller amount. Void accounts should also involve 1) an acute awareness 
of nonexistence, 2) the sensation of being completely alone forever in an 
absolute void, and/or 3) receiving a convincing message saying that the 
real world never existed (Greyson & Bush, 1992). 
Hellish Narratives might also contain features belonging to the prototypical type 
and to the void type. This subtype should also encompass hellish imagery 
and sounds such as 1) the vision of an ugly or foreboding landscape, 2) the 
presence of demonic beings, 3) hearing loud and/or annoying noises, 4) 
seeing frightening animals and/or 5) encountering other beings in extreme 
distress (Greyson & Bush, 1992). 
  
2.2.3.2 Statistical analysis 
 We calculated the proportion (%) of distressing NDEs by taking into account 
all the NDE experiencers that had provided us with a written narrative and who had 
duly completed all questionnaires (i.e., Greyson NDE scale and MCQ) since the 
beginning of enrolment in 2010. NDE experiencers who reported distressing NDEs 
were compared to those who reported classical NDEs regarding demographical and 
clinical information. Differences between groups were assessed using Student’s t-
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tests (for age at NDE, age at interview and time elapsed since NDE) and Fisher’s 
exact tests (for etiology and gender). Results were considered significant at an 
alpha of 0.05 (p<0.05) and were expressed as mean ± SD for quantitative variables 
and as counts and proportions (%) for the qualitative variables. 
 Regarding answers at questionnaires, Greyson NDE scale scores 
distributions being skewed and the answers at the MCQ being ordinal data 
measures, distressing and classical NDEs were compared using Mann Whitney U 
tests and results were expressed as median (IQR). We corrected for multiple 
comparisons using a Bonferroni correction, setting the criterion for statistical 
significance at p<0.0125 for the Greyson NDE subscales scores and at p<0.003 for 
the 16 items of the MCQ. The item relating to the valence was included in our 
analysis to ensure a clear difference between the two emotions-related groups. As 
a second step, and in accordance with recent recommendations (Dienes, 2014), we 
conducted Bayesian Mann–Whitney tests in addition to frequentist inferential 
analyses. Indeed, unlike classical inference methods which can only provide 
evidence against the null hypothesis, Bayesian methods have the advantage of 
quantifying the evidence for and against it (Dienes, 2014). Regarding data 
interpretation, we considered a Bayes Factor (BF) of <3 as anecdotal evidence, 
between 3 and 10 as moderate evidence, between 10 and 30 as strong evidence, 
between 30 and 100 as very strong evidence, and higher than 100 as decisive 
evidence for the model tested relatively to the null or to another model (Lee & 
Wagenmakers, 2014). BF indicates Bayesian evidence for the presence of an effect 
relative to the null, and BF indicates evidence for the null. Data analyses were 
carried out using SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences, version 22.0, SPSS 
Inc., Chicago, IL, USA) and with the 0.9.0.1 version of the JASP software package for 
Bayesian analyses, using default settings for prior distributions. 
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2.2.4 Results 
2.2.4.1 Demographic data 
 We received the testimonies from 506 participants since the beginning of 
the enrolment in 2010. Among these, 123 individuals met the criteria of an NDE 
(i.e., Greyson NDE scale cut-off ≥7), had duly completed questionnaires and were 
included in our analyses, of which 17 were classified as distressing (14%). The 
distributions of demographic data of the two emotions-related subsamples follow a 
normal distribution. Distressing and classical NDE experiencers do not differ in 
terms of gender and age at NDE. Distressing NDE experiencers however include 
more suicide survivors, and classical NDE experiencers appear to be older at the 
time of the interview and to present a longer time elapsed since NDE (see Table 
11). 
 
Table 11. Demographical information of NDE experiencers who lived a distressing NDE vs. 
a classical NDE. 
 Distressing 
NDEs 
(n=17) 
Classical 
NDEs 
(n=106) 
p-Value   
Gender – female 
N(%) 
12 
(71) 
61 
(58) 
0.43   
Etiology – suicide 
attempt N(%) 
4 
(24) 
1 
(1) 
<0.001*   
   t p-Value GHedges 
(CI95) 
Age at NDE  
Mean in 
years(±SD) 
34 
(17) 
32 
(17) 
0.36 0.723 -0.118 
(-0.63-
0.395) 
Age at interview  
Mean in 
years(±SD) 
50 
(12) 
57 
(11) 
-2.417 0.025* 0.629 
(0.11-
1.174) 
Time since NDE  
Mean in 
years(±SD) 
16 
(16) 
24 
(17) 
-2.075 0.049* 0.474 
(-0.041-
0.99) 
*Results are significant. CI = Confidence interval. 
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2.2.4.2 Classification of distressing experiences 
 The final classification of all narratives includes 8 inverse, 8 hellish and 1 
void (see Table 12 for an example of each subtype of distressing NDE narratives). 
Additionally, the text analyses revealed that out of the 17 distressing narratives, 6 
clearly mention the presence of positive feelings at the beginning of the experience 
in their written narrative (i.e., peacefulness and/or joy). 
 
Table 12. Text excerpts of written distressing NDE narratives.  
Type Selected text excerpts translated from French (gender, age at interview) 
Inverse “First, I was sucked into a tunnel. Then, there was a descent into this 
tunnel. At an incredible speed. Perhaps the speed of light. A speed that 
does not last, a flash. It is hard to describe in words, it is very different from 
what I have experienced in the ‘normal’ world. This speed gives me the 
sensation of ‘no time’. In this tunnel, I saw flashes, ‘animated’ faces of 
missing people that I had loved (brother, grandfather). The smile of a little 
boy murdered when I was five, and lots of people I did not know. I 
experienced this ‘journey’ three times. Each time I came back to life. I was 
trying to tell the doctor that I was going back into the tunnel, that I would 
die again, but no sound came out of my mouth. At some point, the 
anesthesiologist said: ‘She tries to speak, I do not understand anything’. My 
mind was talking, screaming, calling for help. But nothing, no reaction, as if 
I was in a parallel world. I suffered terribly physically, I was exhausted, I felt 
abandoned by living beings. I struggled, completely alone, I did not want to 
join all these dead beings, although they were welcoming, reassuring. I 
knew I would die but I was not ready to give in to the temptation of rest”. 
(female, 57 years old) 
Hellish “There are more and more entities surrounding me and this dark 
environment is unbearable. The deafening noise invades the space that 
becomes increasingly dark. I would like this noise to stop. I am caught in a 
whirlwind, the dark gray haze around me is thick, and the smell and sound 
are getting more unbearable (…). And I am beginning to distinguish forms 
in this incredibly thick fog. Human, bestial, monstrous. I am swimming in a 
stinking stench filled with horrible and furtive creatures and I am feeling 
overwhelmed with pain. It hurts everywhere, no, worse, I am becoming 
pain. I understand that my suffering is just beginning. And I am scared. A 
growing fear, appalling. I would like to close my eyes and stop hearing and 
feeling. But it is impossible. My vision is very wide, I see everywhere at 
once, I see in front of me, above, below and on the sides; only a small part 
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on the back is not visible. The less I want to hear, see and feel, the more 
receptive I am. It is terrible, it is like I am absorbing the pain and suffering 
of all these beings... I am extremely lucid, I feel aware like I have never 
been before. Time no longer exists. I wish I could escape this place, escape 
time, but my anguish is such that I cannot move... as if these beings were 
holding me back. (...) I understand that I am between two worlds and that 
this in-between is none other than Hell”. (female, 42 years old) 
Void “I was in the dark. Time did not exist anymore. I did not have a physical 
body but the impression of being above it. There was no suffering. I was 
nothing. Then, below me, I saw an accident, I saw a girl. She suffered 
horribly because she was screaming. It hurt to hear her shouting so loud. 
Then, everything happened very quickly. This shouting person was me. I 
tried to get up, I screamed and I fell back. Anxious, I told to myself: ‘I am 
dead. I do not want to stay in the dark, I want to go to paradise. I have the 
right to go, I have always done everything properly’. I was floating into the 
dark, unaware of what was happening around me. A presence came near 
me and told me in a loud, clear, authoritarian voice: ‘Paradise does not 
exist!’. Self-confident, I answered that this is not true and I explained that I 
have never committed sins. (…) The voice repeated: ‘After death, it is over, 
there is nothing’. Teachers, priests and sisters taught me that if you never 
commit mortal sins, you go to heaven. I wanted to go to heaven. The clear 
and firm voice told me: ‘All those who taught you that lied to you, after 
death there is nothing!’. (…) The voice disappeared. No more voice, 
nothing, it was over. I was desperate, I was crying. Then I fell into an 
endless darkness at full speed. Always faster. There was nothing to stop me 
from falling. I was looking around to grab something. I realized there was 
nothing. It was total black. I was never going to stop falling”. (female, 60 
years old) 
 
2.2.4.3 Comparison of distressing and classical 
experiences 
 The comparison of distressing and classical NDEs regarding intensity (i.e., 
Greyson NDE scale total scores) and content (i.e., Greyson NDE scale components) 
revealed that distressing experiences show lower scores on the affective 
component (p<0.001). This was supported by Bayesian analyses which showed 
decisive evidence in favour of a difference between groups (see Table 13). By 
contrast, distressing and classical accounts do not seem to differ regarding total 
score as well as on the three other components of the Greyson NDE scale (i.e., 
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cognitive, paranormal and transcendental – see Table 13); Bayesian analyses 
provided positive evidence for the absence of a difference. The number of 
distressing NDE experiencers recalling each type of classical NDE feature included 
in the Greyson NDE scale can be found in Figure 3. Regarding the amount of 
memory details, the comparison of distressing and classical NDEs revealed a 
difference regarding emotions felt at the time of the event (i.e., valence) but the 
other items did not differ; this was supported with Bayesian evidence for the null 
effect for the majority of items (see Table 14). More specifically, our results 
indicate stronger evidence for no difference between distressing and classical NDEs 
in terms of self-reported memory clarity, sensory details, self-referential 
information, reactivation frequency, and confidence in the memory. This was also 
the case for emotion-related items, such as the personal importance and the 
feelings experienced while remembering. To ensure our results are not caused by 
the effect of confounding variables, we performed the analyses by controlling for 
age at interview and time since NDE, which led to similar results. 
  
 
Table 13. Score differences between distressing and classical NDEs on the Greyson NDE scale. 
 
 
Distressing NDEs 
(n=17) 
Classical NDEs 
(n=106) 
Ws p-value R 
(CI95) 
BF10 BF01 
Affective component  
Median(IQR) 
2 
(1-4) 
6 
(4-7.75) 
296.5 <0.001* -0.404 
(-0.542--0.245) 
42.276 0.135 
Cognitive component 
Median(IQR) 
3 
(2-5) 
3 
(2-6) 
963.5 0.645 -0.042  
(-0.217-0.136) 
0.482 2.076 
Paranormal component  
Median(IQR) 
4 
(3-6) 
4 
(2-5) 
1018.5 0.385 -0.079 
(-0.252-0.099) 
-0.303 5.701 
Transcendental component  
Median(IQR) 
4 
(3-4) 
4 
(2-6) 
862.5 0.779 -0.026 
(-0.202-0.151) 
0.207 4.822 
Total score 
Median(IQR) 
14 
(13-16) 
16 
(12-21) 
667.5 0.09 -0.155 
(-0.323-0.022) 
0.357  2.803 
 
Results for the components are considered statistically significant at p<0.01 after Bonferroni correction. *Results are significant. 
BF10=evidence in favour of an effect of the valence (distressing vs. classical) on the scores at the Greyson NDE scale. BF01=evidence in 
favour of a null effect of the valence (distressing vs. classical) on the scores at the Greyson NDE scale. 
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Figure 3 – Number of distressing NDE experiencers recalling each NDE feature by 
decreasing order.  
  
 
Table 14. Score differences between distressing and classical NDEs on the MCQ. 
MCQ Items Distressing NDEs 
Median 
(IQR) 
Classical NDEs 
Median 
(IQR) 
Ws p-value R 
(CI95) 
BF10 
 
BF01 
Feeling of re-experiencing 6(5-7) 6(5-7) 908.5 0.957 -0.005 
(-0.181-0.172) 
0.248 4.357 
Visual details 7(6-7) 7(6-7) 1015 0.346 -0.085 
(-0.258-0.093) 
0.289 3.684 
Other sensory details 5(3-7) 4(1-6) 1091.5 0.154 -0.129 
(-0.299-0.049) 
0.340 1.989 
Location 7(3-7) 7(6-7) 756 0.183 -0.120 
(-0.29-0.058) 
0.265 4.584 
Time 4(1-7) 3(1-6) 993 0.483 -0.064 
(-0.238-0.114) 
0.559 4.161 
Coherence 7(5-7) 7(6-7) 789.5 0.421 -0.074 
(-0.247-0.104) 
0.264 4.255 
Verbal component 4(3-5) 2(1-5) 1077 0.190 -0.119 
(-0.289-0.059) 
0.906 4.259 
Feeling emotions  7(5-7) 6(5-7) 958 0.612 -0.046 
(-0.221-0.132) 
0.219 4.621 
Real/imagined  7(6-7) 7(7-7) 819.5 0.466 -0.066  
(-0.24-0.112) 
0.308 3.715 
One’s own actions 7(3-7) 7(5-7) 851 0.790 -0.025 
(-0.201-0.152) 
0.222 4.159 
One’s own words 6(4-7) 6(1-7) 990.5 0.448 -0.069 
(-0.243-0.109) 
0.363 4.438 
One’s own thoughts 7(6-7) 7(5-7) 1069 0.149 -0.131 
 (-0.041-0.284) 
0.267 4.339 
  
 
Results for the MCQ items are considered statistically significant at p<0.003 after Bonferroni correction. *Results are significant. BF10=evidence in 
favour of an effect of the valence (distressing vs. classical) on the scores at the MCQ. BF01=evidence in favour of a null effect of the valence 
(distressing vs. classical) on the scores at the MCQ. 
Visual perspective 6(2-7) 6(4-7) 740 0.214 -0.113 
(-0.284-0.065) 
0.199 4.365 
Valence 1(1-3) 7(6-7) 143 <0.001* -0.559 
(-0.669- -0.424) 
64911 <0.001 
Personal importance  7(6-7) 7(6-7) 899 0.989 -0.002 
(-0.178-0.175) 
0.593 3.768 
Reactivation frequency  7(5-7) 6(4.25-7) 996 0.460 -0.067 
(-0.241-0.111) 
0.264 4.766 
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2.2.5 Discussion 
 Our main goal was to better document distressing NDEs which remain 
poorly studied (Bonenfant, 2001; Bush & Greyson, 1994; Greyson & Bush, 1992; 
Irwin & Bramwell, 1988). This study investigated three major aspects of these 
experiences: (1) the proportion of distressing NDEs in our sample, (2) their 
distribution according to the three categories previously established by Greyson 
and Bush (1992), and (3) the phenomenological and contextual differences existing 
between the memories of distressing and classical NDEs. With regard to our first 
aim, the data suggests that distressing NDEs represent 14% of our total NDE 
sample. Earlier studies generally reported percentages ranging from 1% to 10% 
(e.g., Charland-Verville et al., 2014; Greyson & Bush, 1992). These different 
proportions can be attributed to the very broad definitions of distressing NDEs, as 
well as the varying methodologies. By contrast with previous research, we used a 
rigorous methodology to identify distressing NDEs (i.e., an item asking participants 
to rate their emotions at the time of the NDE). An additional plausible explanation 
is that the distressing dimensions of the experience, added to its mystical aspect, 
could deter people from sharing it. A combination of the aforementioned factors 
could contribute to the observed discrepancies. Our second objective was to 
replicate Greyson and Bush’s (1992) classification of distressing NDEs in order to 
give a more accurate estimate of the number of narratives belonging to each 
subtype. Indeed, the aforementioned authors did not indicate the number of 
accounts belonging to each category and what proportion represents their sample 
of distressing narratives when considering their own database of testimonies. 
Interestingly, our distribution is not fully in line with the results obtained by 
Greyson and Bush (i.e., in decreasing order of frequency: the inverse, the void and 
the hellish NDE; (1992). Indeed, the present sample presents an equal number of 
inverse and hellish NDE narratives and only one void experience. Although the 
exact distribution differs, analyses seem to confirm Greyson and Bush’s (1992) 
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classification. Rommer (2000) proposed a fourth type composed of a life review 
during which the NDE experiencer feels negatively judged by a higher power being. 
We effectively found one distressing narrative that included this feature and could 
match this category but, in accordance to Bush’s (2002) view, it was categorised as 
hellish. To date, little is known about the resulting consequences of these subtypes 
of NDEs. Bush and Greyson (1992) however described three possible responses to 
frightening NDEs: (1) the negative event may be perceived as a warning about 
unwise behaviours, may lead to a self-analysis and ultimately to a “turn around” in 
one’s life; (2) NDE experiencers may treat the event as if it did not matter; and (3) 
the frightening event may result in a difficulty to integrate the experience and in 
the development of a sense of stigma. As already stated by Bush and Greyson 
(1992), the literature on post-traumatic growth in NDE experiencers still remains 
under documented and deserves further research. 
 Regarding our last aim, distressing and classical NDEs were found to have 
comparable total scores on the Greyson NDE scale. A detailed analysis revealed 
that these two types of experiences only differed on the affective subscale. Those 
findings were expected since three items clearly stipulate the presence of positively 
connoted emotions. Moreover, the bright light, often described in NDE narratives 
(Charland-Verville et al., 2014), is known to be often associated with positive 
emotions such as feelings of happiness, serenity and tranquillity (Cassol et al., 
2018; Facco & Agrillo, 2012). As previously stated in Greyson and Bush (1992), 
scales such as the WCEI (Ring, 1980) or the Greyson NDE scale (1983) seem to place 
a high value on positive feelings and may therefore be biased and lack sensibility in 
the identification of negative experiences. It is however interesting to note that, 
although distressing experiences are significantly less positive, we do not only 
observe zero values on the affect component of the Greyson NDE scale. By means 
of a rigorous text analysis, we identified the presence of positive emotions in 
distressing NDE narratives and highlighted the presence of peacefulness feelings in 
the beginning of several accounts. Our results therefore seem to corroborate 
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previous studies describing a combination of blissful and frightening elements in 
some distressing NDEs (e.g., Bonenfant, 2001; Sabom, 1982). Thus, it should also be 
emphasised that these distressing experiences could be misinterpreted as positive 
on the unique basis of the Greyson NDE scale. In parallel, results indicate that 
memories of distressing NDEs are likely to contain as much overall 
phenomenological details as memories of classical NDEs. A Bayesian analysis 
revealed no evidence in favour of a difference between the memories of these two 
types of events, except for the valence. Given that the MCQ allows the assessment 
of the subjective experience associated with remembering an event (Johnson et al., 
1988), this indicates that compared to memories of classical NDEs, memories of 
distressing NDEs are associated with a comparable memory clarity, as well as a 
similar amount of sensory, self-referential and emotional details (i.e., personal 
importance and feelings experienced while remembering). Moreover, they seem to 
be retrieved in memory at the same frequency as memories of classical NDEs. 
Finally, both kinds of NDE experiencers present the same level of confidence in 
their memory and appear to assign comparable personal importance to the 
experience. Therefore, our results showed that the memory of distressing NDEs 
contains a similar level of self-reported phenomenological details as the memory of 
classical NDEs which are known to be vivid and highly detailed (Thonnard et al., 
2013). Finally, we observed a higher proportion of suicidal attempt context in 
distressing NDE experiencers. Thereupon, we speculate that the negative context 
surrounding NDEs may have partly influenced their emotional valence. In 
accordance with neuroscientific and psychological approaches to NDEs (Blackmore, 
1993), we hypothesise that their content, in this case the emotional valence, could 
be influenced by “top-down” processes (i.e., NDE experiencers’ knowledge, beliefs 
and expectations) that are more influential when sensory information is degraded 
(e.g., altered states of consciousness) or ambiguous.  
 Overall, we believe that future research should essentially focus on the 
exploration and understanding of the consequences of these distressing 
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experiences. Past studies focusing on classical NDEs have found that these 
experiences are self-defining (Cassol, D’Argembeau, Charland-Verville, Laureys, & 
Martial, 2019) and have a powerful force of personal change generally reported as 
very positive (Schwaninger et al., 2002; van Lommel et al., 2001). Moreover, 
through their model of sense-making processes and assimilation problems, Bianco, 
Sambini and Palmieri (2017) have shown that making sense of a NDE can be a 
problematic issue, notably because one’s previous models about the world may be 
incongruent with the unusual nature of the NDE-related information. It could 
therefore be reasonable to think that distressing NDEs might have some powerful 
negative consequences on NDE experiencers’ psychological health. Through a 
better understanding of such distressing experiences and their consequences, we 
may become better equipped to target NDE experiencers at high risk of developing 
long-lasting emotional trauma. 
 Regarding this study, it should also be noted that the cross-sectional and 
retrospective design could potentially represent a source of bias in the sense that 
narratives may have been tainted by widespread descriptions of NDEs in the media 
and in lay literature. Greyson (2007) however highlighted the consistency of NDE 
memories over a period of two decades. Additionally, since NDE experiencers 
voluntarily contacted our team, our sample might suffer from a self-selection bias 
and the proportion of distressing NDEs might not be genuinely representative. 
Overall, prospective data collection could constitute a way to address these issues. 
 To conclude, we confirmed Greyson and Bush’s (1992) classification which 
includes inverse, void and hellish NDEs. NDE experiencers report similar ratings for 
the phenomenological details of distressing and classical NDE memories, which are 
both highly vivid. This work paves the way for research on the prevalence and 
consequences of distressing experiences. Frightening NDEs are under documented 
and require specific attention to be integrated into NDE experiencers’ identity. 
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3 Near-death experience memories: Self-
defining memories with flashbulb-like 
features? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Based on the following publications: 
Cassol, H., D’Argembeau, A., Charland-Verville, V., Laureys, S.*, & Martial, C* 
(contributed equally). (2019). Memories of near-death experiences: are they 
self-defining? Neuroscience of Consciousness, 5(1), 1-9. 
Cassol, H., Bonin, E. A. C., Bastin, C., Puttaert, N., Charland-Verville, V., Laureys, S., 
& Martial, C. (in preparation). Near-death experience memories include 
more episodic and non-episodic components that flashbulb memories.  
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3.1 Study 3. Are near-death experience memories 
self-defining? 
3.1.1 Summary 
 We assessed to what extent NDE memories are considered self-defining: 
memories that help people to define clearly how they see themselves. We 
screened 71 participants using the Greyson NDE scale (48 real NDE experiencers 
and 23 NDE-like experiencers who had lived a similar experience in absence of a 
threat to their life). Participants described their two main SDMs. For each SDM, 
they completed the Centrality of Event Scale (CES) to assess how central the event 
is to their identity. The two subgroups did not differ regarding the proportion of 
NDE experiencers who recalled their NDE (30 real NDE experiencers out of 48 and 
11 NDE-like experiencers out of 23). Real NDE experiencers and NDE-like 
experiencers who recalled their NDE (n=41) reported richer experiences as 
assessed by the Greyson NDE scale. Furthermore, these participants rated their 
NDE memory as more central to their identity as compared to other SDMs, and the 
richness of the NDE memory was positively associated to its centrality (CES scores). 
Overall, these findings suggest that the self-defining aspect of the experience might 
be related to its phenomenological content rather than its circumstances of 
occurrence. The self-defining status of NDE memories confirms that they constitute 
an important part of NDE experiencers’ personal identity and highlights the 
importance for clinicians to facilitate their integration within the self.  
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3.1.2 Introduction 
 Along with its particular circumstances of appearance and its mystical 
connotation, the NDE phenomenon seems to be characterized by a rich 
phenomenology and a sense of realness (Martial, Charland-Verville, Cassol, et al., 
2017; Moore & Greyson, 2017). Consequently, NDEs appear to have short- and 
long-term consequences on people’s lives (Greyson, 1997; van Lommel et al., 
2001). Given their significance and consequentiality, NDE memories appear to 
share similarities with a particular type of autobiographical memories referred to as 
SDMs (Blagov & Singer, 2004).  
 SDMs are emotionally intense, vivid, and frequently recalled memories that 
reflect important themes and conflicts in a person’s life (Singer & Salovey, 1993). 
These emotional memories are the building blocks of identity and contribute, in 
particular, to the sense of self-continuity (Conway, Singer, & Tagini, 2004), which 
relies on the ability to consider oneself as an entity that extends back into the past 
and forward into the future (Chandler, 1994). This ability is central to numerous 
processes such as planning future actions, giving meaning to new experiences or 
taking responsibility (Sani, 2008). SDMs can be characterized along four 
dimensions: (i) their specificity, which refers to the structure of the memory; (ii) the 
presence of meaning making, which reflects the individual’s propensity to derive 
personal meaning and reflect upon the experience; (iii) their content, which makes 
reference to the primary concern of the experience; and (iv) the associated affect, 
which represents the emotions felt upon recall (see Table 15 for a more detailed 
description; Blagov & Singer, 2004). From a clinical perspective, scholars have 
shown that the recall of emotionally positive SDMs as well as the ability to 
integrate a lesson or derive meaning from an experience are related to higher 
levels of psychological adjustments in healthy individuals (Blagov & Singer, 2004; 
Wood & Conway, 2006). Hence, careful consideration should be given to the 
development of these capacities of integration and autobiographical reasoning, 
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especially when attempting to (re)build a sense of self-continuity (Inder et al., 
2008). This integration process seems particularly important after intense life-
threatening experiences such as NDEs.  
 
Table 15. The four dimensions of self-defining memories (SDMs) (Blagov & Singer, 2004; 
McLean & Fournier, 2008). 
DIMENSION DESCRIPTION 
Specificity Specific Non-specific 
 Specific memories 
are characterized by 
uniqueness of 
occurrence and 
limited duration in 
time (<24h). 
Example: “The day I 
broke my leg during 
gym class in second 
grade”.  
Extended 
memories include 
events that 
occurred over an 
extended period of 
time (>24h).  
Example: “My 
skiing holidays in 
Switzerland when I 
was 10 years old”.  
Generic memories 
comprise events 
that occurred 
repeatedly over 
time. 
Example: “The huge 
annual Christmas 
meals at 
grandma’s”.  
Autobiographical 
reasoning  
Autobiographical reasoning is notably studied as a dimension of 
SDMs and consists in reflecting on the implications and the 
personal meaning of the event (Singer & Bluck, 2001). This 
meaning making may relate to lesson learning and/or insight 
gaining (Thorne & McLean, 2001). 
Event content 
 
SDMs have been classified into 7 distinct categories (Thorne & 
McLean, 2001): 
1. Life-threatening 
This category includes events with issues of life and 
death. The mentioned emotions are generally fear or 
sadness. These events may correspond to: 
a. Death or serious illness/injury of someone else  
b. Serious accidents or illnesses to oneself  
c. Physical assaults 
d. Rapes, attempted rapes, or sexual abuses to 
oneself  
e. Not classifiable 
2. Recreation/exploration 
Narratives corresponding to this category center on 
recreational activities such as hobbies or travels.  
3. Relationship 
Relationship events comprise experiences in which 
interpersonal relationships are emphasized, such as a first 
love or a separation. 
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4. Achievement/mastery 
This category groups events relating to arduous attempts 
at accomplishment, for example winning a competition, 
passing or failing an exam.  
5. Guilt/shame 
This subset of events includes memories focusing on 
notions of “doing right” vs. “doing wrong” (e.g., feeling 
guilty about lying or hurting someone).   
6. Drug/alcohol abuse 
Narratives classified in this category are centered on 
drugs, tobacco and alcohol, for recreational use as well as 
suicide attempts. 
7. Not classifiable. 
Not classifiable events refer to experiences that do not fit 
into any of the previous categories.  
Affect  
 
This dimension corresponds to the affective response triggered by 
the retrieval of the memory (Blagov & Singer, 2004). 
 
 This study therefore seeks to determine if NDE memories may be 
considered as self-defining. First, because of their documented life-transforming 
effects and their reported importance (Greyson, 1997), we predicted that a 
majority of NDE experiencers would describe their NDE as one of their two main 
SDMs. To do so, they completed an online survey on their SDMs. In order to 
determine whether the potential self-defining dimension of NDEs is due to their 
phenomenal content or their circumstances of appearance (i.e., presence or 
absence of impending death), we also included a subgroup of NDE-like experience 
(i.e., people who experienced a NDE in absence of life threat). Second, we expected 
that NDEs memories would be considered as more central to NDE experiencers’ 
identity and life story as compared to the other recalled SDM. To test this 
hypothesis, the CES (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006), which assesses how central an event 
is to a person’s identity, was administered. We also looked at the association 
between the intensity of the NDE, as measured by the Greyson NDE scale 
developed to quantify the self-reported richness of the experience (Greyson, 1983), 
and its centrality to NDE experiencers’ selves. Finally, we explored the four 
dimensions of reported SDMs with a particular attention to meaning making and 
affect, which are crucial to psychological well-being. 
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3.1.3 Materials and Methods 
3.1.3.1 Participants 
 Participants were initially recruited following calls for NDE testimonies via 
the websites, the appearances in local media, and the publications of the IANDS 
and the Coma Science Group (GIGA-Consciousness, University and University 
Hospital of Liège, Belgium). People who contacted us to share a written narrative of 
their experience were mailed questionnaires including the Greyson NDE scale 
(Greyson, 1983), used to identify the presence of a NDE memory by assessing the 
presence of specific affective, cognitive, transcendental, and paranormal features. 
Additionally, they completed questionnaires requesting socio-demographic 
information (gender, age at interview, and religious belief at the time of the NDE—
religious or nonreligious), their age when they experienced the NDE, the time 
elapsed since the NDE, and the circumstances of appearance of their NDE. On this 
basis, they were assigned to two subgroups: a “real NDE” subgroup (i.e., 
experiences equal or above the cut-off score of 7 that occurred following a severe 
brain injury accompanied by a period of coma >1 h and an hospitalization in an 
intensive care unit) or a “NDE-like” subgroup (i.e., similar phenomenological 
experiences equal or above the cut-off score of 7 that occurred in situations where 
there was no genuine threat to the individual’s life; Charland-Verville et al., 2014). 
Once the participants were divided into two subgroups, they were re-contacted 
and invited to participate in another study focusing on SDMs. The final study 
sample was composed of 48 individuals who reported having lived a “real NDE” and 
23 individuals who described a “NDE-like”.  
 The study was approved and carried out in accordance with the 
recommendations of the ethics committee of the Faculty of Medicine of the 
University of Liège. All participants completed a written informed consent in 
accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. 
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3.1.3.2 Materials 
3.1.3.2.1 Self-defining memory task 
  
 Participants were invited to describe their two main SDMs. It was not 
specified whether or not one of them should be their NDE since we wanted to 
determine the proportion of NDE experiencers who would spontaneously mention 
their NDE as one of their main SDMs. All participants wrote down their two main 
SDMs in any order (i.e., without constraints regarding the chronology or the 
subjective importance of the recalled memories) and with no limit regarding the 
number of words. To do so, they received a written definition of a SDM: (i) the 
memory has to be at least 1-year-old (in order to better gauge the impact of an 
event, one has to have a sufficient hindsight regarding what he/she has 
experienced; it should be underlined that this criterion could not have impacted 
the number of NDEs recalled since all NDE experiencers had experienced their NDE 
more than one year before completing the survey); (ii) it has to be a very clear 
memory of an important event that was personally experienced; (iii) it helps 
understanding who one is as an individual; (iv) it relates to a personally significant 
and enduring theme or concern, and it is linked to other memories that share the 
same theme; (v) it generates strong feelings, no matter the valence; and (vi) it has 
been recalled a great number of times (adapted from Blagov & Singer, 2004; Singer 
& Moffitt, 1991–1992). 
 
3.1.3.2.2 Affect 
  
 Participants indicated on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from -3 (very 
negative) to +3 (very positive): (i) emotions felt during the event and (ii) emotions 
felt while remembering the event and thinking about its consequences on their 
lives (questions derived from the validated Memory Characteristic Questionnaire; 
Johnson et al., 1988). 
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3.1.3.2.3 Centrality of event scale 
  
 This instrument measures how central an event is to a person’s identity and 
life story, with 20 items rated on a 5-point scale (from 1= totally disagree to 5 = 
totally agree). Items 1, 2, 4, 9, 12, 13, 17, and 20 have been developed to assess 
whether an event has become a reference point for the generation of expectations 
and attribution of meaning to other events in one’s life story. Items 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11 
and 19 were designed to assess whether an event is considered as a central 
component of the person’s identity. Finally, items 10, 14, 15, 16, and 18 address 
whether the event is considered by the respondent as a turning point in his/her life 
story (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006). 
 
3.1.3.3 Procedure 
 After initial recruitment (see Participants section), participants of both 
subgroups (“real NDE” and “NDE-like”) were invited to participate in a study on 
SDMs. They received an email with a link to an online survey: (i) they completed an 
online consent form including a description of the study; (ii) they answered items 
related to socio-demographic data; (iii) they completed the SDM task; (iv) finally, 
for each of their two SDMs, they rated the associated affect and completed the 
CES. The order of rating of the two SDMs was randomized: part of the participants 
rated the first recalled SDM as a first step and then the second recalled SDM, while 
the other participants rated their SDMs in the reverse order. The order of SDM 
rating was randomized to circumvent a possible bias: we assumed that most 
participants would recall their NDE memory first and we wanted to minimize 
possible order effects in describing and assessing SDMs. 
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3.1.3.4 Analyses 
 Results were considered to be significant at an alpha of 0.05 and were 
expressed as mean ± SD for normally distributed quantitative variables and as 
median (IQR) for quantitative variables with a skewed distribution. Categorical 
variables were expressed as counts and proportions (%). Data analyses were 
carried out using R statistical software (R 3.4.1). 
 
3.1.3.4.1 Demographics and questionnaires 
 
 As a first step, we compared the gender and religious beliefs ratios 
between “real NDEs” and “NDEs-like” by means of a Fisher’s exact test with 
contingency tables. Student’s t-tests were used to compare reported intensity of 
the NDE (Greyson NDE scale total scores), age at NDE, and age at interview 
between subgroups. Distributions being skewed, differences for time since NDE 
were analyzed using Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney U tests. Finally, percentages of NDE 
experiencers who recalled their NDE were calculated for each subgroup and a 
Fisher’s exact test was performed to compare ratios between subgroups. As a 
second step, all participants were divided into two subgroups depending on 
whether or not they recalled their NDE (no matter its context of occurrence). We 
compared the gender ratio between the “NDE recalled” and the “NDE not recalled” 
subgroups with a Fisher’s exact test. Intensity of the NDE (Greyson NDE total 
scores), age at NDE, age at interview and time since NDE were compared by means 
of Student’s t-tests. Figure 4 represents the flowchart of the distribution of NDE 
experiencers within the different subgroups. 
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Figure 4 – Flowchart representing the distribution of participants within the different 
subgroups.  
 
3.1.3.4.2 Dimensions of self-defining memories 
  
 First, we examined the centrality of events for identity and life story (as 
assessed by the CES scale) in the “NDE recalled” subgroup. Differences in CES total 
scores between the NDE memory and the other SDM were assessed using a 
Student’s t-test. Next, we examined associative strength between CES and Greyson 
NDE scale total scores for the NDE memories using a Spearman’s correlation. 
Second, ratings of affect were compared between NDE memories and other SDMs, 
using a Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney U test. Third, two coders (HC and CM) scored the 
four dimensions of all reported SDMs (n=142). The specificity of each SDM was 
classified in three categories: (i) specific events that happened in a particular time 
and place and lasted less than 24 h; (ii) extended events that lasted longer than a 
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day; and (iii) generic events that occurred repeatedly. The number of observed 
agreements was 138 out of 142 (97.18%), which corresponds to a Cohen’s kappa 
coefficient of 0.89 (95% confidence intervals 0.79–1). The presence (score of 1) or 
absence (score of 0) of meaning making in each narrative was also determined. The 
number of observed agreements was 135 out of 142 reported SDM narratives 
(95%), which corresponds to a Cohen’s kappa coefficient of 0.90 (95% confidence 
intervals 0.83–0.97). To examine whether NDE memories differed from the other 
SDMs in terms of meaning making, a Pearson’s chi-squared test was used to assess 
frequency distribution of meaning making among the two types of memories. 
Finally, coders proceeded to the rating of the content of SDMs based on the 
classification proposed by Thorne and McLean (2001). This classification includes 
seven major categories: (i) life-threatening events, (ii) recreation/exploration, (iii) 
relationship, (iv) achievement/mastery (either with positive or negative outcomes), 
(v) guilt/shame, (vi) drug/alcohol abuse, and (vii) “not classifiable”. Additionally, a 
subclassification of life-threatening events was used, as suggested by Thorne and 
McLean (2001): (a) death or serious illness/injury of someone else (person or 
animal), (b) serious accidents or illnesses of oneself, (c) physical assault, (d) rape, 
attempted rape, or sexual abuse (to oneself), (e) “not classifiable” life-threatening 
events. The number of observed agreements for all SDMs was 135 out of 142 (95% 
of the observations), which corresponds to a Cohen’s kappa coefficient of 0.94 
(95% confidence intervals 0.90–0.98). For all dimensions, discrepancies between 
raters were discussed in order to reach a final classification of all the narratives. 
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3.1.4 Results 
3.1.4.1 Demographics and questionnaires  
 The “real NDE” subgroup (n=48) included NDEs that occurred following a 
life-threatening situation such as anoxia (e.g., cardiac arrest, near-drowning; n=19), 
trauma (e.g., motor vehicle accident, falls; n=14), and other events (non-traumatic 
events such as complication during surgery; n=15). The “NDE-like” subgroup (n=23) 
included NDEs that occurred following a non life-threatening event such as sleep 
(n=5), syncope (n=5), drug and alcohol consumption, (n=3) or other non-life-
threatening situations (e.g., grief, migraine; n=10). No significant differences were 
found between “real NDEs” and “NDEs-like” in terms of gender, Greyson NDE total 
scores, age at NDE, age at interview, and time since NDE (see Table 16). 
 Overall, 58% of the total sample recalled the NDE as one of their two main 
SDMs (41 participants out of 71), respectively 30 NDE experiencers out of 48 in the 
“real NDE” subgroup vs. 11 NDE experiencers out of 23 in the “NDE-like” subgroup. 
The Fisher’s exact test did not show a significant difference between subgroups 
regarding the ratio of participants recalling the experience (p=0.307; ϕ=-0.139). 
“NDE recalled” and “NDE not recalled” subgroups did not significantly differ in 
regard to gender, age at NDE, age at interview and time since NDE. In contrast the 
“NDE recalled” subgroup showed higher total scores on the Greyson NDE scale (see 
Table 16). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 16. NDE experiencers’ Greyson total scores and demographic characteristics (n=71). 
 
Real NDE 
 (n=48) 
NDE-like 
(n=23) 
p-value 
 
Effect size 
NDE 
recalled 
(n=41) 
NDE not 
recalled 
(n=30) 
p-value 
 
Effect 
size 
Gender –female(%) 32(67) 18(78) 0.317 0.119
ǂ 
28(63) 22(73) 0.646 0.055
ǂ
 
Religious(%) 35(73) 14(61) 0.411 -0.122
ǂ 
33(80) 16(53) 0.019 -0.29
ǂ
 
Greyson total score 
 
17(5) 15(5) 0.124 -0.4 17(5) 14(5) 0.008 -0.6 
Age at NDE 
 
28(16) 34(17) 0.207 0.368 28(19) 33(19) 0.199 0.263 
Age at interview  
 
57(14) 59(11) 0.558 0.152 57(14) 58(12) 0.635 0.076 
Time since NDE in years  
 
31(12-41)* 26(10-38)* 0.376 -0.106
+
 29(16) 25(17) 0.365 -0.243 
Quantitative variables are summarized using the M(SD), except for data with * representing median (IQR). The effect size is expressed as GHedges, 
except for data with 
ǂ
 which are expressed as ϕ and data with 
+
 which is expressed as r. Results in bold are significant. 
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3.1.4.2 Dimensions of self-defining memories 
 Analysis of the CES scores carried out on the “NDE recalled” subgroup 
(n=41; 30 real NDE experiencers and 11 NDE-like experiencers) showed that NDE 
memories received higher CES total scores (median=92, IQR=87–96) than other 
SDMs (median=75, IQR=59–84) (p<0.001; r=-0.574). Moreover, a significant positive 
correlation was found between CES scores for the NDE memory and Greyson NDE 
scale total scores (rs=0.48, p< 0.001; Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5 – Association between CES total scores for the NDE memory and Greyson NDE 
scale total scores within the NDE recalled subgroup (rs=0.48, p=0.001). 
 
 Regarding affect, the analyses showed that emotions felt during the event 
were more positive for NDE memories (median=7, IQR=6–7) compared to other 
SDMs (median=4, IQR=1–6) (p<0.001; r=-0.430). Moreover, emotions felt upon 
Study 3. Are near-death experience memories self-defining? 
117 
 
recall were also considered more positive for NDE memories (median=7, IQR=6–7) 
compared to other SDMs (median=6, IQR=4–7) (p<0.001; r=-0.346). 
 The classification of the specificity of all SDMs (n=142) indicated that 
participants reported 122 specific SDMs (<24h; 86%), 14 extended SDMs (>24h; 
10%), and 6 generic SDMs (repeated events; 4%). All NDE memories were specific.  
 Meaning making was detected in 62 of the 142 SDMs (44%). The difference 
in ratio of meaning making between NDE memories (21 out of 41; 51%) and other 
SDMs (41 out of 101; 41%) was not statistically significant (p=0.267; ϕ =0.097).  
 Finally, regarding memory content, NDEs recalled by real NDE experiencers 
(n=30) were all classified as serious accidents or illnesses to oneself (despite 
containing additional transcendental and paranormal components as compared to 
other life-threatening events, as assessed by the Greyson NDE scale) and NDEs 
recalled by NDE-like experiencers were classified as exploration events (i.e., 
experiencing an unexpected spiritual moment; n=10) or events relating to drug use 
(n=1). The classification of all reported SDMs (including NDEs and NDEs-like; n=142) 
consisted of 68 memories of life-threatening events (48%), 30 memories relating to 
relationships (21%; e.g., life-changing encounter, child birth, or family/friend 
reunion after a long separation), 19 memories centered on exploration (13%; e.g., 
facing personal challenges), 18 memories that emphasize achievement (13%; e.g., 
professional recognition and promotion or difficult child birth), and 3 memories 
about feelings of guilt/shame (2%), 3 unclassifiable events (2%), and 1 event 
relating to drug use (1%). Subclassification of the 68 life-threatening events 
included 42 events of serious accidents or illnesses to oneself (62%; e.g., learning to 
live in an handicapped body after severe accident or survival during times of war), 
18 events of deaths or serious illnesses/injuries of someone else (26%; e.g., death 
in the family or illness of a child), 7 events relating to physical assault (10%; e.g., 
domestic violence), and 1 unclassifiable event (2%). The distribution of the 142 
memories within the seven main categories is presented in Figure 6. 
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 Overall, when examining the number of participants who recalled each 
type of content, we found that NDE memories constituted by far the most 
important category, as they were recalled by 41 participants (58% of the 
participants). The second most frequently reported subcategory of event was the 
“death of a family member” which was reported by 18% of participants (n=13), 
followed by a “life-changing encounter” (n=7; 10%), “domestic violence” (n=6; 8%), 
“family/friend reunion after a long separation” (n=5; 7%), and “learning to live in an 
handicapped body after severe accident”, and “confrontational relationships” (both 
reported by four participants; 6%). “Academic success,” “child births,” “facing 
personal challenges,” and “forced exile during times of war” were each reported by 
three participants (4%). “Difficult child birth,” “getting out of a depression,” “illness 
of a child,” “moment of extreme shame,” “physical assault” (as an aggressor), and 
“professional promotions” were each reported by two participants (3%).  
 The distribution of the other (non-NDE) SDMs (n=41) reported by the “NDE 
recalled” subgroup (i.e., real NDE experiencers and NDE-like experiencers who 
recalled their NDE as one of their two main SDMs) among the 7 major categories 
included 16 life-threatening events (39%), 11 events relating to relationships (27%), 
7 events that emphasize achievement (17%), 4 events centered on exploration 
(10%), 2 unclassifiable events (5%), and 1 event relating to guilt/shame (2%). The 
drug, alcohol, and tobacco use category was not represented in this subgroup. 
Subclassification of the 16 life-threatening events included 7 events of serious 
accidents or illnesses to oneself (44%), 6 events of deaths or serious 
illnesses/injuries of someone else (37%), and 3 events relating to physical assault 
(19%). The other subcategories were not represented in the subgroup (see Figure 
6).  
 Lastly, the distribution of the SDMs (n=60) reported by the “NDE not 
recalled” subgroup (i.e., real NDE experiencers and NDE-like experiencers who did 
not recall their NDE as one of their two main SDMs). This classification comprised 
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22 life-threatening events (37%), 19 events relating to relationships (32%), 7 events 
that emphasize achievement (12%), 5 events centered on exploration (8%), 2 
events relating to guilt/shame (3%), and 1 unclassifiable event (2%). The drug, 
alcohol, and tobacco use category was not represented in this subgroup. 
Subclassification of the 22 life-threatening events included 12 events of deaths or 
serious illnesses/injuries of someone else (55%), 5 events of serious accidents or 
illnesses to oneself (23%), 4 events relating to physical assault (18%), and 1 
unclassifiable event (4%). The other subcategories were not represented in the 
subgroup (see Figure 6). 
 
 
Figure 6 – Classification of self-defining memories (SDMs) within the major event 
categories proposed by Thorne and McLean (2001). In black: distribution of all reported 
SDMs (n=142). In grey: distribution of the other (non-NDE) SDM in the “NDE recalled” 
subgroup (n=41). In white: distribution of the SDMs in the “NDE not recalled” subgroup 
(n=60).  
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3.1.5 Discussion 
 This study investigated whether the memory of a NDE is considered as self-
defining. Furthermore, to disentangle between the roles of the nature of the 
experience and its circumstances of appearance, real NDE experiencers (i.e., 
presence of a life-threatening event) and NDE-like experiencers (i.e. absence of life 
threat) described their two most significant SDMs. In line with our hypothesis, 58% 
of the entire sample recalled their NDE as a SDM, respectively 63% of real NDE 
experiencers and 48% of NDE-like experiencers. Analyses did not show significant 
differences in proportions between subgroups. Moreover, when looking closely at 
the content of NDEs, results indicated that NDE experiencers who selected their 
NDE as a SDM had lived richer experiences, as measured by the Greyson NDE scale 
(Greyson, 1983). Indeed, it is likely that NDEs with more cognitive, affective, 
transcendental, and/or paranormal characteristics are experienced more intensely, 
leading to memories that are more likely to be considered self-defining. 
Additionally, we found a larger proportion of religious NDE experiencers among 
participants who recalled their NDE. A possible explanation for this latter finding is 
that the NDE experience might be perceived as more meaningful for religious NDE 
experiencers, thus being more likely to be part of their identity. Overall, our results 
suggest that the self-defining aspect of the NDE memory could be related to its 
particular phenomenological content rather than its circumstances of occurrence, 
although future studies are required to clarify/confirm this latter point. Altogether, 
these results support the view that NDE memories constitute an important part of 
NDE experiencers’ personal identity and are self-defining. This proposition is also 
consistent with previous results showing that two-thirds of those who experienced 
a NDE during a close brush with death describe a substantial impact of this 
experience on their lives (Noyes, 1980). Yet, it has to be borne in mind that the fact 
that some NDE experiencers did not recall their NDE does not necessarily mean 
that this experience is not considered self-defining. Indeed, most people can 
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generally recall more than two SDMs and it might be that a higher proportion of 
NDE experiencers would recall their NDE if they were asked to recount more than 
two SDMs.  
 When considering participants who reported their NDE, we found a 
significant difference between the NDE memory and their other SDM regarding the 
CES total scores, the memory of the NDE being rated as more central to NDE 
experiencers’ identities. Our results therefore suggest that NDE memories can be 
regarded as cornerstones in NDE experiencers’ lives and that they might color the 
way they understand other experiences or the hardship in their lives. Additionally, 
richer (in terms of the number of reported features) NDEs were considered as more 
central to NDE experiencers’ selves. Although this correlation does not 
demonstrate causality, it is reasonable to hypothesize that richer NDEs may lead to 
a memory that is more central to the person’s identity. Considering that the 
richness of the experience appears to be associated with NDE experiencers’ traits 
(e.g., fantasy proneness; (Martial et al., 2018), future studies should investigate to 
what extent NDE richness might also influence their interpretation and integration 
into the life story.  
 When taking a closer look at the dimensions of memories, we found that 
SDMs were globally pleasant and that NDE memories, in particular, were 
associated with positive affect upon recall. These results are consistent with the 
view that NDEs are typically associated with highly positive emotions (Greyson, 
1983). Regarding the specificity of reported SDMs, we observed that a large 
majority of memories (86%) involved specific events rather than extended or 
generic events. This high percentage can be partly explained by the fact that life-
threatening events are typically specific. Lardi, D’Argembeau, Chanal, Ghisletta, and 
Van der Linden (2010) have indeed highlighted that life-threatening events were 
the most specific memories, but they also noted that these events were typically 
associated with low positive affect and strong negative affect. Therefore, real NDEs 
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seem to be a particular subtype of specific life-threatening events that has the 
particularity to be associated with positive affects upon recall.  
 Concerning memory content, half of the sampled memories referred to life-
threatening events. The second most frequent type ofmemories were those in 
which interpersonal relationships are emphasized, followed by memories of events 
relating to exploration, memories highlighting effortful endeavor at mastery or 
accomplishment, and finally events encompassing guilt/shame and drug use 
themes. With the exception of life-threatening and exploration events that are 
unsurprisingly frequent in our sample given NDEs and NDEs-like events, the 
distribution of SDMs into the different categories is similar to some other studies in 
which memories relating to relationships and achievement concerns were largely 
represented (e.g., Lardi et al., 2010). In this context, it should also be emphasized 
that real NDEs memories appear as a unique and specific subtype of “serious 
accidents or illnesses to oneself” as they comprise distinguishable affective, 
cognitive, transcendental, and paranormal features, as compared to other events 
belonging to this subcategory.  
 In regard to meaning making, it is interesting to note that a majority of 
SDM narratives did not include meaning making (i.e., 44% of all reported SDMs 
included meaning making). Additionally, the difference in the prevalence of 
meaning making between NDE memories (51%) and other SDMs (41%) did not 
reach significance, which might suggest that autobiographical reasoning could 
partly depend on the individual rather than on the type of memory (Rubin, 
Berntsen, Deffler, & Brodar, 2018). The relatively low proportion of meaning 
making for NDEs is somewhat surprising given that it is considered crucial for 
psychological adjustment; indeed, the ability to reflect upon one’s life experiences 
has been associated with higher levels of socio-emotional maturity and is 
developed in psychotherapy to improve introspection abilities and build a unified 
self (Inder et al., 2008). Therefore, the development of psychological interventions 
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aiming at facilitating the integration of NDEs into the sense of self and identity 
might be fruitful for some individuals who have experienced this impactful event.  
 Finally, some limitations of this study should be acknowledged. Given the 
relative scarcity of NDEs, we were limited in the recruitment of our participants and 
our sample is relatively small. Larger studies are therefore required to confirm 
these results. Besides, because NDE experiencers voluntarily contacted us, our 
sample suffers from a self-selection bias and one must bear in mind that, 
considering the mystical connotation of such experiences and the fact that they 
may be perceived as distressing, some people might feel uncomfortable to share 
these events. Another possible bias may have arisen from the fact that some 
participants might have guessed the objectives of the study and recalled their NDE 
accordingly or, on the contrary, might have felt that we wanted them to provide 
two memories other than their NDE. Nevertheless, after debriefing, no indication 
of this potential bias was observed. Finally, to exclude a possible influence of the 
context of events, future studies should also include a subgroup of individuals who 
have lived a close brush with death without experiencing a subjective NDE. 
 To conclude with this third study, the self-defining status of NDE memories 
reinforces the importance for caregivers to detect the presence of such an event in 
order to ensure, or at least facilitate, its later integration into NDE experiencers’ 
selves. As a matter of fact, SDMs play a key role in the construction and 
maintenance of a coherent sense of self-continuity, which appears to be positively 
associated to psychological adjustment (Chandler, Lalonde, Sokol, & Hallett, 2003). 
Highly accessible and vivid personal memories contribute to the construction of life 
narratives and, in this way, enable the stabilization of the sense of self and identity 
(Baerger & McAdams, 1999). However, the outcome of this process is not 
systematically positive (Berntsen et al., 2003). A highly negative, unforeseen and 
relatively uncommon event might have an unfavorable influence on the 
interpretation of other experiences as well as on expectations about future events, 
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and therefore can be harmful to mental health (Berntsen et al., 2003). Thereupon, 
it is reasonable to expect that atypical experiences of close brushes with death, 
such as NDEs, become reference points that could potentially lead to deleterious 
outcomes such as lower senses of self-continuity typically associated with anxiety 
and negative affect (Chandler et al., 2003). Overall, our study adds to the growing 
literature demonstrating the significant consequences of NDEs and highlights the 
fact that they deserve careful consideration. 
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3.2 Study 4. Near-death experience memories include 
more episodic and non-episodic components than 
flashbulb memories  
3.2.1 Summary 
 NDE memories are recalled as "realer" than memories of real or imagined 
events. Given their rich phenomenology, emotionality and consequentiality, it was 
hypothesized that they could meet some aspects of the definition of flashbulb 
memories. We aimed to identify and compare the episodic and non-episodic 
information provided in verbal recollections of NDE, flashbulb and control 
autobiographical memories. The phenomenological characteristics and centrality of 
the memories were also compared. Twenty-five participants who had lived a NDE 
in a life-threatening situation were interviewed and completed the MCQ as well as 
the CES for their NDE, a flashbulb and another autobiographical memory used as 
control. Overall, transcribed NDE verbal recollections included more 
internal/episodic details than control autobiographical and flashbulb memories, 
and more external/non-episodic details than flashbulb memories. Moreover, 
flashbulb memories were associated to a lower intensity of feelings while 
remembering and a lower personal importance, and are less reactivated and less 
susceptible to be remembered from a first person perspective compared to NDE 
and control autobiographical memories. Finally, NDE memories are the most 
central memories to experiencers’ identity, followed by control autobiographical 
and then by flashbulb memories. These findings corroborate previous studies 
highlighting the impact and uniqueness of NDE memories.  
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3.2.2 Introduction 
 Near-death experiences (NDEs) have been defined as psychological events 
usually occurring when people are close to death or in situations of intense danger 
(Greyson, 2000b). These mental/subjective experiences are known to contain some 
typical and recurrent features such as the vision of a bright light, OBEs or coming to 
a border or a point of no return (Cassol et al., 2018; Greyson, 1983; Martial, Cassol, 
Antonopoulos et al., 2017). Long regarded as taboo and out of reach for science, 
the scientific study of the phenomenon has emerged a little more than four 
decades ago and led to an increasing number of empirical research (e.g., Martial et 
al., 2019; Palmieri et al., 2014; van Lommel, Van Wees, Meyers, & Elfferich, 2001). 
NDEs are of particular clinical relevance given their frequency of appearance 
(between 6 and 23% of cardiac arrest survivors; (Greyson, 2003; Schwaninger et al., 
2002; van Lommel et al. , 2001) and their consequences on NDE experiencers’ lives 
(Cassol, D’Argembeau, Charland-Verville, Laureys, & Martial, 2019; Groth-Marnat & 
Summers, 1998). Numerous aftereffects have been reported, such as the 
development of a higher spirituality, less materialistic values or a reduced fear of 
death (Groth-Marnat & Summers, 1998; Knoblauch et al., 2001; Noyes, 1980).  
 Previous studies have highlighted the uniqueness of NDE memories within 
autobiographical memory (i.e., memories about an individual’s life; (Williams et al., 
2008). NDE memories were found to contain more details (e.g., sensory, emotional 
and self-referential) than memories of other real and imagined events, and 
memories of a period of coma or impaired consciousness following an acquired 
severe brain dysfunction without NDE (Thonnard et al., 2013). Thus, it was 
suggested that they could not be considered as imagined event memories. Other 
studies have found that richer NDEs (i.e., containing a larger amount of typical 
features, such as out-of-body experiences, entering an unearthly realm or an 
altered time perception) led to memories with more perceptual information such 
as colors, smells and sounds, more contextual information such as time and place, 
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and more emotional information, as measured by the MCQ (Johnson et al., 1988; 
Martial, Charland-Verville, Cassol, et al., 2017; Moore & Greyson, 2017). At first 
sight, the important amount of phenomenological details contained in their 
recollections might seem counter-intuitive given that NDEs are assumed to occur 
during an altered state of consciousness and classically associated with a critical or 
confused situation (e.g., van Lommel et al., 2001). In an effort to explain the special 
nature of NDE memories, different theories have been put forth. Notably, it was 
suggested that the significant emotionality associated with these mental events 
could enhance the quantity of sensory details stored in memory (Schaefer & 
Philippot, 2005). Besides, emotional events are more likely to be frequently 
rehearsed, therefore potentially increasing the amount of memorized 
characteristics (Thonnard et al., 2013). 
 Given their emotionality and consequentiality (i.e., the consequences of 
the event for the individual or aftermath), some authors hypothesized that NDE 
memories could meet some aspects of the definition of a particular kind of 
autobiographical memories known as flashbulb memories (Thonnard et al., 2013). 
Flashbulb memories refer to very vivid and long-lasting memories of the 
circumstances in which one learned about a shocking public event (Brown & Kulik, 
1977). Studies on flashbulb memories have been focusing on landmark events such 
as the September 11 terrorist attacks or the death/assassination of famous people 
(Curci et al., 2001; Finkenauer, Luminet, Gisle, El-Ahmadi, & Der, 1998; Tinti, 
Schmidt, Sotgiu, Testa, & Curci, 2009). A prominent feature of these memories is 
that they display high ratings of belief in accuracy/subjective certainty (Brown & 
Kulik, 1977; Kraha & Boals, 2014) and that people can usually remember some of 
their personal aspects for several decades (Berntsen & Thomsen, 2005), for 
example the place they were when they heard the news, who they were with, the 
clothes they were wearing, or the emotions felt at the time of the event (Luminet & 
Curci, 2009). Overall, details contained in flashbulb memories may fall into different 
“canonical” categories: place, ongoing activity, informant, own affect, other affect, 
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and aftermath (Brown & Kulik, 1977). The level of consequentiality associated with 
flashbulb memories and the underlying memory processes however remain 
debated. Pioneers in the area have suggested that these memories do not imply 
the existence of a special memory mechanism and included the notion of 
consequentiality as a key element in the formation of these memories, along with 
novelty, surprise, emotionality and overt rehearsal (i.e., overt rehearsal takes place 
during conversations, contrary to covert rehearsal which takes place when the 
person thinks about the event; (Brown & Kulik, 1977; Finkenauer et al., 1998). 
However, results from other studies suggest different underlying memory 
processes for memories of learning about public news (such as flashbulb 
memories) and memories for private events (i.e., first-hand experience) (Demiray & 
Freund, 2015; Lanciano, Curci, Matera, & Sartori, 2018; Tinti et al., 2009). For 
example, first-hand experiences would show a higher consequentiality and life 
impact, and would have a protective function because their content is related to 
individual’s personal identity and well-being (Pillemer, 2009). 
 Generally speaking, narratives of autobiographical memories are known to 
be multifaceted in content and to include both episodic (i.e., thoughts, emotions, 
information relating to time and place, as well as perceptual details) and semantic 
information (i.e., general knowledge and facts about the world and personal life) 
(Addis, Musicaro, Pan, & Schacter, 2010; Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2008; Levine, 
Svoboda, Hay, Winocur, & Moscovitch, 2002). Given that episodic and semantic 
memory are thought to rely on different neural processes (Moscovitch et al., 2005), 
Levine et al. (2002) have developed an Autobiographical Memory Interview (AI) 
which includes a reliable coding scheme enabling the distinction between episodic 
and non-episodic details comprised in verbalized autobiographical memories. In 
their AI coding scheme, episodic details (scored by using categories adapted from 
the MCQ) refer to the central event, as well as emotional, perceptual, temporal and 
spatial characteristics, and non-episodic details relate to repetitions, metacognitive 
statements, and information that does not pertain to the main event or that is not 
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contextually bounded, such as general knowledge or facts. While the former seem 
essential for high-fidelity representation of personally experienced events, the 
latter rather contribute to the coherence and continuity of self-knowledge and 
identity through time (Levine et al., 2002). To date, the AI scoring scheme has been 
used in a wide range of studies related to memory processes in ageing (e.g., Levine 
et al., 2002), psychiatric conditions (e.g., Moscovitch et al., 2018), 
neurodegeneration (e.g., Bastin et al., 2013) or lesion cases (e.g., Steinvorth, 
Levine, & Corkin, 2005). However, no study has yet investigated the episodic and 
semantic composition of NDE verbal recollections to compare them with those of 
flashbulb memories. Therefore, the primary aim of this study was to (1) assess 
whether the episodic and non-episodic information comprised in verbal 
recollections of NDE, flashbulb and control autobiographical memories differ and 
(2) further compare their phenomenological characteristics using the sMCQ (a 
short version of the MCQ (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2008; Johnson et al., 
1988) and their consequentiality by means of the CES (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006).  
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3.2.3 Materials and Methods 
3.2.3.1 Participants  
 NDE experiencers were recruited via the websites, appearances in local 
media and publications of the IANDS France, the Coma Science Group (University 
Hospital of Liège, Belgium), and the GIGA-Consciousness (University of Liège, 
Belgium). The study was approved by the ethics committee of the Faculty of 
Medicine of the University of Liège. Participants who contacted us signed a written 
consent form, completed questionnaires requesting socio-demographic (gender 
and age at interview) as well as clinical information (age at the NDE, time elapsed 
since the NDE and presence of a life threatening event), and completed the 
Greyson NDE scale (Greyson, 1983). We included in the present study 25 
participants whose experience was secondary to a life-threatening situation and 
who met the accepted criteria of a NDE (i.e., Greyson NDE scale's total score ≥ 7). 
 
3.2.3.2 Experimental task 
 We conducted a semi-structured interview in a quiet room for each 
participant. As a first step, we administered a screening assessment including the 
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) 
and the Montreal Cognitive Assessment (MoCA; Nasreddine et al., 2005), in order 
to detect and exclude memory biases related to negative mood as well as mild 
cognitive impairments, respectively. Once participants were screened for mood 
and for memory impairments, the interviews were carried out based on the 
probing and scoring recommendations of the AI by Levine and colleagues (Levine et 
al., 2002).  
 Specifically, participants were asked to freely describe in considerable 
detail three target memories dating (without restriction regarding the recall time), 
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as far as possible, to the same period: (1) the memory of their NDE, (2) a flashbulb 
memory (they were provided with a definition and examples; i.e., memories for the 
circumstances in which one first learned of a very surprising and consequential or 
emotionally arousing event such as September 11 terrorist attacks), and (3) an 
autobiographical memory. Each event had to be temporally and contextually 
specific, occurring over minutes or hours, but not exceeding a day. The order in 
which the memories were to be recalled was randomized. According to the AI 
guidelines, two further levels of recall may be needed in case of a lack of key 
information: (1) general and (2) specific probing. General probes are non-specific 
cues aiming to encourage full description (e.g., "Can you tell me more about it?"). 
Specific probes cue precise aspects of the event in order to determine if 
participants remember more information (e.g., "Where did this event take place?"). 
Nevertheless, no specific probe was employed in the present study due to 
substantial recalls by our participants. Narratives were audio-recorded, transcribed 
and analyzed using the established manual scoring procedure, allowing to separate 
episodic details (i.e., description of the event, sensory or mental state details 
specific to the event; “internal details”) from non-episodic details (i.e., semantic or 
factual statements, or other details not specific to the event; “external details”) 
(Levine et al., 2002). 
 Finally, after each memory recall, participants completed the short version 
of the Memory Characteristics Questionnaire (sMCQ; D’Argembeau & Van der 
Linden, 2008; adapted from Johnson et al., 1988) and the CES (Berntsen & Rubin, 
2006).  
 
3.2.3.3 Analysis  
 Data analyses were carried out using R statistical software (R 3.5.2).  
 
Study 4. Near-death experience memories include more episodic and non-episodic 
components than flashbulb memories 
132 
 
3.2.3.4 Study sample 
 Greyson NDE scale total scores, age at NDE and age at interview are 
summarized as mean ± SD. Distributions being skewed, results at the PANAS and 
the MoCA are summarized as median (IQR), and differences for time since event 
(NDE vs. flashbulb vs. autobiographical) were analyzed using Friedman tests and 
expressed as median (IQR) and average rank.  
 
3.2.3.5 Autobiographical Memory Interview  
 The transcribed recalls were segmented into “details”, or “segments”. A 
detail is defined as « a unique occurrence, observation, or thought, generally 
expressed as a grammatical clause » (Levine et al., 2002). A segment can be defined 
as a sentence or part of a sentence that conveys information. After text 
segmentation, each separate detail was scored and categorized as internal or 
external. Internal details pertain to the main event and are episodic in nature, 
whereas external details are not directly related to the main event and may 
correspond to semantic information. Internal details are subdivided into: (1) event 
details, which describe the unfolding of the story (e.g., happenings, persons 
involved, reactions/emotions of oneself or other people, one’s clothing, the 
weather); (2) the time (e.g., life epoch, day, month, year, season, clock time); (3) 
the place (i.e., any information that involves localization in space, such as a city, a 
street, a building, a room); (4) perceptual details (i.e., visual, olfactory, tactile, 
gustatory, auditory information, proprioceptive or nociceptive information); and (5) 
thoughts and emotions (relating to the mental state of the subject). Apart from 
semantic information, repetitions of information and other unrelated details (i.e., 
time, place, event, perceptual and emotional details that do not directly pertain to 
the main event) are classified as external. Two independent raters (HC and EB) 
analyzed each transcribed recall by scoring each detail. Scoring reliability was 
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assessed using intra-class correlation (ICC) coefficients, showing that both raters 
scored the narratives in a highly reliable manner (ICCinternal details: 0.99; ICCexternal details: 
0.98). Residual discrepancies between raters were discussed later on to reach a 
final classification for all details. Based on this final classification, all subtypes of 
details generated spontaneously were summed across memories. 
 For each type of memory, the main measures of interest were the overall 
amount of (1) internal details, (2) external details, and (3) the ratio of internal 
details to total details in order to assess the level of episodicity of the memories 
(i.e., the degree to which memories contain episodic details independently of the 
overall fluency of participants). Variables being normally distributed, differences 
between groups were assessed using one-way repeated measures analyses of 
variance (rmANOVAs) and results were considered significant at p=0.017 after 
Bonferonni correction. In case of significant results, we performed post-hoc 
comparisons using Tukey HSD, setting the level of significance at 0.017 after 
Bonferonni correction. Regarding additional measures, we looked at the effect of 
the memory type on the amount of subtypes of internal and external memory 
details (i.e., event, perceptual, emotional and semantic details, as well as time, 
place and repetitions). Variables not being normally distributed, differences 
between groups were assessed using Friedman tests and results were considered 
significant at p=0.004 after Bonferonni correction. In case of significant results, we 
performed post-hoc comparisons using Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, setting the 
level of significance at 0.017 after Bonferonni correction.  
 
3.2.3.6 Questionnaires 
 CES total scores were analyzed using a rmANOVA. Answers at the sMCQ 
being ordinal data measures, memories (NDE vs. flashbulb vs. autobiographical) 
were compared using a Friedman test, setting the level of significance at 0.003 
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after Bonferonni correction. In case of significant results, we performed post-hoc 
comparisons using Tukey HSD tests for rmANOVAs and Wilcoxon signed-rank tests 
for Friedman tests, setting the level of significance at 0.017 after Bonferonni 
correction. Additionally, we examined associative strength between CES total 
scores and the reported details (i.e., internal score, external score, and internal 
ratio) using Pearson’s correlations.  
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3.2.4 Results 
3.2.4.1 Study sample 
 Our sample includes 25 NDE experiencers who have experienced a NDE 
following a life-threatening situation such as anoxia (e.g., cardiac arrest, near-
drowning; n=8), trauma (e.g., motor vehicle accident, falls; n=6) or other events 
(non-traumatic events such as complication during surgery; n=11). Participants’ 
negative mood was not higher than normal (i.e., as assessed by the PANAS) and 
they are all above the cut-off score at the MoCA (see Table 17).  
 All participants were able to recall a flashbulb memory and an 
autobiographical memory that happened around the same time than the NDE. 
Recalled memories do not differ regarding the number of years elapsed since the 
event (medianNDE=27, IQR=10-45, average rank=2.24; medianFlashbulb=17, IQR=15-27, 
average rank=1.68; medianAutobiographical=26, IQR=12-42, average rank=2.08; 
[X2(2)=4.622, p=0.099, kendall coefficient=0.092]). Recalled flashbulb memories 
were the following: the assassination of J. F. Kennedy (n=1), the first steps on the 
moon (n=5), the fall of the Berlin wall (n=2), death of King Baudouin of Belgium 
(n=3), death of Princess Diana (n=1), September 11 terrorist attacks (n=8), Liège 
shooting attack (n=4) and Paris terrorist attacks (n=1). Demographical and clinical 
information of the entire sample can be found in Table 17. 
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Table 17. Demographic and clinical information for NDE experiencers (n=25; 10 
female). 
Age at interview (in years) 
Mean ± SD 
 
59±12 
Age at NDE (in years) 
Mean ± SD 
 
31±20 
Reported time since NDE (in years) 
Mean ± SD 
 
28±19 
Greyson NDE scale total score 
Mean ± SD 
 
15±5 
PANAS+ 
Median (IQR) 
 
35(29-39) 
PANAS- 
Median (IQR) 
 
12(10-16) 
MoCA 
Median (IQR) 
 
29(28-30) 
 
3.2.4.2 Autobiographical Memory Interview  
 The number of internal/episodic and external/non-episodic details and the 
ratio of internal details over the total number of details as a function of the type of 
memory are presented in Table 18. There was a significant main effect of the 
memory type on the quantity of reported internal/episodic details (see Table 18). 
Post-hoc comparisons indicated that the number of internal/episodic details for the 
NDE memory was significantly higher than for the autobiographical (F(1, 
24)=29.343, p<0.001) as well as for the flashbulb memory (F(1, 24)=34.906, 
p<0.001). The autobiographical and the flashbulb memory did not differ (F(1, 
24)=1.096, p=0.306). We also found a significant main effect of the memory type 
on the amount of external/non-episodic details (see Table 18). Post-hoc 
comparisons indicated that the NDE memory contained significantly higher amount 
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of external/non-episodic details than the flashbulb memory (F(1, 24)=13.368, 
p=0.001). However, the NDE and the autobiographical memory (F(1, 24)=6.154, 
p=0.021) did not differ. The autobiographical and the flashbulb memory did not 
differ either (F(1, 24)=1.173, p=0.289). Finally, the ratio of internal details did not 
differ between memories (see Table 18).   
 Differences in episodic and non-episodic subcomponents of NDE, flashbulb 
and autobiographical memories can be found in Table 19. Results indicated a main 
effect of the memory type on the amount of event and perceptual internal details 
(see Table 19). Specifically, post-hoc comparisons indicated that NDE memories 
contained significantly more internal event details than autobiographical (V=12, 
p<0.001) and flashbulb memories (V=19, p<0.001). Autobiographical and flashbulb 
memories did not differ (V=80, p=0.223). NDE memories also showed higher ratings 
for internal perceptual details as compared to autobiographical (V=3.5, p<0.001) 
and flashbulb memories (V=246, p<0.001). Once again, autobiographical and 
flashbulb memories did not differ (V=54.5, p=0.775). No other significant difference 
was observed. Although not significant when considering Bonferroni correction for 
multiple comparisons, there was a trend for higher emotional internal details 
associated with the NDE compared to other types of memories. To ensure our 
results are not due to the effect of confounding variables, we performed the 
analyses by integrating NDE experiencer’s age as a regressor, which led to similar 
results. 
 
 
   
 
Table 18. Episodic/internal and non-episodic/external components of NDE, flashbulb and autobiographical memories. 
Results are considered statistically significant at p<0.017 after Bonferroni correction. Df1=between groups degrees of freedom. Df2=within 
groups degrees of freedom. *Results are significant. 
AI details NDE 
Mean(SD) 
n=25 
Flashbulb 
Mean(SD) 
n=25 
Autobiographical  
Mean(SD) 
n=25 
F Df1 Df2 p-value η
2
 
Internal  53(32.738) 15.96(8.899) 18.24(5.286) 30.337 2 48 <0.001* 0.558 
External 19.76(14.615) 9.08(6.531) 11.44(10.198) 7.699 2 48 0.001* 0.243 
Ratio of internal 
details 
0.73(0.18) 0.64(0.16) 0.66(0.21) 2.060 2 48 0.139 0.079 
   
 
Table 19. Episodic/internal and non-episodic/external subcomponents of NDE (n=25), flashbulb (n=25) and autobiographical (n=25) memories. 
AI details NDE 
Median(IQR) 
NDE 
Average rank 
Flashbulb 
Median(IQR) 
Flashbulb  
Average rank 
Autobio  
Median(IQR) 
Autobio 
Average rank 
X2 Df p-value Kendall  
coefficient 
Internal           
Event  20(9-33) 2.62 6(3-10) 1.50 10(4-12) 1.88 18.431 2 <0.004* 0.369 
Time 2(1-3) 2.10 1(1-2) 1.64 2(1-3) 2.26 6.241 2 0.044 0.125 
Place 1(0-2) 2.02 1(1-2) 2.18 1(0-2) 1.80 2.844 2 0.241 0.057 
Perceptual 7(3-12) 2.76 0(0-2) 1.58 0(0-2) 1.66 27.175 2 <0.004* 0.544 
Emotional 10(5-16) 2.48 3(2-6) 1.70 6(2-8) 1.82 9.800 2 0.007 0.196 
External           
Event  7(1-13) 2.36 2(1-3) 1.62 3(1-6) 2.02 7.708 2 0.021 0.154 
Time 0(0-0) 2.06 0(0-0) 2.00 0(0-0) 1.94 0.750 2 0.687 0.015 
Place 0(0-0) 1.98 0(0-0) 1.96 0(0-0) 2.06 0.378 2 0.828 0.057 
Perceptual 0(0-1) 2.16 0(0-0) 1.80 0(0-0) 2.04 7.000 2 0.030 0.140 
Emotional 1(0-5) 2.16 1(0-2) 1.96 0(0-2) 1.88 1.489 2 0.476 0.030 
Semantic 1(0-3) 1.98 3(1-4) 2.24 1(0-2) 1.78 3.325 2 0.190 0.067 
Repetition 3(1-4) 2.32 2(1-2) 1.88 1(0-3) 1.80 4.722 2 0.094 0.094 
Results are considered statistically significant at p<0.004 after Bonferroni correction. Df=degree of freedom. *Results are significant. 
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3.2.4.3 Questionnaires 
3.2.4.3.1 Short Memory Characteristics Questionnaire  
 
 Median ratings for each characteristic as a function of the type of memory 
are presented in Table 20. Results indicated a between-memory difference in the 
(1) feeling of mentally reliving the event, (2) sensation of feeling the emotions felt 
during the event while remembering, (3) visual perspective taken while 
remembering, (4) emotions felt at the time of the event (i.e., valence), (5) personal 
importance attached to the event, and (6) reactivation frequency. Memories did 
not differ in the amount of sensory details, clarity (i.e., time, location and 
coherence), confidence in the memory as well as remembering one’s own 
actions/words/thoughts. Post-hoc comparisons indicated that the feeling of 
mentally reliving the event is higher in autobiographical memories as compared to 
flashbulb memories (V=187, p=0.002). NDE memories did not differ from 
autobiographical (V=32, p=0.361) and flashbulb memories (V=144, p=0.049). The 
sensation of feeling the emotions felt during the event while remembering is higher 
in NDE and autobiographical memories compared to flashbulb memories (V=192, 
p=0.001 and V=20, p<0.001, respectively), but did not differ between NDE and 
autobiographical memories (V=37.5, p=0.109). Regarding visual perspective, 
flashbulb memories showed lower scores than NDE (V=162.5, p<0.001) and 
autobiographical memories (V=4.5, p<0.001) indicating that they were less 
susceptible to be remembered from a first person perspective. Difference between 
NDE and autobiographical memories did not reach significance (V=24, p=0.438). 
Flashbulb memories also showed lower scores for the valence as compared to NDE 
(V=207.5, p<0.001) and autobiographical memories (V=232, p=0.001; NDE and 
autobiographical memories did not differ, V=74.5, p=0.171), indicating that the 
latter were more positive in average. NDE and autobiographical memories also 
scored higher than flashbulb memories in terms of personal importance (V=250, 
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p<0.001 and V=7.5, p<0.001, respectively). On the other hand, difference between 
NDE and autobiographical memories did not reach significance (V=30.5, p=0.307). 
Finally, NDE and autobiographical memories were more frequently shared and 
reactivated than flashbulb memories (V=211.5, p<0.001 and V=194, p<0.001, 
respectively). Once again, difference between NDE and autobiographical memories 
did not reach significance (V=73.5, p=0.793). 
  
 
Table 20.  Score differences between NDE (n=25), flashbulb (n=25) and autobiographical (n=25) memories on the sMCQ. 
sMCQ Items NDE 
Median(IQR) 
Average 
rank 
Flashbulb 
Median(IQR) 
Average 
rank 
Autobio 
Median(IQR) 
Average 
rank 
X
2
 Df p-value Kendall  
coeff. 
Reexperiencing 6(6-7) 2.20 5(3-6) 1.50 7(6-7) 2.30 12.500 2 0.002* 0.250 
Visual details 7(6-7) 2.20 6(6-7) 1.76 7(6-7) 2.04 4.863 2 0.088 0.097 
Other sensory details 6(5-7) 2.36 4(2-5) 1.60 6(4-7) 2.04 9.455 2 0.009 0.189 
Location 7(7-7) 2.10 7(7-7) 2.02 7(6-7) 1.88 1.676 2 0.433 0.034 
Time 4(1-6) 1.86 6(5-6) 2.32 5(2-6) 1.82 4.437 2 0.109 0.089 
Coherence 7(7-7) 2.22 7(5-7) 1.72 7(6-7) 2.06 7.244 2 0.027 0.145 
Verbal component 5(4-7) 2.12 5(4-6) 1.92 6(3-6) 1.96 0.903 2 0.637 0.018 
Feeling emotions  6(5-7) 2.12 5(3-6) 1.48 7(6-7) 2.40 13.728 2 0.001* 0.275 
Real/imagined  7(7-7) 2.08 7(7-7) 1.96 7(7-7) 1.96 1.200 2 0.548 0.024 
One’s own actions 7(6-7) 2.28 6(4-7) 1.58 7(6-7) 2.14 11.064 2 0.004 0.221 
One’s own words 7(5-7) 2.18 4(3-7) 1.80 6(4-7) 2.02 2.563 2 0.278 0.051 
One’s own thoughts 7(7-7) 2.38 6(4-7) 1.74 6(6-7) 1.88 8.448 2 0.015 0.169 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Results are considered statistically significant at p<0.003 after Bonferroni correction. Df=degrees of freedom. *Results are significant. 
Visual perspective 7(7-7) 2.28 5(1-6) 1.30 7(7-7) 2.42 27.382 2 <0.003* 0.548 
Valence 7(6-7) 2.24 3(2-4) 1.24 7(6-7) 2.52 28.658 2 <0.003* 0.573 
Personal importance  7(6-7) 2.42 3(2-4) 1.30 7(5-7) 2.28 22.707 2 <0.003* 0.454 
Reactivation frequency  6(5-6) 2.38 3(2-4) 1.34 5(5-6) 2.28 20.835 2 <0.003* 0.416 
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3.2.4.3.2 Centrality of Event Scale  
 
 There was a significant effect of the memory type on the reported 
centrality [F(2, 48)=48.256, p<0.001, eta-squared=0.668]. Post-hoc comparisons 
indicated that the mean score for the NDE memory (mean=81.4, SD=15.767) was 
significantly higher than the autobiographical memory (mean=62, SD=23.429) (F(1, 
24)=12.767, p=0.002) as well as the flashbulb memory (mean=35.36, SD=12.783) 
(F(1, 24)=115.525, p<0.001). Moreover, the autobiographical memory was 
significantly higher than the flashbulb memory (F(1, 24)=38.149, p<0.001). 
Additionally, a significant positive correlation was found between CES scores and 
the number of reported internal details (r=0.49, p<0.001) as well as the number of 
external details (r=0.27, p=0.02), regardless of the memory type. The correlation 
with the ratio of internal details did not reach significance (r=0.17, p=0.154).  
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3.2.5 Discussion 
 Previous studies have highlighted the vivid nature and high 
consequentiality of NDE memories (Cassol et al., 2019; Martial, Charland-Verville, 
Cassol, et al., 2017; Moore & Greyson, 2017; Thonnard et al., 2013), leading to the 
assumption that they could be underpinned by the same memory processes as 
flashbulb memories (Thonnard et al., 2013). Therefore, the aim of this study was to 
adopt a more fine-grained approach to highlight and compare the episodic and 
non-episodic contributions to the recall of NDE, flashbulb and control 
autobiographical events that occurred around the same time. To do so, we used 
the AI which provides reliable and valid indices of episodic and semantic 
contributions to personal remote memories. 
 First, analysis of verbal recollections highlighted that NDE memories 
include a higher amount of internal/episodic details than flashbulb and 
autobiographical memories, as well as more external/non-episodic information 
than flashbulb memories. This is consistent with previous studies suggesting a 
particularly high amount of qualitative characteristics associated with NDE 
memories in comparison with other types of memories (e.g., Moore & Greyson, 
2017; Thonnard et al., 2013). In contrast, the internal detail ratio (i.e., the number 
of internal details produced in proportion of the total of details generated; also 
referred to as the “episodicity” of a memory) did not differ between memories. 
Interestingly, the higher amount of external details provided for NDE memories 
compared to flashbulb memories seemed to be driven by the recall of more specific 
details related to episodic events that were not the central NDE (rather than 
general semantic information). This would suggest that NDE memories also 
encompass vivid recall of surrounding events beyond the NDE itself. 
 The richness and high amount of overall details that have been delivered 
for NDE memories, as compared to other more or less notable memories dating 
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from the same period, could be explained by various factors. First, a NDE itself is 
characterized by an exceptional and unique association between unusual 
perceptions (such as the impression of leaving the physical body, entering a 
different dimension or being in an unknown spatio-temporal dimension) and a 
clear sensorium and intense sensation of “reality” (i.e., comparable to the sense of 
certainty that accompanies everyday perception; Dell’Olio, 2010; Schwaninger et 
al., 2002), conditions that are likely to lead to vivid memories. Second, previous 
studies have highlighted a tendency towards a decline in memory reports (normal 
forgetting process) in flashbulb memories in comparison with other emotionally 
arousing events (e.g., Christianson, 1989; Christianson & Engelberg, 1999). 
Consistency and amplification of memories over time would be conditioned by 
one’s degree of involvement and the severity of the emotionally arousing event 
(Neisser et al., 1996; van Giezen, Arensman, Spinhoven, & Wolters, 2005). In line 
with this view, studies including participants who were directly exposed to or 
personally involved in traumatic events identified different memory patterns than 
studies addressing flashbulb memories, in which subjects were not personally 
involved in the emotional event. In fact, some studies have even shown that unlike 
the emotionally charged traumatic events whose narratives become richer over 
time, flashbulb memories rather tend to decline (Krinsley, Gallagher, Weathers, 
Kutter, & Kaloupek, 2003; van Giezen et al., 2005). When looking closer at the 
subtypes of details that have been recalled, we identified more event and 
perceptual internal details within the NDE memory, as compared to flashbulb and 
autobiographical memories. Specifically, event details describe the unfolding of the 
story, and perceptual details comprise auditory, olfactory, tactile, taste, visual and 
spatial-temporal (allocentric-egocentric space, body position and duration) 
information. Some authors suggested that the overall quantity of details comprised 
in NDE memories could be due to the fact that self-referential information can 
improve recalling performances (Conway & Dewhurst, 1995). Specifically, self-
referential information would enhance the encoding process, the organization in 
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memory, as well as the enrichment of the event by extended knowledge (Conway 
& Dewhurst, 1995). The high overall amount of phenomenological details in NDE 
memories could therefore be explained by the unprecedented nature of their 
emotions and features (Charland-Verville et al., 2014; Greyson & Stevenson, 1980; 
Greyson, 1983), as well as their self-defining value and high centrality to NDE 
experiencers’ life stories, as reported by the CES (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006; Cassol et 
al., 2019). From a broader cognitive perspective, the high amount of 
internal/episodic and external/non-episodic details observed in verbal recollections 
of NDE memories is interesting as it suggests that people might be able to recall 
memories of a moment characterized by an altered state of consciousness where 
the brain and its associated processes are thought to be working with altered 
capacities. Nevertheless, it is still unclear when exactly these events are 
experienced as well as when their memory encoding precisely occurs. 
 Second, we compared the phenomenological characteristics (i.e., sMCQ 
scores) as well as the consequentiality and centrality (i.e., CES scores) of NDE, 
flashbulb and autobiographical memories. The analyses revealed that sMCQ scores 
related to NDEs and autobiographical memories were higher than those of 
flashbulb memories regarding the sensation of feeling the emotions felt during the 
event while remembering, their importance and their reactivation frequency. 
Moreover, the feeling of mentally reliving the event was higher for the 
autobiographical memory compared to the flashbulb memory. The finding that 
NDEs are emotionally highly charged and constitute an important part of NDE 
experiencers’ life story is in line previous reports (e.g., Bianco, Sambin, & Palmieri, 
2017; Cassol et al., 2019; Greyson, 1997). On the contrary, the high scores of 
autobiographical memories might seem unexpected but could find explanation in 
the fact that some of them were somewhat connected to the NDE. Indeed, NDE 
experiencers have lived their NDE several decades ago in average and reported 
difficulties when having to recall another event from the same period. From then 
on, recalled autobiographical memories were events closely linked to their 
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NDE/coma (i.e., return to their daily lives after a long hospitalization, recovery after 
their coma) or significant/life-changing events such as a child birth or their 
encounter with their spouse (i.e., categories of memories that have typically been 
reported as self-defining in previous studies; e.g., Cassol et al., 2019). Furthermore, 
regarding reactivation frequency, it has been shown that shocking memories of 
personal events are more thought and talked about than news reception memories 
such as flashbulb events (Pillemer, 2009). Finally, we also noted significant 
differences regarding the perspective taken during recollection. Autobiographical 
memories can either be retrieved from the first person perspective, in which the 
experience is visualized through one's own eyes, or from the third person 
perspective, in which the experience is seen through an observer’s eyes (Nigro & 
Neisser, 1983). While participants tended to see the scene from their own 
perspective (field perspective) when recalling their NDE and their autobiographical 
memory, it was less the case for flashbulb memories for which they were more 
likely to see themselves from an observer’s perspective. Adopted visual 
perspectives are influenced by different variables and appear be the consequence 
of contextual as well as dispositional factors, and/or their interaction (Nigro & 
Neisser, 1983; Sutin & Robins, 2008). These findings are consistent with previous 
research (Robinson & Swanson, 1993; Sutin & Robins, 2008) highlighting that 
natural first person memories are generally rated higher on the phenomenological 
dimensions related to the reliving of a memory. Moreover, it has been shown that 
the adoption of a third-person perspective could be an avoidance strategy set up to 
distance the individual from a memory and reduce its emotional intensity (Kenny & 
Bryant, 2007; Sutin & Robins, 2008). Therefore, the difference in the adopted visual 
perspective could be due to the emotions felt at the time of the event (i.e., 
valence), that are overall very positive in NDE as well as in autobiographical 
memories and more negative in case of flashbulb events. Regarding centrality, 
answers to the CES revealed that NDE memories had the higher scores, followed by 
autobiographical memories and then by flashbulb memories. These findings 
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corroborate previous findings and confirm the particular status of NDEs with regard 
to NDE experiencers’ identities and life stories (Cassol et al., 2019). The lower 
scores associated to flashbulb memories highlight the distinction between the 
consequences that one predicts when hearing about a surprising event and its 
actual impact on one’s life. These results are consistent with previous research on 
hearing shocking public events that have shown lower life impact, consequentiality, 
and personal importance (Pillemer, 2009). In addition, we found that the amount of 
episodic and non-episodic details provided by participants was associated to their 
reported centrality, regardless of the memory type. It is therefore reasonable to 
hypothesize that central events could benefit from a preferential encoding in 
autobiographical memory.  
 Finally, we would like to mention limitations to this study. NDE 
experiencers voluntarily contacted us after calls in the lay media and our sample 
consequently suffers from a self-selection bias. Moreover, given the relative 
scarcity of NDEs and the fact that we had to meet participants personally in 
accordance to the AI protocol, we were limited in the recruitment of our 
participants and our sample is relatively small. Therefore, results should be 
confirmed by larger studies. Besides, human memory is by definition a 
reconstructive process (Schacter, Norman, & Koutstaal, 1998) sensitive to 
numerous factors such as ageing (e.g., Devitt, Addis, & Schacter, 2017); therefore, 
the generalizability of our results could also be impacted by the fact that all 
memories are drawn from a homogenous pool of NDE experiencers. To address this 
issue, it would be interesting to asses autobiographical and flashbulb memories in 
healthy controls and to further explore the cognitive processes specific to NDE 
experiencers, especially since previous studies suggest a specific cognitive profile, 
including a propensity for dissociation (Greyson, 2000a) and illusory recollections 
(Martial, Charland-Verville, Dehon, & Laureys, 2018). 
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 To conclude, we used the AI scoring protocol to explore the verbal content 
of three remote autobiographical memories in a sample of NDE experiencers: the 
NDE, a flashbulb and a control autobiographical memory. Overall, NDE verbal 
recollections include more internal/episodic than control autobiographical and 
flashbulb memories, and more external/non-episodic details than flashbulb 
memories. More precisely, they comprise more event and perceptual internal 
details. Moreover, we found that flashbulb memories are associated to a lower 
intensity of feelings while remembering and a lower personal importance, and are 
less reactivated and less susceptible to be remembered from a first person 
perspective. Finally, NDE memories are more central than autobiographical 
memories, which in turn are more central than flashbulb memories. Besides, more 
central events contain more episodic verbal details. Overall, our results fall in line 
with existing literature that highlights the uniqueness of NDE memories. 
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4 Neurochemical models of near-death 
experiences 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Based on the following publication: 
Cassol, H.*, Martial, C.* (contributed equally), Charland-Verville, V., Pallavicini, C., 
Sanz, C., Zamberlan, F., Vivot, R. M., Erowid, F., Erowid, E., Laureys, S., 
Greyson, B., & Tagliazucchi, E. (2019). Neurochemical models of near-death 
experiences: A large-scale study based on the semantic similarity of written 
reports. Consciousness and Cognition, 69, 52-69. 
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4.1 Study 5. A large scale study based on the semantic 
similarity of written reports 
4.1.1 Summary 
 The real or perceived proximity to death often results in a non-ordinary 
state of consciousness characterized by phenomenological features such as the 
perception of leaving the body boundaries, feelings of peace, bliss and 
timelessness, life review, the sensation of traveling through a tunnel and an 
irreversible threshold. NDEs are comparable among individuals of different 
cultures, suggesting an underlying neurobiological mechanism. Anecdotal accounts 
of the similarity between NDEs and certain drug-induced altered states of 
consciousness prompted us to perform a large-scale comparative analysis of these 
experiences. After assessing the semantic similarity between ≈15,000 reports 
linked to the use of 165 psychoactive substances and 625 NDE narratives, we 
determined that the NMDA receptor antagonist ketamine consistently resulted in 
reports most similar to those associated with NDEs. Ketamine was followed by 
Salvia divinorum (a plant containing a potent and selective κ receptor agonist) and 
a series of serotonergic psychedelics, including the endogenous serotonin 2A 
receptor agonist DMT. This similarity was driven by semantic concepts related to 
consciousness of the self and the environment, but also by those associated with 
the therapeutic, ceremonial and religious aspects of drug use. Our analysis sheds 
light on the longstanding link between certain drugs and the experience of “dying“, 
suggests that ketamine could be used as a safe and reversible experimental model 
for NDE phenomenology, and supports the speculation that endogenous NMDA 
antagonists with neuroprotective properties may be released in the proximity of 
death. 
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4.1.2 Introduction 
 Throughout known history, humans have shown a tendency towards 
modifying their ordinary state of consciousness by consuming certain fungi and 
plant materials (Devereux, 1997; Escohotado, 1999). Naturally occurring molecules 
that interact with endogenous neurotransmitters and neuromodulators can induce 
an ample range of effects, such as sedation, stimulation, euphoria, modifications in 
the perception of the environment and the self, and complex and interactive 
hallucinations (Nichols, 2016). From Paleolithic cave art to contemporary music the 
ineffability of drug induced altered states of consciousness led to artistic 
expressions attempting to communicate the associated subjective experiences 
(Devereux, 1997; Shapiro, 1988). Frequently, analogies are made between the 
experiences elicited by certain psychoactive compounds and other non-ordinary 
states of consciousness (e.g., dreams, nightmares, sleep paralysis, mystical 
experiences, meditative states) (Kraehenmann, 2017; Millière, Carhart-Harris, 
Roseman, Trautwein, & Berkovich-Ohana, 2018; Sanz, Zamberlan, Erowid, Erowid, 
& Tagliazucchi, 2018). Certain psychiatric conditions have been compared 
(“modeled”) to the acute effects of psychoactive compounds (Bubeníková-
Valešová, Horáček, Vrajová, & Höschl, 2008; Kyzar, Nichols, Gainetdinov, Nichols, & 
Kalueff, 2017; Nichols, 2016). Such comparisons are especially common for drugs 
collectively known as hallucinogens, a class that includes serotonergic psychedelics 
(the most known example being lysergic acid diethylamide [LSD]), dissociatives 
(e.g., arylcyclohexalamines such as ketamine and phencyclidine [PCP]) and 
deliriants (e.g., Solanaceae plants rich in anticholinergic tropane alkaloids). It is also 
documented that dopaminergic stimulants such as methamphetamine can induce 
psychotic hallucinatory states (McKetin, 2018).  
 Perhaps the most intriguing of all experiences compared to drug-induced 
altered states of consciousness is that of “death” or “dying” (Grof, Halifax, & 
Kübler-Ross, 1977; Strassman, 2001). Such comparison is evident in the etymology 
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of word “ayahuasca” (“vine of the dead” in the Quechua language), an Amazonian 
concoction with psychedelic effects induced by DMT (Schultes & Raffauf, 2004). 
Certain societies indigenous to North America incorporate peyote (Lophophora 
williamsii, a cactus containing the psychedelic molecule mescaline) in their 
ceremonies to allow a glimpse into their conception of an afterlife (Bailey, 1973). 
The Bwiti people native to present-day Gabon employ the bark of Iboga (which 
contains the potent hallucinogenic tryptamine ibogaine) in combination with 
polyrhythmic music to induce “near-death” trances (Maas & Strubelt, 2003). In 
contemporary Western society, the experiences elicited by natural and semi-
synthetic hallucinogens have also been compared to dying (Lee & Shlain, 1992). The 
feeling of death and rebirth attributed to certain psychedelics has been postulated 
as a component of their potential therapeutic effect (Grof et al., 1977). 
Descriptions of dissociative anesthetics, especially ketamine, abound in 
comparisons with the experience of dying (Corazza & Schifano, 2010; Jansen, 1990; 
Jansen, 1997a, 1997b). Timothy Leary, a key figure in the popularization and 
subsequent stigmatization of LSD, referred to ketamine experiences as 
“experiments in voluntary death” (Jansen, 1997a, 1997b). It must be noted that the 
comparison between the experiences induced by these drugs and dying occurs at a 
purely psychological level, since these substances are very safe under most 
circumstances (Alberich et al., 2017; Albott et al., 2018; dos Santos, Bouso, Alcázar-
Córcoles, & Hallak, 2018; Nichols, 2016).  
 “Dying” as a non-ordinary state of consciousness can be related to NDEs 
(Greyson, 2008; Sleutjes et al., 2014). We have already discussed it, however, 
NDEs-like raise questions about the extent to which the proximity to death is 
involved in the appearance of a subjective NDE phenomenology. In addition, many 
researchers have independently noticed the phenomenological overlap between 
NDEs and the experiences induced by serotonergic and dissociative psychedelics 
(Jansen, 1990; Jansen, 1997a, 1997b; Strassman, 2001; Timmermann et al., 2018). 
Thus, it has been hypothesized that the long-standing association between these 
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psychoactive compounds and the experience of “dying” could be based on their 
capacity to emulate NDEs.  
 The association between drug-induced experiences and NDEs is frequently 
discussed in terms of anecdotal evidence and firstperson accounts. Direct 
experimental evidence supporting this association is scarce. Corazza et al. 
retrospectively compared reports of 36 subjects who experienced NDEs (related to 
cardiac arrest) with the experiences of 36 subjects under the acute effects of 
ketamine (Corazza & Schifano, 2010). The authors found sufficient commonalities 
to conclude that ketamine can reproduce at least some aspects of NDE 
phenomenology. Recently, Timmermann and colleagues performed a within-
subjects placebo-controlled study with 13 participants to test the 
phenomenological similarities between the DMT state and NDEs (Timmermann et 
al., 2018). They found significant differences vs. placebo using numerical scales 
designed to quantify NDE (Greyson, 1983). Furthermore, the authors detected a 
significant overlap between the phenomenological features of DMT-induced 
experiences and those described by a matched group who reported a NDE after a 
life-threatening situation.  
 The aforementioned studies provide unique and valuable evidence, but 
also limitations related to the use of structured questionnaires to quantify and 
compare highly complex and heterogeneous experiences, as well as biases in the 
selection of the psychoactive compounds to be contrasted with NDEs. Indeed, NDE 
phenomenology has also been compared to that induced by LSD (Morse et al., 
1989), carbon dioxide (Meduna, 1950), hashish (Siegel, 1984), 5-MeO-DMT (the 5-
methoxylated analogue of DMT) (Shulgin & Shulgin, 1997), ayahuasca (orally 
ingested DMT, enabled by its combination with β-carbolines present in 
Baanisteriopsis caapi) (Strassman, 2001), and others. Thus, the following questions 
remain open: (1) Is the phenomenological similarity between NDEs and drug-
induced experiences highest for substances within a certain pharmacological class 
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and mechanism of action?; (2) Can this similarity be inferred from unstructured 
free narratives, and do they offer insights complementary to the use of structured 
questionnaires?; (3) Given the heterogeneity in the events associated with NDEs 
(e.g., surrounding circumstances, proximity to death, emotional valence attributed 
by the subject, etc.), does such heterogeneity reflect on the similarity with the 
phenomenology of drug-induced states of consciousness?  
 In the present work we seek to provide an answer to these questions by 
retrospectively comparing 625 narratives of events classified as NDEs with a large 
number of reports (> 15,000) spanning experiences with 165 psychoactive 
substances of ten different pharmacological classes. We build upon previous work 
showing that natural language processing (NLP) tools used to obtain the semantic 
similarity between narratives provide an unstructured alternative to quantify the 
phenomenological similarity of different reported experiences (Lange, Greyson, & 
Houran, 2015; Sanz et al., 2018). Finally, we discuss how our results shed light on 
the historical association between certain psychoactive compounds and the 
experience of “dying”, on the possible neurobiological mechanisms underlying the 
robust and reproducible phenomenology of NDEs, on the possibility that NDEs are 
associated with the release of endogenous neuroprotective agents in the proximity 
of death, and finally on the possible therapeutic uses of pharmacologically inducing 
NDEs in the terminally ill. 
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4.1.3 Materials and methods 
 In the following, we describe the corpus of NDE narratives (“NDE corpus”), 
the demographics of the experiencers and the known circumstances at the time of 
the NDEs, as well as the corpus of free narratives of experiences with psychoactive 
compounds obtained from the Erowid Experience Vaults (“Erowid corpus”). We 
present an overview of the NLP tools applied to the corpora, especially of latent 
semantic analysis (LSA) (Landauer, Laham, & Derr, 2004), the core method to 
quantitatively compare the similarity of the reported experiences. 
 
4.1.3.1 NDE corpus 
 NDE experiencers were recruited via the Division of Perceptual Studies 
(University of Virginia Health System, USA) and the GIGAConsciousness (Coma 
Science Group, University of Liège and University Hospital of Liège, Belgium). 
Completion of the anonymous questionnaire was voluntary. The NDE corpus 
consisted of 625 retrospective narratives of NDEs, comprising a total of 623.926 
words. All experiences scored 7 or higher on the NDE Scale (15.2±7), except for 182 
accounts which were collected before the development of such scale (Greyson, 
1983). In those cases, the narratives contained enough detail to suggest they would 
have scored 7 or higher if the experiencers had completed the scale. Many 
narratives included additional information concerning participant demographics, 
nature of the circumstances surrounding loss of consciousness during the 
experience, severity of physical trauma/closeness to death, and self-assessment of 
the emotional valence of the experience (using a 3-point Likert scale ranging from 
−1 pleasant, 0 neutral, to +1 unpleasant). The age of the participants (68% females) 
at the time of the experience was 31±15 years (7 missing values), and the age at 
the time of the study was 52±13 years (2 missing values). Loss of consciousness at 
time of the NDE was attributed to head injury in 13% of the cases, to 
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anesthesia/drug use in 30% of the cases, and to cardiac arrest in 10% of the cases 
(228 missing values). Severity of physical trauma/closeness to death was rated 
retrospectively by the experiencers as “not serious” in 27% of the cases, as 
“serious” in 37% of the cases and as involving loss of vital signs in 35% of the cases 
(209 missing values). The NDEs were rated as “pleasant” in 82% of cases, as 
“neutral” in 8% of cases and as “unpleasant” in 9% of cases (279 missing values). 
The NDE corpus metadata can be visualized in Figure 7. 
 
 
Figure 7 – Characterization of the NDE corpus metadata. Left: hierarchical pie chart showing 
the proportion of NDEs related to loss of consciousness due to head injury, anesthesia/drug 
use, cardiac arrest, and unknown causes. Each segment of the pie chart is further 
subdivided according to the severity of the physical trauma/closeness to death, divided into 
three categories: not serious, serious illness or injury, and loss of vital signs. The width of 
these outer segments is proportional to the average NDE Scale score (Greyson, 1983) of the 
experiences. Right: Histograms of the age of the experiencers at the time of the NDE, and at 
the time their accounts were retrospectively recollected. 
 
4.1.3.2 Erowid corpus 
 Reports of psychoactive substance use were downloaded from the Erowid 
Experience Vaults (https://erowid.org/experiences/). The webpage 
Study 5. A large scale study based on the semantic similarity of written reports 
159 
 
www.erowid.org is defined as a “member-supported organization providing access 
to reliable, non-judgmental information about psychoactive plants, chemicals, and 
related issues”. Among other resources, it contains a large number (> 20,000) of 
curated freely expressed reports associated with the use of different psychoactive 
substances.  
 As described in a previous publication (Sanz et al., 2018), we curated the 
Erowid corpus by performing the following steps: (1) discarded reports that 
resulted from the combination of different substances; (2) discarding duplicate 
reports appearing under more than one category; (3) classified the reports in the 
most specific way unless such specificity dramatically reduced the number of 
reports associated with each individual substance; (4) distinguished the reports 
associated with plant and fungi and their isolated psychoactive compounds; (5) 
only included substances with more than ten reports. This resulted in 165 
substances that were manually classified into the following classes: serotonergic 
psychedelics, dissociative psychedelics, entactogens, deliriants, 
depressants/sedatives, stimulants, antipsychotics/antidepressants, oneirogens (i.e., 
which produce dream-like states of consciousness) and others. Some substances 
were also given a secondary category due to the complex nature of their effects.  
 Following previous work, drug categories were determined using a hybrid 
criterion based on pharmacological action and the subjective effects induced by the 
substances. Serotonergic psychedelics (5-HT2A agonists) were grouped based on 
their mechanism of action (Nichols, 2016). The category of dissociative psychedelics 
comprised primarily NMDA antagonists such as the arylcyclohexylamines ketamine 
and PCP, but also included substances with other mechanisms of action (i.e., 
Amanita muscaria mushrooms) (Wallach & Brandt, 2018). Deliriants were in most 
cases Solanaceae plants rich in tropane alkaloids (El-Dabbas & Evans, 1982). 
Entactogen drugs were categorized by their subjective effects that produce specific 
social and emotional effects such as empathy, sociability enhancement, anxiety 
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suppression and disinhibition (Nichols, 1986). Stimulants included dopaminergic 
drugs such as cocaine, amphetamines and modafinil, as well as others of different 
pharmacological profile; analogously, depressants/sedatives were defined by their 
effects on the central nervous system, and included substances such as 
benzodiazepines as well as natural and synthetic opioid analgesics (Perrine, 1996). 
Prescription antidepressants and antipsychotics were grouped together into one 
category. Only two plants in the Erowid corpus are consumed primarily for their 
oneirogen effect (Calea zacatechichi and Silene undulata) (Toro & Thomas, 2007). 
Certain substances had a large number of subjective reports, but their relatively 
unique mechanism of action did not justify the creation of a new category; such 
substances were classified as “other” (e.g., Salvia divinorum). 
 
4.1.3.3 Corpora preprocessing 
 The preprocessing of the NDE and Erowid corpora was performed using the 
Natural Language Toolkit (NLTK, http://www.nltk. org/) in Python 3.4.6. We applied 
the following steps: (1) separation into individual words after discarding all 
punctuation marks (word repetitions allowed); (2) word lemmatization using NLTK 
(i.e. conversion to the root from which the word is inflicted); (3) conversion to 
lowercase; (4) discarding words containing less than three characters (after 
lemmatization) (Sanz et al., 2018). Since texts from the Erowid corpus are likely to 
be influenced by the nature of the substance being reported, we manually 
compiled a list of words including substance names, different slang variations (e.g., 
“weed”, “coke”), and words relating to the possible routes of administration (e.g., 
“smoke”, “snort”, “inject”). These were removed from both the NDE and Erowid 
corpora. The rationale behind this “censoring” of the corpora was to retain words 
describing the experiences elicited by the substances, but not the drugs themselves 
nor contextual factors such as the route of administration. 
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4.1.3.4 Latent semantic analysis 
 We employed an index of semantic similarity between narratives as a proxy 
of the similarity of the associated altered states of consciousness (Landauer et al., 
2004). The main assumption behind our method is that if two subjects are asked to 
describe certain experiences, and both narratives mention the same core concepts 
with similar frequencies, then it is likely that both narratives reflect similar 
subjective experiences. Previous work has established the adequacy of LSA to 
classify the reported subjective effects of different psychoactive substances (Bedi 
et al., 2014; Coyle, Presti, & Baggott, 2012), and to compare drug-induced altered 
states of consciousness vs. non-ordinary experiences of a different nature (Bedi et 
al., 2014; Sanz et al., 2018).  
 As a first approximation, we define a matrix A with T rows (number of 
terms appearing in the corpus) and D columns (number of documents, in this case 
each document corresponds to all the reports of a substance in the Erowid corpus, 
or to all the narratives in the NDE corpus). This term-document matrix contains in 
its i, j entry the number of times the i-th term is mentioned in the j-th document. 
Then, it is possible to compute the similarity between documents j1and j2 as the 
linear correlation between their corresponding columns in the matrix A (i.e., the 
documents are considered similar if the usage of terms is correlated between 
documents). It must be noted that the similarity is measured in terms of word co-
occurrences, and not in terms of the frequency of single words. For instance, the 
word “fear” could appear frequently in a report of a frightful experience, but also in 
a report emphasizing absence of fear. However, the different co-ocurrence 
frequencies of “fear” with other words will increase the semantic distance of the 
reports. A problem with this approach is only counting term occurrences, instead of 
computing their frequency weighted by how many times the term occurs within a 
given document vs. across the whole corpus. Thus, we applied the frequency–
inverse document frequency (tf-idf) transform, as implemented in scikit-learn 
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(www.scikit-learn.org). The entries of the matrix A are determined as the product 
of the term frequency and the inverse document frequency. The term frequency is 
defined as the number of times the term appears in each document. The inverse 
document frequency is defined as the logarithmically scaled inverse fraction of the 
documents containing the term. To eliminate very frequent/rare terms from the 
corpus, only those appearing in more/less than 5%/95% of the documents were 
retained. Intuitively, the tf-idf transform gives a higher weight to terms that are 
more specific to a given document, decreasing the weight based on the number of 
documents in the corpus that contain such term.  
 Another difficulty with the first approximation described above is that, for a 
large vocabulary of terms, the occurrence frequencies are sparse, i.e. most entries 
in the matrix A are zero and the linear correlation values of the columns are likely 
to be very low. By grouping words that appear in similar contexts as concepts, the 
number of independent variables used to span the semantic space is reduced. For 
this purpose, we applied LSA, a NLP tool based on the hypothesis that words with 
similar meaning appear with similar frequency in texts (Landauer et al., 2004). To 
apply LSA, the term-document matrix obtained using the tf-idf transform was first 
decomposed into the product of three matrices using Singular Value 
Decomposition (SDV) (Huang & Narendra, 1975), A = U × Σ × W. In this 
decomposition U and V are real unitary matrices and Σ is a diagonal matrix of 
singular values ordered by size. To reduce the dimensionality of the semantic 
space, only the first k singular values of Σ were retained, yielding the truncated 
matrix Σk. From this matrix, the rank-reduced term-document matrix is computed 
as A∗ = Uk × Σk × Wk.  
 
Study 5. A large scale study based on the semantic similarity of written reports 
163 
 
4.1.3.5 Principal component analysis and automated 
component labeling 
 We applied principal component analysis (PCA) to reduce the term-
document matrix into a smaller number of components capturing topics that 
recurrently appear in the corpora (using an algorithm based on SVD as 
implemented in MATLAB 2014). We considered only the topics represented by the 
first five components, in terms of explained variance in the tf-idf rank-reduced term 
document matrix. Each component was associated with one coefficient per term in 
the vocabulary. These coefficients were used to represent the topics in word cloud 
format using the website https://wordart.com/.  
 To avoid the arbitrary naming of the components, for each of them we 
selected the 20 terms with the largest coefficients, and queried a large space for 
the words with the highest semantic proximity. For this purpose we used the 
Datamuse API (https://www. datamuse.com/), a word-finding engine based on 
word2vec (Minarro-Giménez, Marín-Alonso, & Samwald, 2014), an embedding 
method using neural networks to map words into a vector space with the 
constraint that words appearing in similar contexts are also close in the vector 
space embedding. 
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4.1.4 Results 
4.1.4.1 Similarity between NDE and drug-induced 
experiences 
 We performed a SVD of the term-document matrix, grouping as single 
documents all NDE narratives and all reports associated with the 165 substances in 
the Erowid corpus. We retained the first 20 singular values; this choice was based 
on the number of drug categories included in the corpus, as well as on previous 
research showing adequate results using the same dataset (Sanz et al., 2018). The 
robustness of the results against the choice of this parameter was evaluated and is 
presented in a latter section.  
 We obtained the correlation matrix derived from computing all pairwise 
correlations between the columns of the rank-reduced term-document matrix A∗ 
(Figure 8A). The narratives of substances within the same category tended to 
display a higher semantic similarity when compared to those of other categories; 
this was especially clear for antipsychotics and deliriants. Stimulants and sedatives 
presented a smaller degree of within-group semantic similarity. Reports associated 
with the use of serotonergic and dissociative psychedelics and entactogens 
presented the highest within-group semantic similarity when considered together, 
but their differentiation was difficult. Figure 8B presents the average semantic 
similarity values for each substance category, and also includes the semantic 
similarity with NDE reports. It is evident upon direct visual inspection that NDE 
reports show the highest degree of semantic similarity with narratives of 
dissociative drug experiences.  
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Figure 8 – A. Pairwise document semantic similarity matrix obtained after applying LSA to 
the term-document matrix and retaining the 20 largest singular values. B. Matrix containing 
the average similarity values between all documents in each substance class, including the 
similarity with NDE narratives.  
  
 We then computed the semantic similarity between NDE narratives and 
those associated with each single substance. Figure 9 presents a ranking of the 
substances in terms of such similarity. Each circle represents a drug that is color-
coded based on its primary (center) and secondary (border) category. The 
rectangles in the left/right of the figure zoom into the 20 substances whose reports 
present the lowest/highest semantic similarity to NDE narratives. The pie charts 
indicate the proportion of each drug category in the top/bottom ranked 
substances. While the most represented category among the top 20 substances 
was that of serotonergic psychedelics, the dissociative psychedelic ketamine 
presented the highest similarity to NDE reports, followed by S. divinorum, and a 
series of naturally occurring (L. williamsii, 5-MeO-DMT, Psilocybe spp., DMT, iboga, 
ibogaine, ayahuasca, mescaline and E. peruviana), semi-synthetic (LSD) and 
synthetic (5-AcO-DMT, DPT) serotonergic psychedelics. Other dissociatives that 
ranked among the top 20 substances were nitrous oxide, PCP and methoxetamine. 
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The only deliriants were the plants of the Datura genus. Conversely, the 20 
substances with the lowest similarity to NDE narratives only included one 
serotonergic psychedelic (2C-T-21), and neither deliriants nor dissociative 
psychedelic. Most of the substances were either sedatives or stimulants.  
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Figure 9 – Ranking of psychoactive substances in the Erowid corpus in terms of the 
similarity of their reported subjective effects to NDE narratives. The rectangles on the 
left/right zoom into the top 20 lowest/highest ranking substances. The pie charts indicate 
the proportion of each primary category within both rectangles. Substances are 
represented with circles that are color-coded based on their category (the color of the 
center / border corresponds to the primary/secondary category). 
 
 The boxplots in Figure 10A show the average ranking (in terms of semantic 
similarity to NDE narratives) for each substance category. Dissociatives ranked first, 
followed by deliriants and serotonergic psychedelics. Pairwise Wilcoxon signed-
rank tests showed that the mean ranking of dissociative substances was higher 
than that of all other categories except deliriants. All hallucinogens (e.g., 
dissociatives, deliriants and serotonergic psychedelics) presented a higher average 
ranking than sedatives, stimulants and antipsychotics/antidepressants.  
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Figure 10 – A. Average substance ranking per category (in terms of the similarity of the 
reported effects to NDE narratives). Boxplots indicate median   25th and 75th percentiles. 
Lower numbers represent higher semantic similarity (i.e., the highest possible rank is 1, 
corresponding to ketamine). B. Pairwise Wilcoxon signed-rank tests for the difference in the 
semantic similarity to NDE narratives for each pair of drug categories. Black squares indicate 
a significant difference (p<0.05) for the pair of drug categories in the corresponding row 
and column.  
 
4.1.4.2 Lexical and semantic similarities between NDE 
and drug-induced experiences 
 We then investigated the lexical and semantic features that related to the 
similarity between NDEs and reports of drug-induced experiences. We first ranked 
the terms based on their frequency of occurrence (obtained after applying the tf-
idf transform) both in NDE and ketamine reports. We also computed the average 
ranking between both sets of reports, to identify those terms having a high 
prevalence in ketamine and NDE reports. Results are shown in Figure 11. The most 
common terms in both sets of narratives relate to perception (“face”, “vision”, 
“saw”), emotion (“fear”), consciousness and cognition (“reality”, “moment”, 
“universe”, “understand”, “consciousness”, “memory”, “explain”, “learn”), the self 
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and others (“own”, “arm”, “self”, “person”, “human”, “everyone”, “others”) and 
setting (“door”, “floor”, “inside”, “outside”).  
 The comparison of the most frequent terms in both sets of experiences 
suggests shared phenomenological features associated with an altered state of 
perception of the self and the environment, and a departure from the everyday 
contents of conscious mentation. The application of PCA allowed us to classify 
these terms into recurrent topics appearing throughout both corpora. 
 
 
Figure 11 – Lexical similarity between NDE and ketamine reports. The upper panel presents 
the 40 most frequent terms in the NDE narratives, together with a word cloud 
representation (word size was weighted by the normalized ranking). The middle panel 
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presents the same information for narratives of ketamine-induced experiences, while in the 
bottom panel terms are ordered based on the average frequency across both sets of 
narratives.  
 
 Figure 12A shows word clouds representing the first five principal 
components, which cumulatively described more than 60% of the variance in the 
data. The terms were weighted by the absolute value of their coefficients in the 
linear combination required to span each component. The names of the 
components were obtained by selecting words with the lowest semantic distance 
to the 20 most relevant terms in each component (using a trained word2vec model 
available in the Datamuse API, https://www.datamuse.com/). The first five 
principal components were the following: 
1st: “Look/self”, included many of the shared terms between NDE and ketamine 
experiences (Figure 12), relating to perception, consciousness, and setting. 
2nd: “Tone/negative”, placed a greater emphasis on negative bodily sensations 
(i.e., “body load”). 
3rd: “Make/stuff”, included terms related to the preparation of natural materials 
with the purpose of extracting and isolating their psychoactive compounds. 
4rd: “Take/dependency”, included terms clearly related to drug abuse, addiction 
and associated circumstances. 
5th: “Disease/religion”, included terms related to diseases and their medical 
treatment, as well as others related to ceremonies, rituals and “spiritual” healing. 
 
 In Figure 12B we show the projection of each category of drugs into the 
five principal components, as well as the projection of the NDE narratives. The 
radar plots present “fingerprints” consistent with the known subjective and 
Study 5. A large scale study based on the semantic similarity of written reports 
171 
 
physiological effects of the drugs. For instance, serotonergic psychedelics projected 
almost exclusively into the “look/self” component, stimulants projected into the 
“take/dependency”/“tone/negative” components, antipsychotics into the 
“disease/religion”, and deliriants had the largest projections into the “look/self” 
and “make/stuff” components. NDE narratives projected into three different 
components: “look/self”, “disease/religion” and “make/stuff”.  
 To visualize the relationship between the semantic similarity of NDEs and 
the narratives associated with specific psychoactive substances, we superimposed 
the radar plots in Figure 12C. This comparison was done for the projections of NDEs 
vs. ketamine, DMT, cocaine and heroin reports. For the first two substances, the 
similarity with the NDE semantic “fingerprint” is apparent upon direct inspection, 
while for the other two substances obvious differences are manifest, mainly 
involving their projections into the “take/dependency” component. 
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Figure 12 – A. Five first principal components, ordered by decreasing explained variance. B. 
Radar plots showing the projections of the narratives (per substance category and NDEs) 
into each of the five principal components. C. Radar plots showing the comparison between 
the projections of NDE narratives into the five principal components and those of ketamine, 
DMT, heroin and cocaine narratives. 
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4.1.4.3 Robustness vs. number of singular values 
retained 
 The SVDs performed in the previous sections retained the 20 largest 
singular values. In Figure 13A we show the correlation coefficient matrix for pairs 
of vectors that contain the rankings of the 165 psychoactive substances obtained 
using a number of singular values ranging from 5 to 145. We observe that modest 
to high correlations appeared near the diagonal of the matrix, indicating that small 
changes in the number of retained singular values did not dramatically alter the 
ranking of the substances. The correlations became more stable as the number of 
singular values was increased. We also note that two ranking vectors computed 
using a very different number of singular values (e.g., 20 vs. 100) compare poorly. 
In Figure 13B we investigate the robustness of substance category ranking vs. 
number of retained singular values. We observe that consistent results emerged for 
the highest ranked substances. In other words, while changing the number of 
singular values influenced the ranking of substances whose reports did not present 
a high semantic similarity to NDE narratives, those substances with a high semantic 
similarity to NDE narratives remained relatively stable. When computing the mean 
similarity across all choices of the number of retained singular values (Figure 13C), 
ketamine emerged again as the substance whose reports presented the highest 
semantic similarity to those of NDE, followed by a series of substances whose 
ordering is similar to that of Figure 9. From retaining 5–145 singular values, 
ketamine ranked first in most instances, followed by LSD, ibogaine, L. williamsii and 
PCP (Figure 13D). 
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Figure 13 – Robustness vs. the number of singular values. A. Correlation matrix between the 
vectors that contain the rankings of the 165 substances (in terms of the similarity of their 
associated reports to those of NDE narratives), when computed using different numbers of 
retained singular values (from 5 to 145 singular values). B. Semantic similarity to NDE 
narratives as a function of the number of retained singular values, color-coded by the 
category of the drug in each ranking position. Substances with lower rankings were not 
stable against changes of this parameter, while the top ranked substances remained 
relatively stable. C. Substances ranked by their mean semantic similarity to NDE narratives 
(computed across all choices of the number of retained singular values, from 5 to 145). D. 
Pie chart showing the proportion of instances in which a substance ranked first (among all 
choices of the number of retained singular values).   
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4.1.4.4 Relationship between semantic similarity and 
NDE metadata 
 We understand as “NDE metadata” all the information that is not 
contained in the NDE narratives themselves, but informs on the surrounding 
circumstances and demographics. In Figure 14A, we show the mean rating (in 
terms of NDE narrative semantic similarity) for each drug category, when 
comparing to NDEs associated with loss of consciousness due to head injury, 
anesthesia/drug use, and cardiac arrest. The mean ranking vs. drug category 
remained stable across conditions, and resembled that of Figure 10A. A similar 
result is shown in Figure 14B (proximity to death) and Figure 14C (emotional 
valence of the experience). As shown in the pie charts, ketamine emerged in almost 
all cases as the drug whose reports presented the highest semantic similarity to 
NDE narratives. The only exception was the comparison with NDEs associated with 
loss of consciousness induced by cardiac arrest, for which LSD ranked comparably 
to ketamine. Statistical analyses (one-way ANOVA) did not detect a significant 
effect of the NDE metadata on the drug ranking.  
   
 
Figure 14 – Similarity between 
narratives associated with substance 
use and NDEs of different cause, 
proximity to death and emotional 
valence. A. Semantic similarity between 
drug category and NDEs associated to 
loss of consciousness due to head injury, 
anesthetic agents/other drugs, and 
cardiac arrest. The rows of the matrices 
indicate the number of singular values 
retained in the SVD decomposition for 
LSA, and the columns indicate the drug 
category (color-coded as in Figures 9 
and 10). The sub-panels include the 
average ranking per substance category, 
as well as pie charts showing the 
proportion of times that the reports of a 
given substance presented the highest 
similarity to those of NDE narratives. B. 
Same information as in panel A, but for 
NDEs separated by the proximity to 
death (not serious, serious and loss of 
vital signs). C. Same information as in 
panels A and B, but for NDEs separated 
by the emotional valence attributed by 
the experiencers (pleasant, neutral, 
unpleasant). 
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4.1.4.5 Replication of results with additional censored 
terms  
 To evaluate whether our main results depended on the presence of the 
contextual information in the “make/stuff” and “take/ dependency” components, 
we repeated the analysis after censoring the top 500 most relevant terms of each 
component. After applying LSA (retaining the highest 20 singular values), the top 
ten drugs in terms of the semantic similarity of their written reports to those of 
NDEs were the following: ketamine, ayahuasca, S. divinorum, L. williamsii, 5-MeO-
DMT, LSD, Cannabis, Psilocybin mushrooms, iboga, nitrous oxide. Conversely, the 
ten least similar were: betel nut, atomoxetine, IAP, triazolam, yohimbe, passion 
flower, 2C-T-21, etizolam, olanzapine, 2C-T-4. 
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4.1.5 Discussion 
 Even disregarding processes at the sub-cellular scale and characterizing the 
≈1011 neurons as “on/off” binary units, the number of potential physical states of 
the brain is astonishing. Such complexity is required to support the highly 
differentiated nature of consciousness (Tononi, 2012; Tononi & Edelman, 1998). 
Given the diversity in the potential contents of human experience, it is remarkable 
that those contents can be organized into qualitatively different global states of 
consciousness. Even more remarkable is that analogies can be made between a 
finite set of “altered states”, whose underlying neurophysiological correlates are 
seemingly unrelated. Especially interesting are the comparisons between 
pharmacological and physiological or spontaneously occurring altered states of 
consciousness, since such comparisons could inform the development of 
neurochemical models for the latter (Luke, 2008; Strassman, 2001).  
 We addressed the long-standing analogy between the experience of dying 
and the acute effects of certain psychoactive drugs. Links between dying, death, a 
potential existence of afterlife and certain hallucinogenic plants and fungi emerged 
independently across different societies, and are also ubiquitous in contemporary 
psychedelic culture. However, scarce empirical research has been conducted to 
clarify the nature of this relationship. Unlike other human experiences, dying is 
difficult to study under controlled laboratory conditions by means of repeated 
measurements, which is a necessary condition to demonstrate within- and 
between individual robustness, and to determine a core set of phenomenological 
features. Lacking a precise definition, the association between pharmacologically 
altered states of consciousness and “dying” could represent the cultural 
propagation of an originally arbitrary association (i.e., “meme”) (Dawkins, 2016). 
 The systematic study of reports of individuals who survived close brushes 
with death suggests an alternative hypothesis. NDEs present a common core of 
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robust and reproducible phenomenological features with relatively minor 
variations in terms of cultural background (Belanti et al., 2008), even though 
certain features (e.g., life review and tunnel sensations) were shown to depend on 
religious beliefs (Kellehear, 1993), and the robustness of NDEs does not necessarily 
imply a consistent temporal ordering of the defining phenomenological features 
(Martial, Cassol, Antonopoulos, et al., 2017) – although previous works have 
revealed certain consistencies across cultural backgrounds (Athappilly, Greyson, & 
Stevenson, 2006) and in terms of temporal ordering (Lange et al., 2004).  
 This body of empirical evidence supports that near-death is by itself an 
altered state of consciousness that can be investigated using quantitative 
psychometric scales (Greyson, 1983). Two studies followed this approach and 
compared experiences induced by ketamine (Corazza & Schifano, 2010) and DMT 
(Timmermann et al., 2018) to NDE phenomenology, the latter having the merit of 
assessing DMT phenomenology under controlled experimental conditions including 
a placebo. These studies support a significant overlap between both altered states 
of consciousness, yet a comparison including a wider range of substances is needed 
to systematically evaluate how such overlap depends on the pharmacological 
mechanism of action of different drugs, as well as on the neurophysiological 
changes elicited by them. The use of free narratives of drug-induced experiences 
presents many limitations (see below for a discussion), but nevertheless allows a 
comparison that is massive both in terms of the investigated drugs and the number 
of associated reports.  
 The comparison between NDEs and drug-induced experiences associated 
with an ample range of mechanisms of action offers the possibility of indirectly 
evaluating neurochemical models of NDEs. Strassman developed a parsimonious 
model for NDEs suggesting a relationship with DMT, a serotonergic psychedelic 
whose presence is demonstrated in human cerebrospinal fluid (Barker, McIlhenny, 
& Strassman, 2012; Strassman, 2001). The author further hypothesized that DMT 
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production primarily occurs in the pineal gland, given its unique location outside 
the blood-brain barrier and high concentrations of both serotonin and 
methyltransferase enzymes (Barker, Borjigin, Lomnicka, & Strassman, 2013), which 
are required for in vivo conversion of tryptamine to DMT. However, postmortem 
attempts to isolate DMT from pineal glands were unsuccessful (Strassman, 2001). 
Regardless of these considerations, both our analysis and the recent work by 
Timmermann and colleagues (2018) established that DMT-induced experiences 
present a substantial overlap with NDEs, with especially strong associations 
between DMT-induced near-death type experiences and mystical-type experiences, 
and the feelings of “ego-dissolution”, “unitive experience” and “oceanic feeling”. 
This study also established associations between NDE-like DMT experiences and 
certain personality traits (this association with personality traits is also known in 
other types of NDE-like); in agreement with the observation that both NDEs and 
psychedelic experiences are highly dependent on contextual factors (Greyson, 
1993; Nichols, 2016). Our study established the similarity of both experiences by 
means of free narratives. The application of dimensionality reduction techniques 
(PCA) revealed discrete components with similar ratings between DMT experiences 
and NDEs, especially in components related to alterations in conscious perception 
of the environment and the self (“look/self”) and therapeutic, mystical and spiritual 
aspects of the experience (“disease/religion”). These results are consistent with the 
use of psychometric scales by Timmermann et al. (2018). We must note, however, 
that it has not been established that the numerical ratings extracted from free 
narratives are equivalent to those obtained using psychometric scales– even 
though preliminary analyses have been conducted for the NDE Scale (Lange et al., 
2015). Importantly, our analysis revealed that such commonalities were not specific 
to DMT experiences, but common to other serotonergic psychedelics as well. 
Among the top 20 substances eliciting experiences most similar to NDEs, more than 
50% of them were serotonergic psychedelics, including L. williamsii, LSD, 5-MeO-
DMT and mushrooms of the Psilocybe genus, all of them ranking higher than DMT. 
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 A possible biological role for the release of endogenous DMT at times of 
stress is related to its neuroprotective effects, in particular, the prevention of cell 
death due to hypoxia and oxidative stress mediated via σ1 receptor agonism 
(Frecska, Szabo, Winkelman, Luna, & McKenna, 2013; Szabo et al., 2016). These 
effects remain to be demonstrated in humans; furthermore, Nichols has argued 
that endogenous DMT production could not reach concentrations sufficiently high 
to elicit any noticeable changes in subjective experience (Nichols, 2018). Our 
analysis revealed that ketamine, a synthetic arylcyclohexalamine dissociative 
anesthetic, was associated with narratives most similar to those of NDEs, 
regardless of the circumstances surrounding the NDEs, the actual proximity to 
death and the emotional valence assigned by the experiencers. Ketamine acts by 
antagonism at the PCP site of glutamate NMDA receptors. Such antagonism has 
been shown to prevent cell death due to the excitotoxicity caused by hypoxia 
(Church, Zeman, & Lodge, 1988; Rothman & Olney, 1986). Many studies and clinical 
trials have established that ketamine shows neuroprotective and 
neuroregenerative effects in humans, even when administered after onset of 
cerebral insult, improving the clinical outcomes related to stroke, brain injury and 
status epilepticus (Church et al., 1988; Fujikawa, 1995). This led Grinspoon and 
Bakalar (Grinspoon & Bakalar, 1997) and subsequently Jansen (Jansen, 1989; 
Jansen, 1997a, 1997b) to suggest that an endogenous ketamine-like compound is 
released at times of stress and is responsible for the remarkable similarities 
between ketamine-induced experiences and NDEs. Candidate endogenous agents 
(“endopsychosins”) (Jansen, 1990) have been found in animal tissues, but are likely 
complex neuropeptides and their molecular structure remains to be determined 
(DiMaggio, Contreras, Quirion, & O’Donohue, 1986). Other substances suggested as 
endogenous neuroprotective NMDA antagonists are N-acetylaspartyl-glutamate, 
kynurenic acid and agmatine (Luke, 2008). The role of glutamate in NDEs is further 
supported by shared similarity with certain types of epilepsy associated with 
massive glutamate release (Laureys, Gosseries, & Tononi, 2016; Morse et al., 1989).  
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 The hypothesis of DMT and endogenous NMDA antagonists as the sole 
causes of NDEs has received extensive criticism, both in terms of the associated 
phenomenology and neurobiological plausibility. NDEs can occur in situations in 
which the threat is only apparent or even absent (e.g., NDE-like phenomenology 
during hypnagogic or meditative states) and brain cells are not under direct stress 
(Fenwick, 1997); however, Jansen did not rule out the possibility of an anticipatory 
NDMA receptor blockade, stating that “there is no reason to suspect that the NDE 
mechanism would never be activated spontaneously” (Jansen, 1997a, 1997b) – 
indeed, our analyses ranked ketamine-experiences as the most similar to NDEs 
regardless of the proximity of death (Figure 14B). Furthermore, OBEs are one of the 
most salient features of ketamine experiences (Wilkins, Girard, & Cheyne, 2011), 
which Grinspoon and Bakalar described as “… becoming a disembodied mind or 
soul, dying and going to another world. Childhood events may also be re-lived. The 
loss of contact with ordinary reality and the sense of participation in another reality 
are more pronounced and less easily resisted than is usually the case with LSD. The 
dissociative experiences often seem so genuine that users are not sure that they 
have not actually left their bodies” (Grinspoon & Bakalar, 1997). It has been shown 
that OBEs are frequent in NDEs associated with cardiac arrest (French, 2005), as 
well as in other kinds of NDEs (Charland-Verville et al., 2014), supporting a link to 
NMDA receptor blockade via an endogenous ketaminelike compound. 
 Differences in NDE and ketamine-induced phenomenology have been 
noted, especially between the generally blissful nature of NDEs and the potential 
occurrence of ketamine “bad trips” (Fenwick, 1997). This objection can be 
countered by noting that the blissful nature of NDEs may have been overestimated 
(Greyson & Bush, 1992), that contextual factors (“set and setting”) play an 
important role in the emotional valence of NDEs and ketamine experiences 
(Greyson, 1993; Grinspoon & Bakalar, 1997) and finally noting that the subjective 
effects elicited by an endogenous NMDA antagonist do not need to exactly match 
those of ketamine (unless that antagonist is ketamine itself). In support of the 
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ketamine model, it has been argued that subjects who experienced both NDEs and 
ketamine report a remarkable similarity between both experiences (Jansen, 1997a, 
1997b). Criticism to the ketamine model is based on the observation that not all 
individuals in the proximity of death actually report an NDE (Sleutjes et al., 2014); 
however, a similar percentage of the population is unable to recall their ketamine 
experiences (Jansen, 1997a, 1997b). Conversely, neurochemical models based on 
other serotonergic psychedelics received criticism due to the divergence between 
typical psychedelic imagery and the hallucinatory content present during NDEs. 
Nevertheless, DMT is known to produce more immersive experiences with intense 
imagery that can include tunnel-like visions and encounters with seemingly 
autonomous “entities” (Strassman, 2001; Strassman, Qualls, Uhlenhuth, & Kellner, 
1994). The strong association between ketamine and OBEs is shared with NDEs, but 
is less manifest in the case of serotonergic psychedelics, including DMT (Wilkins et 
al., 2011).  
 Our analysis included reports from a large number of substances and thus 
allowed the exploration of drugs whose phenomenology is not commonly 
associated with that of NDEs. While on average the phenomenology of substances 
classified as dissociatives was the most similar to NDEs (with significantly higher 
similarity than that of serotonergic psychedelics), reports associated with the use 
of deliriants also presented a high semantic similarity to NDE narratives. These 
comprise plants of the Datura and Brugmansia genera, which are rich in alkaloids of 
anticholinergic effect known to induce complex and interactive hallucinations, a 
general state of confusion and anterograde amnesia (El-Dabbas & Evans, 1982; 
Iglesias-Lepine, Mariñosa, Ferrer-Da Pena, & Epelde, 2012). Drug users frequently 
lack the insight to identify the imagery as hallucinatory. Analogously, individuals 
who report NDE are also known to believe in the reality (i.e., corresponding to 
appropriate real external stimuli) of the experienced events (Schwaninger et al., 
2002) due to the experienced clear sensorium. However, since the tropane 
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alkaloids present in these plants are toxic, it is possible that the semantic similarity 
was driven by descriptions of real life-threatening situations.  
 Similar considerations may apply to Salvia divinorum, a very potent 
hallucinogen that is considered safe, but is known to be occasionally smoked by 
users who believe are consuming cannabis (Vohra, Seefeld, Cantrell, & Clark, 2011). 
This plant contains salvinorin A, a highly selective and potent agonist of the κ opioid 
receptor (Chavkin et al., 2004) capable of producing intense visual, auditory, 
somatic and vestibular distortions (Addy, Garcia-Romeu, Metzger, & Wade, 2015; 
Sumnall, Measham, Brandt, & Cole, 2011). The intensity of the experience elicited 
by this drug relative to cannabis may represent a shock to unsuspecting users, who 
could retrospectively report the belief of being close to death. Nevertheless, it is 
interesting to note that opiate antagonists (which block the subjective effects of 
salvinorin A) (Sheffler & Roth, 2003) such as naloxone can increase survival time in 
fatal or near-fatal circumstances (Holaday & Faden, 1978), leading to the 
hypothesis that certain endorphins (mainly betaendorphin, known to increase in 
concentration of bodily fluids of dogs moments before their death) (Sotelo, Perez, 
Cuevara, & Fernandez, 1995) can mediate NDE-like phenomenology (Carr & 
Prendergast, 1981). However, beta endorphins present high selectivity for μ opioid 
receptors, whose activation, unlike κ receptors, is implicated in processes such as 
analgesia, sedation and euphoria, but not in the production of hallucinations (Loh, 
Tseng, Wei, & Li, 1976). Certain endorphins (e.g., dynorphin) bind preferentially to 
κ receptors (Chavkin, James, & Goldstein, 1982), but there are no experimental 
results that link them directly to NDEs. The endorphin model of NDEs also presents 
limitations stemming from the fact that agonism at opioid receptors can produce 
effects that do not resemble the phenomenological features of NDEs (Sivanesan, 
Gitlin, & Candiotti, 2017).  
 It is interesting to note that the PCA decomposition of the narratives 
yielded similar “fingerprints” for DMT, ketamine and NDEs (Figure 12), in contrast 
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to other two control substances (cocaine and heroin). This was mainly due to the 
fact that these two hallucinogens presented a relative high projection into the 
“look/self” and “disease/religion” components. The first likely reflects the 
departure from ordinary conscious perception characteristic of these drugs and 
NDEs (also manifest in the lexical analysis presented in Figure 11). With respect to 
the “disease/religion” component, both ketamine and DMT (as part of the 
Amazonian concoction ayahuasca) have been explored for therapeutic uses, 
especially for the treatment of major depression (e.g., Kyzar et al., 2017). The 
presence of words related to spiritual and religious contexts suggests that the 
potential therapeutic benefits of these substances appear intertwined with 
ceremonial use in the Erowid corpus (Dakwar et al., 2018; Niciu et al., 2018). This 
suggestion is supported by the evidence that dissociative NDEs at the time of 
trauma may provide some therapeutic benefit in reducing the risk of full-blown 
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD; Greyson, 2001). NDEs are known to produce 
long-lasting effects, some of which are deemed positive by the experiencers, such 
as changes in their personal understanding of life, self, and personal relations, 
modifications in their social customs as well as in their religious or spiritual beliefs 
and their interest in material possessions and social status (e.g., Bianco et al., 2017; 
Kellehear, 1990; Parnia et al., 2007). Increased psychological well-being and self-
worth have been linked to NDEs (Noyes, 1980). It is interesting to note that 
psychedelics were shown to induce similar long-term effects (Forstmann & 
Sagioglou, 2017; Gasser, Kirchner, & Passie, 2015; Griffiths et al., 2016; Grob et al., 
2011). These commonalities lend support to Kenneth Ring’s early speculation on 
the “universality” of transcendental experiences: “The authenticity of a 
transcendental experience is revealed by its transformative effects (…). My reading 
of the evidence suggests that whether the trigger be a spontaneous mystical 
experience, a psychedelic episode, or an NDE, once this core is activated, it begins 
to unfold and bring about transformation in much the same way, as if an archetype 
of transformation were engaged” (Ring, 1988). However, it must also be noted that 
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both psychedelics and NDEs can be distressing experiences with negative sequelae. 
The changes in personal beliefs can be sudden and disorienting, and feelings of 
anger, depression and estrangement from family and friends have been reported 
(Duffy & Olson, 2007; Greyson, 1997). There have also been symptoms of PTSD 
associated with NDEs, even though avoidance symptoms are less prevalent, leading 
to the suggestion that the positive affect linked to NDE-dissociative episodes 
mitigate PTSD symptoms that frequently arise from other dissociative experiences 
(Greyson, 2001). Overall, it is clear that both NDEs and certain hallucinogenic drugs 
with similar phenomenology, such as ketamine and serotonergic psychedelics, can 
induce long-lasting effects on personality and well-being, but further research is 
needed to precisely determine the nature of these effects and their prevalence. 
Finally, NDE reports also presented a significant projection into the “make/stuff” 
component, likely representing contextual information and the description of 
activities not directly related to the NDEs. Nevertheless, the similarity with the 
reports of ketamine-induced experiences remained the highest even after 
censoring the 500 most relevant terms of the “make/stuff” and “take/dependency” 
components.  
 Neurochemical models of NDEs can be theoretically attractive; however, 
we must emphasize that the analyses conducted in the present work neither 
validate nor refute these models, since they are based on retrospective reports and 
no physical examinations of the subjects at the time of the reported NDEs were 
performed. Regardless of the validity of different neurochemical models of NDEs, a 
very interesting question was posed by R. Strassman: “if so, so what?” (Strassman, 
1997). In other words: even if the validity of one of these models is confirmed, why 
is neuroprotection linked to substances such as ketamine-like compounds and/or 
DMT, which are also known to elicit an altered state of consciousness frequently 
characterized by feelings of bliss and transcendence? Why is neuroprotection by 
endogenous substances not associated with unconsciousness, or with feelings of 
distress and aversion? It has been shown that decreased fear of death can be a 
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long-term consequence of NDEs (Greyson, 2007); thus, NDEs seemingly lack 
adaptive value. However, this conclusion relies on the assumption that decreased 
fear of death leads to less caution or increased risk-taking behavior. Also, it could 
be argued that elderly individuals are more likely to experience health problems 
leading to NDEs, and that feelings of aversion towards death could result in the 
prolonged competition for resources with individuals who have more potential to 
reproduce. Furthermore, NDE-dissociative episodes might mitigate PTSD symptoms 
linked to other dissociative experiences (Greyson, 2001) and NDE experiencers 
seem to endorse more anti-suicidal attitudes as compared to non-NDE 
experiencers who have come close to death (Greyson, 1993), thus adding support 
to the potential adaptive value of these experiences. In any case, drugs that mimic 
NDE phenomenology might also reduce death-related anxiety, suggesting a 
potential therapeutic use for the terminally ill. Evidence exists that certain drugs 
whose reported subjective effects present a high semantic similarity to NDE reports 
can alleviate end-of-life anxiety in patients with advanced stage cancer, i.e., 
psilocybin, LSD and ketamine (Griffiths et al., 2016; Grob et al., 2011; Kolp et al., 
2007).  
 Given the nature of our analyses, our discussion is biased towards the 
discussion of neurochemical models of NDEs. However, unless direct empirical 
evidence is obtained, we can only affirm that the reported phenomenology of 
certain drugs is similar to that of NDEs, and that those drugs could be effective 
tools for the safe and temporary induction of NDE-like altered states of 
consciousness in controlled laboratory settings. It is nevertheless certain that these 
laboratory-induced NDEs may be a mere “reflection” of “authentic” NDEs. Like all 
models, those based on the effects of psychoactive drugs present limitations. For 
instance, certain effects of subanaesthetic doses of ketamine are not among the 
features that characterize NDEs, arguing against the reductionist explanation of 
NDEs as a consequence of NMDA receptor blockade (Adler et al., 1999; Dillon, 
Copeland, & Jansen, 2003). Other models have been proposed that are not directly 
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related to endogenous psychoactive compounds, but to alterations in neural 
activity in certain brain areas, primarily in temporal lobe regions (Britton & Bootzin, 
2004; Saavedra-Aguilar & Gomez-Jeria, 1989). Multifactorial explanations for NDE 
phenomenology have also been proposed. Mobs and Watt argued that each 
“classic” feature of this phenomenology can be explained via a different 
mechanism, e.g., awareness of being dead as a form of Cottard syndrome, OBEs as 
a failure to integrate multisensory information, the perception of a tunnel of light 
as a consequence of retinal ischemia, etc. (Mobbs & Watt, 2011). However, it has 
been pointed out by Greyson and colleagues that this article only accounted for 
those features that could be explained by the authors, while ignoring other 
features that are regarded as the most defining for NDEs (Greyson, Holden, & van 
Lommel, 2012). Furthermore, these alternative models must also be understood as 
speculative, given the lack of experiments performed at time of reported near 
death. Few experiments have investigated the neurophysiological changes 
associated with the ceasing of vital functions. Most strikingly, a surge of coherent 
high frequency (gamma,>25 Hz) oscillations preceding isoelectric activity has been 
demonstrated both in humans and animal models (Borjigin et al., 2013; Chawla et 
al., 2017). However, Greyson and colleagues provided a series of arguments against 
the interpretation of these short surges of “hyperactivity” as neural correlates of 
NDEs (Greyson, Kelly, & Dunseath, 2013). It is nevertheless important to note that 
serotonergic psychedelics such as LSD and psilocybin result in broadband 
reductions of brain oscillations (Carhart-Harris et al., 2016; Muthukumaraswamy et 
al., 2013), while ketamine enhances gamma oscillations in parietal and cingulate 
cortices and medial frontal theta oscillations, and decreases occipital, parietal and 
anterior cingulate alpha power (Lazarewicz et al., 2010; Muthukumaraswamy et al., 
2015). While these results suggest commonalities (alpha power decreases) and 
divergences (gamma power increases) between the spectral changes elicited by 
ketamine and serotonergic psychedelics, muscle artifacts are known to heavily 
affect high frequency bands under the effects of the latter (Muthukumaraswamy et 
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al., 2013), and increased gamma oscillations have been reported for ayahuasca and 
LSD (Muthukumaraswamy & Liley, 2018; Sattar et al., 2018; Schenberg et al., 2015). 
It is therefore difficult to compare the spectral changes elicited by serotonergic 
psychedelics and ketamine, and those recorded during the cease of vital functions.  
 Our study presents both advantages and limitations stemming from the use 
of a large number of retrospective narratives. In both cases, these narratives rely 
on the memory of the event. The time between the occurrence of the NDEs and 
participation in the study averages approximately two decades (Greyson, 2007). 
Reports of subjective effects from Erowid Experience Vaults are likely closer to the 
time of substance use, but present several limitations of their own. While 
substantial relevant data was available for the participants of the NDE study, 
demographical information is not commonly available for Erowid users. Reports 
could be contaminated by expectation effects, and most lack laboratory verification 
of the identity and dose of the consumed substances, which may be even unknown 
to the users reporting the experiences. Dose could bias the results if subjects 
consumed higher doses of ketamine compared to those of serotonergic 
psychedelics such as LSD and psilocybin, resulting in dissociation and feelings of 
disembodiment only for the latter. However, DMT is known to produce these 
effects at relatively low doses when smoked or administered intravenously 
(Strassman et al., 1994; Winstock, Kaar, & Borschmann, 2014), and ketamine 
reports still presented a higher semantic similarity to those of NDEs than the DMT 
reports. Another limitation is the relative cultural homogeneity of the population. 
However, currently no other sources of data exist that include a large number of 
reports for an equally large number of substances.  
 In conclusion, we have systematically compared the semantic similarity of 
reports associated with the use of psychoactive compounds and NDE narratives, 
and found evidence that ketamine (and to a lesser extent different serotonergic 
psychedelics and deliriant alkaloids) can produce an altered state of consciousness 
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resembling near-death. With the available experimental data, it is neither possible 
to corroborate nor refute the hypothesis that the release of an endogenous 
ketamine-like neuroprotective agent underlies NDE phenomenology. However, our 
results do provide evidence that ketamine, as well as other psychoactive 
substances, result in a state phenomenologically similar to that of “dying” 
(understood as the content of NDE narratives). This could have important 
implications for the pharmacological induction of NDE-like states for scientific 
purposes, as well as for therapeutic uses in the terminally ill as means to alleviate 
death anxiety. We believe that the development of evidence-based treatments for 
such anxiety is a cornerstone of a more compassionate approach towards the 
universal experience of transitioning between life and death. 
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 The present thesis revolves around three main axes: i) to contribute to a 
better characterization of the phenomenology of NDEs (study 1 and study 2); ii) to 
investigate the type of autobiographical memory they could be associated to (study 3 
and study 4); and iii) to explore potential neurochemical models of NDEs (study 5). 
 Given the augmenting number of NDE testimonies and the impact of these 
experiences on peoples' lives (van Lommel et al., 2001), it appeared crucial to reach a 
better description of the phenomenon. The content of NDEs has been the focus of 
numerous studies at the very dawn of NDE research. Since then, the phenomenon 
came out of the taboo atmosphere, leading to an increasing amount of testimonies 
worldwide. This craze resulted in a growing body of descriptions that differed from 
the initial prototypical NDE (i.e., Moody's core experience; 1975) which undeniably 
called for new rigorous studies aiming at extracting the main NDE features.    
 In study 1, henceforth, we used a qualitative thematic analysis to detail the 
rich phenomenology of these experiences in a sample of cardiac arrest survivors. In 
order to provide new insights, “blind” experts in thematic analysis went through tens 
of written narratives. Experts were blinded to etiology and were naïve to the field of 
NDEs. Obviously, NDEs are regularly discussed in the lay literature and the experts 
may not have been strictly blinded, however, we wanted to enhance methodological 
rigor and reduce measurement biases by limiting any substantial influence of existing 
literature and preconceived notions on the processing of the narratives. For example, 
researchers' knowledge of existing quantitative scales (e.g., Greyson NDE scale; 
Greyson, 1983) could have had an incidence when extracting the main themes. In 
total, we extracted 11 themes: one “transversal” and ten “time-bounded” themes. 
The “altered time perception” emerged as the only transversal theme. This theme 
shapes the whole experience and cannot clearly be isolated from the other NDE 
characteristics. Unlike the ten other features, it does not correspond to a limited 
moment of the event. Additionally, analysis pointed out that it is generally addressed 
retrospectively by NDE experiencers, while they are engaged in reflections about the 
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event. In contrast, “time-bounded” themes have more limited time duration and are 
generally described as clear isolated events. The identified time-bounded themes 
were the following: “light”, “return”, “meeting/encounter”, “hyperlucidity”, 
“description of scenes”, “darkness”, “OBE”, “awareness of death”, “life events” and 
“entrance in the NDE”.  
 The major benefit of this approach is that, contrary to closed questionnaires, 
it brings information about the combination of features and further provides a 
broader overview about the spontaneous description of such ineffable experiences. 
What particularly drew our attention is that the “feeling of peacefulness” and “joy” 
have not been identified as full-fledged themes. By highlighting this, we do not deny 
that a majority of NDEs is positively perceived (which makes them undeniably unique 
given their context of occurrence –i.e., the life-threatening situation—), but we rather 
emphasize that a heterogeneous range of emotions seem to be associated with them. 
As underlined by the text analysis, “light”, “hyperlucidity”, and “awareness of death” 
are generally linked to positive emotions such as well-being, happiness, serenity and 
amazement. On the contrary, “OBEs”, “meeting”, “darkness”, “life events”, 
“description of scenes” and “return” are related to conflicting emotions, ranging from 
well-being or amazement to confusion, unbearable sadness, fear or pain. Finally, 
“entering the NDE” and “altered time perception” are less frequently associated with 
emotional qualifiers. Given the existence of distressing feelings in detailed written 
accounts, it is unfortunate that negative emotions are overlooked by presently 
available tools designed to identify NDEs (e.g., Greyson, 1983; Ring, 1980).   
 These contrasting emotions and the non-identification of positive feelings as 
full-fledged themes stroked our curiosity and brought us to dig deeper into the 
phenomenon of distressing NDEs. Conclusions about these frightening events were 
inescapable: hard facts about them are scarcely available and recent data inexistent. 
Consequently, study 2 was conceptualized in response to this lack of empirical 
evidence. Several interesting results came out from our analyses. First, distressing 
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NDEs represented 14% of our NDE sample, while previous studies rather reported 
percentages ranging from 1% to 10% (e.g., Charland-Verville et al., 2014; Greyson & 
Bush, 1992). Second, we confirmed Greyson and Bush’s (1992) classification 
consisting of inverse, void and hellish frightening NDEs, and we identified an equal 
number of inverse and hellish NDE narratives as well as one void experience. Third, 
distressing and classical NDEs only differed on the affective component of the 
Greyson NDE scale, suggesting that negative experiences include as much 
transcendental, paranormal and cognitive elements as classical ones. Interestingly, 
some distressing accounts began with feelings of peacefulness and could therefore be 
misinterpreted as predominantly positive on the unique basis of existing scales. 
Fourth, distressing NDE memories appeared to be as phenomenologically detailed as 
classical ones (i.e., similar memory clarity, amount of sensory, self-referential, 
emotional and contextual details). Finally, the prevalence of suicidal attempters was 
higher among distressing NDE experiencers. 
 Altogether, results of studies 1 and 2 should draw our attention on three 
main points. First, the greater proportion of suicides in frightening experiences may 
support and reflect the strong implication of “top-down” processes in the emergence 
of the NDE phenomenon. In moments where sensory inputs are missing or degraded 
such as during altered states of consciousness, the content of conscious experiences 
is influenced by previous knowledge, beliefs, state of mind and expectations in order 
to mentally “fill in the gap” (Blackmore, 1996; Martial et al., 2018). Hence, the 
psychological context surrounding suicidal attempts could more easily lead to 
negatively toned experiences. Consistent with this view, studies have for example 
highlighted the culture-related incidence of some NDE features (e.g., tunnel vision; 
Belanti et al., 2008; Kellehear, 1993; Pasricha & Stevenson, 1986), suggesting that the 
religious and cultural backgrounds could also shape NDEs’ content (Blackmore, 1993). 
Even though a core component to NDE may exist (e.g., OBEs, meeting with religious 
figures and the vision of a light seem to be described in different cultures), a cultural 
impact must therefore be considered when interpreting individual accounts. Further 
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studies appear necessary to elucidate the influence of experiencers’ state of mind, 
expectations, culture, religion and society on the content of the NDE phenomena.  
 The second point is that future efforts should also focus on developing and 
validating a new scale to measure NDEs in the future, in order to characterize them in 
the finest possible way. Currently, the only used scales are the Greyson NDE scale 
(Greyson, 1983) and the WCEI (Ring, 1980), both created in the eighties. A new scale 
built upon latest findings and based on robust statistical analyses are needed to 
identify NDEs, especially since current questionnaires only screen positive emotions 
and could not be sufficiently sensitive to detect their negative homologous.  
 The third and last point that we need to address is the overall amount of 
details provided in narratives and the vividness associated with NDE memories, either 
negative or positive. These observations are not unprecedented. Considerable 
research has focused on the phenomenology of these memories (e.g., Martial, 
Charland-Verville, Cassol, et al., 2017; Moore & Greyson, 2017), notably showing that 
they are more likely to display richer perceptual information and more contextual 
details (spatio-temporal information) compared to memories of imagined (e.g., 
fantasies or unfulfilled goals) or even real events (Thonnard et al., 2013). Thus, 
authors concluded that NDE memories could not be considered as typical imagined 
events (Thonnard et al., 2013). The “superiority” of real event memories in 
comparison to imagined ones in terms of phenomenological richness is in fact well 
established. For instance, Johnson and collaborators (1988) demonstrated that real 
events include larger amounts of contextual information like the time and the place 
where the event took place, perceptual details such as colors or sounds, and more 
emotional information. Several studies later corroborated this finding (e.g., Johnson, 
2006; McGinnis & Roberts, 1996; Takahashi & Shimizu, 2007). What remains poorly 
understood, however, is why NDE memories are allegedly more vivid than other 
memories of real event recollections (Thonnard et al., 2013). In their experiment, 
Thonnard et al. (2013) compared NDE memories with an old and a recent real event 
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memory, showing that NDE memories were phenomenologically richer, and 
ultimately concluded that they would be more detailed than real-life event memories. 
Yet, little is known about the type of other real event memories that were selected by 
experiencers in this study. Were these landmark or trivial episodes? In other words, 
are NDE memories really more detailed than any other kind of real event 
recollections? These findings led some authors to formulate different hypotheses 
about the nature of NDE memories: i) Martial and collaborators (2017) suggested that 
they could be considered as “SDMs”; and ii) Thonnard and coworkers (2013) that they 
could meet the definition of “flashbulb memories”. Consequently, we decided to test 
these assumptions by means of two distinct protocols (i.e., the former in study 3 and 
the latter in study 4).  
 In study 3, we investigated the hypothetic self-defining value of NDE 
memories. To do so, NDE and NDE-like experiencers were contacted and asked to 
evoke their two main SDMs. First, results showed that 58% of the entire sample 
recalled the NDE as a SDM, respectively 63% of real NDE experiencers and 48% of 
NDE-like experiencers. This high percentage of NDE-like experiencers strongly 
suggests that the self-defining aspect of the NDE memory could be at least partly 
explained by its content, and not only by the life-threatening context surrounding the 
event. Second, we found a larger proportion of religious (i.e., at the time of the NDE) 
people among experiencers who recalled their NDE, compared to those who did not. 
Thereon, it is reasonable to hypothesize that some aspects of the phenomenon, such 
as the mystical and transcendental compounds (e.g., entering an unearthly world, 
meeting with deceased relatives/religious spirits), might be perceived as more 
meaningful for religious experiencers. Third, when only considering the subsample of 
experiencers who recalled the NDE, we found that NDE memories are rated as being 
more “central” to peoples’ identities and life stories compared to other recalled SDM, 
as measured by the CES (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006). In other words, they can be 
considered as turning points and cornerstones in experiencers’ lives. Finally, we also 
noted that half of the NDE memories did not include “meaning making”, yet this 
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process would be essential to good mental and physical health, especially during 
hardships related to death and loss (Inder et al., 2008; Mackay & Bluck, 2010). 
Interestingly, many theories suggest that PTSD is in fact a disorder in autobiographical 
memory and that the incomplete processing of a traumatic event would largely 
contribute to the further development of PTSD symptoms. In this view, memories of 
traumatic events are poorly integrated in one’s life and fragmented, unlike other 
autobiographical memories (Berntsen & Rubin, 2014). Thereupon, as stated earlier, 
we may hypothesize that atypical experiences of close brushes with death, like NDEs 
and distressing NDEs in particular, may become reference points that could 
potentially lead to deleterious outcomes such as PTSD symptoms if they are not 
adequately processed.  
 From a clinical perspective, study 3 therefore raises awareness on the 
relevance of developing psychological interventions to foster the integration of NDEs 
into experiencers’ life story and identity. On a similar note, effort should be made to 
launch the creation and dissemination of practice guideline recommendations about 
NDEs among medical healthcare professionals. This clinical framework could prevent 
a potential feeling of alienation among all kinds of experiencers by developing a non-
judgmental and psychologically safe environment in which they feel free to share, to 
process and to integrate their experience. Besides, this could reduce caregivers’ 
burden by offering tools and strategies to deal with NDE testimonies.  
 Study 4 was developed concomitantly to address the second hypothesis: can 
recollections of NDEs meet the definition of flashbulb memories? This was done by 
comparing the NDE, a flashbulb and a control autobiographical memory dating from 
the same period. Results first showed that NDE verbal recollections comprised a 
greater amount of episodic information (i.e., event, perceptual and emotional details 
directly related to the main event) than control autobiographical and flashbulb 
memories, as well as more non-episodic (i.e., event details external to the main 
event) information than flashbulb memories. Second, flashbulb memories were 
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associated to a lesser intensity of feelings upon recall and a lower personal 
importance, and are less frequently reactivated and less susceptible to be 
remembered from a first person perspective compared to NDE and control 
autobiographical memories. Lastly, NDE memories were considered more central 
than control autobiographical memories, which in turn are more central than 
flashbulb memories.  
 Altogether, results of study 4 indicate that NDE memories distinguish 
themselves from flashbulb memories in many aspects. NDE recalls were particularly 
rich even though they were generally reported after decades, a factor that is known 
to reduce the detail and vividness of a memory (Talamini & Gorree, 2012). Although 
they contained more episodic details (as measured by the AI protocol; Levine, 
Svoboda, Hay, Winocur, & Moscovitch, 2002) and were considered more central (as 
measured by the CES; Berntsen & Rubin, 2006) than other autobiographical and 
flashbulb memories, they did not always differ from control autobiographical events 
regarding the amount of phenomenological details assessed by the MCQ subscores 
(Johnson et al., 1988). The analysis cannot allow us to clearly state that they are 
phenomenologically similar, however, the comparable scores observed for NDE and 
autobiographical memories may be explained by the fact that the latter were 
sometimes related to the NDE (e.g., memories of their hospitalization) and that some 
of them could also fit the definition of a SDM (i.e., some NDE experiencers recalled 
potential life-changing events such as their child’s birth).  
 In the literature, vividness is often evoked as a central component for 
mentally reliving autobiographical memories (van Schie, Chiu, Rombouts, Heiser, & 
Elzinga, 2019). Previous studies have shown that, at the neural level, more vivid 
memories are associated to an increased activation of specific key regions (van Schie 
et al., 2019): the bilateral hippocampi, which are related to the quality of 
remembering an experience (e.g., Addis, McIntosh, Moscovitch, Crawley, & 
McAndrews, 2004; Burgess, Maguire, & O’Keefe, 2002), the bilateral activation of the 
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amygdala, associated to emotionality (Cabeza & St Jacques, 2007; Geib, Stanley, 
Wing, Laurienti, & Cabeza, 2017) as well as the right anterior and posterior insula 
(Deen, Pitskel, & Pelphrey, 2011), involved in self-awareness (Pais-Vieira, Wing, & 
Cabeza, 2016). The anterior part of the insula is generally associated to the awareness 
of emotionality and saliency of subjective experience, and its posterior part to the 
awareness of body sensations (Craig, 2009, 2011; Simmons et al., 2013). This entire 
activation pattern is indicative of autonoetic consciousness; a sense of recursive and 
introspective mental time travel (e.g., Lehner & D’Argembeau, 2016). Additionally, 
van Schie and coworkers (2019) suggested that vivid memories were associated to 
enhanced mood during recall. Precisely, authors highlighted that vividness had a 
greater impact on affective and neural responses during positive memories compared 
to neutral ones. They suggested that emotional memories may assist pre-reflective 
self-awareness (i.e., a process allowing individuals to perceive themselves as the 
immediate actors of their experience, unextended in time; Gallagher, 2000), which in 
turn would support the feeling of re-experiencing the positive emotions related to the 
event. This enhanced emotionality would be beneficial when purposefully reflecting 
on the self (Dritschel, Beltsos, & Mcclintock, 2014). Even though this greater impact of 
vividness on the mood felt upon recall was shown for positive vs. neutral memories, a 
similar pattern could also be found for negative memories, such as distressing NDEs 
which also display high memory vividness and intensity of feelings while 
remembering. Further studies should determine the process and activation specific to 
more negative events.  
 In the light of the above, it is easier to conceive why NDE memories remain 
highly vivid and detailed despite the passage of years. Characteristics such as their 
high emotionality and their self-defining value (observed in a majority of cases) were 
demonstrated to be critical to memory vividness. Besides, despite the fact that they 
are central first-hand experiences and that they lead to different verbal recollections 
than those of flashbulb events, these two memories share key components such as 
emotionality at the time of the event, novelty (i.e., they are related to unprecedented 
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events) or long-lasting memory traces. In sum, NDE memories could be regarded as a 
particular type of “SDMs with flashbulb-like features”.  
 On the contrary, what study 3 and 4 cannot answer is how people keep such a 
deep trace of an event that typically occurred in the context of a life-threatening 
situation often involving a cardiac arrest (generally associated to amnesia of the 
event; Parnia, Spearpoint, & Fenwick, 2007), and potentially under the influence of 
psychoactive medications, which may alter memory as well (Curran, 2000). It is, 
however, interesting to mention that memory enhancement for emotional memories 
could be linked to the release of adrenal stress hormones such as 
adrenaline/epinephrine and cortisol (LaLumiere, McGaugh, & McIntyre, 2017). In 
their study, Cahill and Alkire (2003) showed that if adrenal stress hormones are 
administered to participants after an encoding phase, memory consolidation will be 
facilitated and recall will consequently be enhanced. Besides, epinephrine is utilized 
during cardiopulmonary resuscitation. Extrapolating from these studies, one could 
assume that encoding and consolidation of the NDE memory after a cardiac arrest 
could be related to the release of specific neurotransmitters such as epinephrine.  
 Nonetheless, we should keep in mind that the exact moment these 
experiences take place remains unknown, and their specific neural correlates have 
not been identified yet. As a matter of fact, classical authentic NDEs are impossible to 
predict, which makes simultaneous high-resolution brain monitoring impractical. To 
sidestep this hurdle, several models have been suggested to approach the NDE 
phenomenon in a safe and reversible manner. Among those, some neurotransmitters 
and drugs were evoked because of their resemblance with the NDE, notably DMT and 
ketamine (e.g., Jansen, 1997b; Timmermann et al., 2018). In order to reach a more 
accurate idea of an adequate drug model for NDEs, we explored the semantic 
similarity between 625 NDE narratives and ≈15 000 reports linked to the use of 165 
psychoactive substances in study 5. Results indicated that the NMDA receptor 
antagonist ketamine corresponds to the reports that are the most similar to those 
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associated with NDEs. Salvia divinorum ranks second and is followed by a series of 
serotonergic psychedelics, notably the endogenous serotonin 2A receptor agonist 
DMT. Similarity between accounts was unsurprisingly influenced by concepts 
associated to consciousness of the self and the environment (i.e., words relating to 
perceptions, senses and/or the setting such as “color”, “visual”, “inside” or 
“universe”), but also by therapeutic, ceremonial and religious aspects. Overall, our 
analysis indicates that ketamine could indeed be used as a safe and reversible 
pharmacological model to study the phenomenology of NDEs. Moreover, results 
suggest that endogenous NMDA antagonists with neuroprotective properties could 
be released during close brushes with death. 
 Along with this pharmacological approach, other physiological models to 
NDEs have also been tested such as vasovagal syncope, which may trigger episodes 
identified as NDEs-like and therefore regrouping several NDE features (i.e., Greyson 
NDE scale scores ≥ 7; Charland-Verville et al., in preparation). Moreover, some specific 
NDE features such as OBEs can be reproduced under IVR (i.e., IVR may be used to 
visually replace the person's real body by a life-size virtual body seen from the first 
person perspective, therefore, when the viewpoint is lifted up, it may result in an 
OBE; Cassol et al., in preparation) or relived by NDE experiencers themselves through 
hypnosis techniques (see the methods reported elsewhere by Faymonville et al., 
2003; Martial, Mensen, et al., 2019). These models offer the opportunity to reproduce 
one or several NDE feature(s) in a controlled laboratory setting while recording the 
brain’s activity and connectivity by means of high-density EEG or functional magnetic 
resonance imaging. Correlating these measures could ultimately bring new insights 
about the neural correlates of such experiences. In addition to these promising 
pharmacological and physiological models, future studies should also consider 
reproducing and expanding results of end-of-life electrical surges (ELES) identified in 
human studies (Chawla et al., 2017, 2009). Chawla and coworkers (2017) have 
demonstrated that these ELES are common among patients who suffer cardiac arrest. 
Interestingly, authors reported that for the subset of ELES that were witnessed by one 
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of the investigators, patients seemed unconscious and were montionless even though 
the neuromonitoring was compatible with an increased level of consciousness. In a 
previous study (Chawla et al., 2009), investigators suggested that the mechanism of 
ELES might be due to neuronal networks that have retained their membrane potential 
when facing a loss of blood flow. In other words, when oxygen levels are depleted, 
neurons may depolarize in a cascade, thereby provoking high frequency EEG signals, 
which could be interpreted as “a last gasp survival mechanism” (Chawla et al., 2017, 
p. 391). Interestingly, other phenomena might provide some mechanistic insights to 
explain the NDE phenomenology during altered states of consciousness. Even though 
this phenomenon is still poorly documented, a hypothesis similar to the “last gasp 
survival mechanism” was evoked to explain episodes of paradoxical lucidity in 
patients suffering from Alzheimer’s disease just before they die, even though they 
present an irreversible degeneration of the cerebral cortex and the hippocampus, 
resulting in severe memory loss (Mashour et al., 2019). Authors have suggested that 
this paradoxical lucidity may be the consequence of synaptic modifications, complex 
adjustments in signaling cascades, neuronal interactions and compensation for 
functional inhibition due to neurotoxic proteins (Mashour et al., 2019; Palop, Chin, & 
Mucke, 2006). Overall, however, more data are needed to establish or refute a link 
with NDEs, and to determine if EEG patterns of ELES are sufficient in strength and 
duration to account for these experiences. 
 Given that we are currently unable to determine when NDEs occur exactly, 
the debate about their underlying processes is still open, and the phenomenon 
therefore still challenges some theories and postulates about consciousness. This is 
evidenced, for example, by the fact that several authors have discussed that these 
experiences are a strong argument in favor of non-local consciousness hypotheses 
which assume that consciousness does not always coincide with the functioning of 
the brain (Parnia, 2007;  van Lommel, 2013). 
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 Even though neurosciences have not yet produced a definitive theory 
supported by empirical data to account for the entire NDE phenomenon, it clearly 
appears that research has made considerable progress in that direction (French, 2009; 
Martial, Cassol, Laureys, & Gosseries, under review). Indeed, we have provided 
several examples that could support a neurophysiological possibility of paradoxically 
rich subjective experiences during altered states of consciousness. Overall, efforts 
should consequently be made to develop and test a model that would include a 
combination of the neurobiological factors potentially involved in the emergence of 
NDE features as illustrated, albeit very schematically, in Figure 15. Lake (2017), for 
example, recently built a multifactorial NDE model according to which highly 
integrated dynamic networks (i.e., “connectomes”) would be triggered by 
psychological and/or physiological factors such as fear, traumas or drug intakes. 
 
 
Figure 15 – Illustration of neurophysiological mechanisms possibly involved in the 
emergence of NDEs (Martial et al., under review). This illustration includes potential causal 
agents of NDEs: (A) physiologic stress comprising altered levels of blood gases, such as 
transient anoxia and hypercarbia (e.g., Klemenc-Ketis et al., 2010; Lempert et al., 1994) and, 
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probably occurring secondarily, B) natural or drug-induced release of endogenous 
neurotransmitters including N-methyl-D-aspartate (NMDA) antagonists and endorphins (e.g., 
Carr & Prendergast, 1981; Jansen, 1991). Both factors may lead to (C) dysfunctions of specific 
brain regions such as the temporal lobe (Blanke, 2005) and the anterior insular cortex (e.g., 
Picard & Kurth, 2014).  
 Given their specific phenomenology and their potentially distinct 
neurophysiologic markers, NDEs could be regarded as a state of consciousness on its 
own. More specifically, these experiences could be regarded as episodes of internal 
awareness (e.g., mental imagery, inner speech, or mind-wandering) while being 
disconnected from the environment (Martial et al., under review; Sanders, Tononi, 
Laureys, & Sleigh, 2012). Thus, they would correspond to a state of “disconnected 
consciousness” with a specific content/phenomenology and their own biological 
fingerprint, thereby being distinct from other episodes of disconnected consciousness 
such as dreams.   
 Before concluding this work, it is important to address limitations that might 
hinder the generalizability of some of our results. First, the scarcity of NDEs did 
influence the recruitment of our participants and sometimes led to relatively small 
sample sizes that might have impacted some of our analyses. We did not perform a 
priori sample size estimation and power analyses; however, we aimed at testing as 
many participants as possible, in an exploratory fashion. We therefore acknowledge 
that some of our analyses might be underpowered, thereby hindering the detection 
of potentially interesting effects. Moreover, our research work being exploratory and 
observational, we sometimes examined large amounts of variables and consequently 
set stringent statistical thresholds. In the future, larger hypothesis-driven studies 
targeting more specific variables of interest are required to confirm some of the 
results and trends yielded by our work.  
 Second, because of these limited sample sizes and experimental constraints, 
there was a participant overlap between some studies (see Table 21). Study 1 and 
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study 2 are retrospective analyses of data collected through calls in the media, 
following which participants completed questionnaires and provided a written 
narrative of their experience. Two NDE experiencers were included in both studies. 
However, the overlap does not imply a reanalysis of the same data since study 1 
explored their written narratives and study 2 their answers to the Greyson NDE scale 
and the MCQ. Study 3 and study 4 were conducted later and included some NDE 
experiencers that had already been involved in the two previous researches. 
Nevertheless, we have no reason to expect that the inclusion of these participants in 
previous studies might have influenced results of study 3 which was a distinct task 
related to the centrality of their NDE as well as the self-defining dimensions of its 
memory. Issues related to the overlap of samples could however arise with regard to 
study 4 which assessed the quantity of episodic and non-episodic details comprised in 
three types of autobiographical memories, including the NDE. Indeed, it could be 
objected that their previous recall may have impacted the number of details provided 
in participants’ verbal recollections, since rehearsal is known to strengthen memory 
trace and consolidation (e.g., Himmer, Schönauer, Heib, Schabus, & Gais, 2019). 
However, we believe that this previous inclusion may only have a limited impact on 
our results given that NDE memories are frequently reactivated and recalled anyhow 
(i.e., see results of the MCQ question 16). Additionally, a majority of NDE experiencers 
described the NDE memory as a SDM, whose particularity is to be frequently brought 
into memory and talked about.  
 Overall, considering the relative scarcity of NDEs and the challenge to recruit 
such experiencers, it is reasonable to say that the studies included in the present 
thesis exhibit relatively limited overlap. 
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Table 21. NDE experiencers overlap between the different studies.   
 Study 1 
Thematic 
analysis 
Study 2 
Distressing 
NDE 
accounts 
Study 3 
NDE vs. 
SDMs 
Study 4 
NDE vs. 
flashbulbs 
Study 5 
Neurochemical 
models 
Study 1 
Thematic 
analysis 
 
n=34 
 
Study 2 
Distressing NDE 
accounts 
 
n=2 
 
n=123 
 
Study 3 
NDE vs. SDMs 
 
n=2 
 
n=14*  
 
 
n=71 
 
Study 4 
NDE vs. 
flashbulbs 
 
n=2 
 
n=7* 
 
 
n=13 
 
n=25 
 
Study 5 
Neurochemical 
models 
 
n=0 
 
n=625 
*the overlap only relates to NDE experiencers who had lived positive NDEs as determined by 
the MCQ.  
To conclude, NDEs are subjective events with a neurophysiological basis that 
have aroused curiosity and led to myths and legends for centuries (Thonnard et al., 
2008). If their underlying neural correlates and states of consciousness have not been 
precisely identified yet, we now know that they may lead to vivid SDMs likely to have 
a significant impact on people’s lives. Consequently, we believe that an even better 
comprehension of the phenomenon would lead to a more appropriate recognition of 
what NDE experiencers have been through and counteract a possible feeling of 
alienation. 
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